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Fish are an extremely important resource worldwide, for nutritional and economic reasons.
However, many fish stocks are being exploited at an ecologically unsustainable level. It is
thus of importance that fisheries’ management strategies can be found which will allow signif-
icant amounts of fishing to occur, while protecting these renewable resources for the future.
In this thesis we are particularly concerned with situations where individual economic inter-
ests and environmental concerns coincide. We use behavioral models of individual fishers to
investigate how individual profit motivation leads to aggregate fishing behavior. These are
coupled with a variety of fish population models, in order to obtain a picture of how this
exploitation impacts the fishery. We pay consideration to the economic value of the fishery,
as well as using population abundance as a proxy for ecological health. This approach is
viewed through the lens of game theory.
In Chapter 2 we consider a dynamic size spectrum PDE model of a single fish popula-
tion, which is supported by a producer spectrum of plankton on which the juvenile fish prey.
This size spectrum model gives the abundance of the fish population by the size of its con-
stituent members, by tracking the transfer of biomass that occurs throughout the population
due to predation, mortality, and reproduction. This size spectrum model is paired with an
individual based model of many fishers exploiting the population in a small scale open ac-
cess fishery. We allow individual agents to change their own size-selectivity behavior, and
to make the choice of whether or not to fish in order to meet profit expectations. We find
that the aggregate size-selective harvesting behavior reaches a Nash equilibrium, in which
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we also observe balanced harvesting of the fish stock. Furthermore, the number of active
agents in the fishery converges over time. Results from this chapter have been submitted for
publication.
In Chapter 3, we consider the classic Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model of a fishery from
a non-cooperative game theory perspective. We frame exploitation as a symmetric 2-player
game in which fishers take action by selecting a harvesting intensity. For a fish population at
equilibrium, we find a level of fishing effort that strictly dominates all other actions, as well
as a Pareto optimal frontier where the total exploitation is equivalent to that of a monop-
olist. Consequently, this game is structurally equivalent to an Iterated Prisoners Dilemma.
We extend our analysis to non-equilibrium populations using numerical simulations, and
evaluate the relative performance of well-known strategies for an IPD (such as tit-for-tat) in
these conditions.
In Chapter 4, we use a Markov decision process framework to find an optimal exploitation
policy for a monopolist in a noisy environment. Optimal policies map from the population
biomass to the level of fishing effort which will maximise the current and future value of
the fish stock. Fish populations were modelled using a Beverton-Holt process to allow for
the inclusion of noise in the stock recruitment relationship. Increasing stochasticity in the
population was found to reduce the optimal fishing intensity with respect to biomass. This
analysis was then extended in Chapter 5 to a Markov game situation in which there are two
independent fishers acting to maximize profit. A combination of fishing policies that was a
Nash equilibrium was obtained.
The thesis concludes with Chapter 6, where we summarise the thesis and present some




1.1 Fisheries background and overall motivation
The science of fisheries management has come a long way since T.H. Huxley claimed that
“probably all the great sea fisheries, are inexhaustible: that is to say that nothing we do
seriously affects the number of fish” (Huxley, 1883). Indeed, it is now widely known that
fishing not only has significant and long-term effects on fish stocks, but that many fish pop-
ulations are in serious decline (Myers and Worm, 2003).
Fish are an important source of nutrition, particularly in densely populated parts of the
world where protein consumption levels can be low. According to the Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United Nations, 150g of fish can supply an adult with 50-60% of their
daily protein requirements (FAO, 2014). Additionally, fishing is an important source of em-
ployment globally, with around 58.3 million people involved in the primary fishing sector
worldwide, and with employment in the fishing sector growing faster than the global popula-
tion (FAO, 2014). Overfished stocks are those harvested at ecologically unsustainable levels,
providing lower yields than what are potentially attainable, and have abundances smaller
than that which produces the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). 24% of global capture
fisheries production comes from the ten species with the highest productivity, with most of
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the stocks of these species either fully fished at the MSY level, or overfished (FAO, 2014).
By rebuilding fish stocks, overall production could be increased by 16.5 million tonnes (FAO,
2014). Consequently, protecting fish stock levels while maintaining or increasing yield (Bed-
dington et al., 2007), particularly for highly productive species, is essential to sustain the
fishing sector, both as a key source of employment in developing countries, and as a provider
of essential nutrition for a large number of people (Kolding et al., 2016; Mills et al., 2011).
Conventionally used top-down fisheries management strategies aim to fulfil the fundamental
fisheries’ goals of maximising the sustainable yield (Botsford et al., 1997), while protecting
small non-spawning juvenile fish, in order to give all fish a chance to reproduce at least
once (Garcia et al., 2012). These management strategies are motivated by equilibrium bases
stock estimates, and can include: input controls, such as restricted fishing licenses or fixed
fishing seasons; gear restrictions, such as minimum mesh sizes; and catch regulations, such
as a total allowable catch (TAC) (Allison and Ellis, 2001). However, these strategies can
have unintended consequences on ecosystems, including: disruption of size structure (Zhou
et al., 2010; Garcia et al., 2012) in which population structure changes significantly from
the unexploited state and over time the number of large fish decreases; and fisheries induced
evolution (Law et al., 2013; Borrell, 2013) through the introduction of new human-induced
selection pressures. Recently, the alternative approach of balancing the total fishing pressure
in proportion to the natural productivity of the target species has been suggested (Garcia
et al., 2012). It is hypothesized by some researchers that balanced harvesting will increase
resilience of fish stocks, lower disruption, and increase yields (Jacobsen et al., 2014). There
is some controversy about this hypothesis, with questions about the requirement to target
juveniles, as well as the need to harvest species which are not economically viable (Burgess
et al., 2015), and a lack of empirical evidence (Froese et al., 2015). Further investigation will
therefore be required to establish the actual ecological efficacy of balanced harvesting, and
to evaluate its economic viability in comparison to existing fisheries management strategies.
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Size-based fishing regulations can be complicated, and can involve such restrictions as min-
imum capture size requirements, quotas, and gear restrictions, each of which can vary de-
pending on species. These methods of fishing cause fishers to target large, mature fish,
which provide a large yield in biomass terms. Big, old, fat, fertile, female fish (BOFFFFs)
are mature fish that are extremely successful at reproducing (Birkeland and Dayton, 2005),
and which are important for population replenishment. An outcome of selectively targeting
large fish is that these mega-spawners are caught, and are thus unable to continue contribut-
ing to the population, which can lead to serious impacts on population biomass (Birkeland
and Dayton, 2005). Another consequence of selectively targeting large fish of commercially
valuable species is that bycatch of unwanted species and sizes is often discarded (Davis and
Ryer, 2003). The proportion of bycatch to landed catch (the yield which is taken ashore)
can be very high in some fisheries (Davies et al., 2009), and the mortality rate for discarded
bycatch can be as high as 100% for some species (Davis and Ryer, 2003).
In addition to high-level fisheries management policies, there are a variety of fishing methods
and behaviours that individual fishers are able to use. The selectivity of fishing methods
refers to the targeting of specific sizes and species for harvest (MacLennan, 1992) Trawling is
the use of moving boats dragging nets in order to harvest fish (Wolff et al., 2015). Sufficiently
small fish are able to swim through the net-mesh, and are thus for the most part protected
from being caught by trawl fishing. However, some unwanted by-catch of small fish can
occur. Fish too large to fit through the mesh size will be caught, and so trawling generally
selects fish larger than a certain size, determined by the net mesh size (Wolff et al., 2015). In
order to combat this, additional equipment such as turtle excluder devices (TEDs) (Crowder
et al., 1994) can be used. These devices are escape hatches for large organisms including
loggerhead sea turtles (Crowder et al., 1994), sharks and rays, (Brewer et al., 2006) which
can be fitted onto existing trawl nets in order to reduce selectivity for large fish. Gillnet
fishing, set netting, and longline fishing are alternative targeting strategies in which a specific
small range of sizes of fish are expected to be harvested (Wolff et al., 2015). Like trawling,
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the minimum size is determined by the fineness of the net mesh. As the net does not move
in a gillnet fishing strategy, large fish bounce off the net without getting trapped (Wolff
et al., 2015). Particular strategies that harvesters choose to use can be investigated using
individual based models. Such models can be used to simulate the behaviour of individual
agents by considering the ways they interact with each other and with their environment, in
order to develop a system level picture of the total impact of the exploitation of the marine
species.
1.1.1 Mathematical modelling of fish populations
Because of the difficulties of observing fish species and their habitats, gaining accurate mea-
surements of stock levels can be difficult. Historically, population estimates could be obtained
through extrapolation from landed catch data or from first-hand descriptions of marine fauna
(Fortibuoni et al., 2017). Data from stock assessments and surveys, and mathematical mod-
els have been used to improve stock level estimates. Mathematical models are therefore an
important tool for extending or understanding of fish population dynamics (Brauer et al.,
2001; Kot, 2001). Biomass in a fish population can increase through individual growth,
where fish become bigger, and population growth, in which the number of fish changes.
The first significant attempt to model the growth of a fish population was by Malthus
(1798), who hypothesized an exponential density-independent growth scenario, where the
rate at which the population grows is proportional to the population size. An important
advance in population modelling was made by Verhulst (1838) and popularised by Pearl
and Reed (1920). They employed Malthus’ “first principle” of population modelling to a
population in which growth has an upper bound due to resource limitations, such as prey
availability, habitat size, or intra-specific competition. The model imposes a carrying capac-
ity K or maximum population size that the ecological niche can support in the long term,
and means that growth is density dependent. The Verhulst-Pearl model, also called the
logistic growth model, is commonly used in ecology to model populations (Kot, 2001). The
16









In addition to continuous time models of population dynamics, discrete time models of
population growth have been used, in which organisms are grouped by generation or cohort.
In discrete time models, population growth is often modelled via a “stock-recruitment” re-
lationship, denoting how current spawning-stock biomass (used as a proxy for reproductive
potential) affects the number of recruits (or surviving juveniles entering the fishery) in the
following year. Key features of a stock-recruitment relationship are density-independent
mortality at low stock sizes, with density-dependent mortality being able to occur over the
range of stock sizes. This will result in decreasing per-capita recruitment as the current stock
level becomes large. The Ricker model, which was first suggested in the context of the stock
recruitment occurring in a fishery, relates the expected total number un+1 of individuals in
the population at a certain time, to the number of individuals un at a point δt earlier in time.
This type of model can also be applied in an age-structured model to the size of a single
cohort (single year class), as a function of the size of the previous cohort (Ricker, 1954). Like
the logistic growth model, the Ricker model accounts for the intrinsic population growth rate
r and the carrying capacity K:
un+1 = une
r(1−unK ). (1.2)
A similar discrete time, stock-recruitment model of successive population levels at time t
apart is the Beverton-Holt model (Beverton and Holt, 2012). Both of these discrete time
models are commonly used, and differ in their assumptions about how density-dependent
mortality affects the juvenile fish population. The Beverton-Holt map is
un+1 =
Kun
un + (K − un) e−rt
. (1.3)
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The Beverton-Holt model assumes that juvenile mortality is linearly dependent on the cur-
rent number of fish that remain alive in the cohort, and that there is always predation occur-
ring. The Ricker model is instead based on the assumption that the juvenile mortality rate
is proportional to the initial cohort size. The Beverton-Holt model can also be understood
as a discrete-time equivalent of the logistic growth model. Specifically, the Beverton-Holt
mapping is the fixed-time solution
u(t) =
Ku(0)
u(0) + (K − u(0)))e−rt
(1.4)
to the logistic growth ODE given in Equation (1.1).
The population models referred to above are unstructured models, meaning that they treat
all individual population members as being identical, and only track the total population




for some function f of the current population biomass. In reality, individual fish can have
different life histories, and be in different stages of their life cycles. Age-structured and
size-structured models break the population down into separate categories of different age
or size, and keep track of the size of each category. Age-structured population models are
commonly used, with some well known examples being Leslie matrices, and the Lotka inte-
gral equation (Kot, 2001). An alternative, and potentially more useful approach is to model
the fish population based on its size-structure. This class of models look at the number of
individual fish of a given size (in terms of length or weight) at any given time. These size
classes can be either discrete or continuous. While fish size does not directly correlate to age
(Pawson, 1990), it is more directly measurable from landed catch. Of greater is interest is
that the feeding preferences of individual fish are strongly based on the relative size between
predator and prey (Ursin, 1973).
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Simple size-structured models lump together many members of the species into a small
number of groups. A simple attempt would be to solely categorise and enumerate all in-
dividuals as small fish and large fish, or as “Juvenile” and “Mature” members of the pop-
ulation, which could also be extended to include newborn “Recruits”. More complicated
size-structured models allow a continuous size range of the modelled fish population, with
the population density u(x, t) given at each size x at time t. A McKendrick-von Foerster








In this first order PDE, g(x, t) and µ(x, t) are defined functions representing respectively the
mass-specific growth rate for fish of size x at time t, and the natural rate of mortality. Size-
structured models in which population dynamic processes are density dependent are called
size-spectra models (Andersen et al., 2015). As the growth of individual fish is dependent
on their energy intake and usage (Jobling, 1995), in a size-spectrum model the feeding
preferences of fish of each size can be used to derive the growth behaviour g of the population
as a whole (Law et al., 2012). The preference of larger fish to feed on individuals of a specific
size can similarly be used to determine the natural mortality µ of fish that occurs due to
predation. The life-history behaviours of individual fish of specific sizes are therefore used to
inform population-level dynamics in a size-spectrum model. A size-spectrum version of the
McKendrick-von Foerster equation can be developed by allowing population level behaviours
such as growth and mortality to also depend on population density. In this case, we will have
g(u, x, t) and µ(u, x, t) as the mass-specific growth rate and the mortality rate, respectively.
1.1.2 Harvesting models and the economics of fisheries
Fish population models can be extended to allow for the exploitation of the fish resource for
economic gain. The yield or catch is the total biomass or value of fish removed from the fish-
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ery. An extremely important concept in fisheries management is the maximum sustainable
yield (MSY) (Hjort, 1933). MSY is the largest yield in biomass terms that can be continually
taken from the fish stock over time. Harvesting at the MSY level is consistent with keeping
the population biomass at the level at where the population growth rate is at its maximum
(Tsikliras and Froese, 2019). In a logistic growth model, this happens at the point where
the population is at half of its carrying capacity. As the name suggests, MSY provides the
largest possible sustainable yield, and as such maximises the potential usage of the fisheries
resource as food. Baranov (1918) developed an early and influential harvesting model for the
number of fish caught in terms of the initial population size, natural mortality, and fishing
mortality, under the assumption that both sources of mortality occur simultaneously. In this
model fishing is therefore not simply an additional reduction of the population size on top
of natural death.
If the economic values and costs of this exploitation are taken into account, then an eco-
nomic model of a fishery is obtained. The first important attempt to prioritise the economic
utilisation of natural resources (including fisheries) was made by Gordon, who posited that
the widely acknowledged problems of overexploitation and depletion of fish stocks are a re-
sult of an inefficient allocation of fishing efforts, caused by the lack of economic rent yielded
by fisheries (Gordon, 1954). Previous fisheries management strategies aimed to obtain the
largest sustainable catch without considering the human use of resources, meaning that the
MSY was targeted rather than the maximum economic yield (MEY). Gordon evaluated the
optimal fishing behaviour to obtain MEY as a function of fishing effort, taking into account
the costs of fishing, as well as the revenues obtained from it.
The economic outcomes of fisheries are dependent on the type of access that fishers have.
A single entity with the exclusive access or ability to harvest a fish population is called a
monopolist. A monopolist can choose the extent to which they exploit the fish population,
and so can fish in such a way to maximise their own profit from fishing. If there are two
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distinct fishers (or, for example, coalitions of fishers), the fishery is a duopoly. In such a
situation, each entity will wish to maximise their own returns from fishing, but must take
into account the fact that their competitor can also exploit the same fish resource. This
competition between fishers can result in depleted fish populations, and lower profits than
with monopolist access. An open-access fishery is an unregulated situation in which there
are many individual fishers with equal ability and opportunity to fish. In an open-access
fishery, there are no restrictions for fishers to enter or exit the fishery, and no individual fisher
can influence the market price of fish. Furthermore, individual fishers have no enforceable
property rights to the fish population; if they choose not to harvest, or are unable to, there
is nothing stopping another fisher from taking their “share” of the fish stock.
The harvesting of fish can be incorporated into existing population models as a harvest-
ing term representing an external source of fish mortality. For unstructured models like
those described above, the biomass harvested from the population is calculated by consider-




= f(u)− Fu (1.7)
The rate at which biomass is extracted from the population is called the yield Y , and is:
Y = Fu (1.8)
which means that as the fishing effort F is increased, the yield obtained from the fishery
will also increase. Harvesting can also be included in size-structured population models via
an additional size-dependent mortality term F (x, t). That is, in such models the fishing
mortality can be a function of both time and the size of fish being harvested. For example,






(gu)− (µ+ F )u (1.9)
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F (x, t)u(x, t)dx (1.10)
When harvesting is added to the unstructured logistic growth model, we obtain the Gordon-









This model is governed by a bioeconomic equation where the profit P obtained during a




Y − cFdt (1.12)
In this model B is the market price of fish per unit biomass, which is assumed to be constant
regardless of the total amount of fish caught. The constant c is the fixed cost per unit
effort of fishing, and includes opportunity costs. Opportunity costs are the costs associated
with putting effort towards fishing rather than other potentially beneficial alternatives. For
example, a fisher could spend their time in another source of employment, and be paid for
this. In such a case, the opportunity cost includes the income lost to the fisher due to the
choice to fish rather than the maximally beneficial alternative. This means that if P ≥ 0 from
fishing, the fisher is receiving at least as much return from fishing than if they had chosen
their best possible alternative; in such a situation a fisher will willingly continue fishing as
at this level they are receiving the minimum profit required for fishing to be economically
worthwhile. The MEY, as referred to earlier, is the catch level which provides the greatest
difference between the total revenue obtained from fishing, and the total cost incurred. This
level, as the profit maximising yield, is the monopolist’s economic optimum (Gordon, 1954).
22
MSY
Figure 1.1: Population growth over time for a fish population with logistic growth dynamics
where K is the carrying capacity of the population. The slope of the sigmoid curve gives
the population growth rate; it is at its steepest when the population is at half of its carrying
capacity.







The MSY is obtained when the caught biomass is maximised, without regard to costs. This
is equivalent to maximising the revenue (and not profit) obtained from fishing. This means
that while we expect the yield obtained at MSY to be higher than an MEY, the profit at
MSY will be lower than at MEY. The exception to this is when there are no costs associated
with fishing. If c = 0, then revenue and profit are equal and so MSY and MEY are the same
for that fishery.
In Figure 1.1, we observe the logistic growth of an unexploited fish population. The popu-










Figure 1.2: A schematic diagram of the relationship between cost and revenue in the Gordon-
Schaefer bioeconomic model, as functions of fishing effort. Solutions representing MEY,
MSY, and the open-access equilibrium are shown.
capacity. For a sustained yield, there will be a constant rate at which biomass is removed
from the population. As such, the MSY will result when the fishing effort causes the popu-






Open-access fisheries are those where the ability to harvest fish is unrestricted, with the
right to fish free and available to all. In such a fishery, if the total revenue is greater than the
total cost, then there is excess profit available in addition to the minimum profit required
to fish, which is included in the costs of fishing as an opportunity cost. Because access
to the fishery is free, in an open-access fishery either an existing fisher will increase their
effort, or a new fisher will join the fishery, in order to take advantage of the available profits.
Consequently in an open-access fishery the total fishing effort will be such that an equilibrium
is reached where the total revenue obtained by all fishers is equal to the total cost (including
opportunity costs). This is what Gordon (1954) refers to as a “bionomic” equilibrium. In
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Figure 1.2 depicts the relationship between total cost, total revenue and fishing effort in an
unstructured model. The MEY, MSY, and open-access (bionomic equilibrium) solutions are
marked on this schematic diagram. It is observed that the relationship among fishing efforts
for these solutions is FMEY ≤ FMSY , which corresponds to the observation from (1.8) that
for fixed population biomass, increased efforts result in increased yields. Therefore fishing to
maximise economic returns means fishing at a lower effort than the level which maximises
the actual biomass attained (unless there are no costs of fishing, in which case MEY and
MSY are equal). Because fishing depletes population levels (Baum et al., 2003), fishing with
the higher effort FMSY results in a lower equilibrium stock level than fishing with the lower
effort FMEY . Because MEY maximises the value of revenue minus costs, and the bionomic
equilibrium occurs where revenues and costs are equal, the relationship FMEY ≤ FOA also
holds, with these efforts only being equal in the trivial case where both are zero. There is
no strict relationship between MSY and the bionomic equilibrium, with the relative position
of FOA and FMSY depending on both the slope of the revenue curve and the cost per unit
effort of fishing.
1.2 Game theory
One way to model the decision making behaviour of fishers is to treat the fishery as a game.
Games are strategic situations in which one or more individuals interact with each other
and their environment (Tadelis, 2013). Approaches of this type began with von Neumann
and Morgenstern (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), who mainly considered zero-sum
games, in which gains by one player must be equally matched by losses from another. Their
work was famously built upon by Nash, who considered both non-cooperative (Nash, 1951)
and cooperative (Nash, 1953) (non-zero-sum) games between two players, and who devel-
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oped the important concept of a Nash equilibrium solution. In a game, each player faces
a decision problem, or a choice between a set of possible actions. For each possible action
that a player can take, they will experience a corresponding outcome. Players each have
preferences for specific outcomes, and we can define a preference relation which ranks the
order in which the player desires these outcomes (Tadelis, 2013).
It is possible to construct a payoff function, from the set of possible actions to the set of out-
comes, which represents a player’s preference relation. A payoff function allows us to directly
consider a player’s preferences for the particular action or actions which will maximise their
own payoff, rather than having to refer to their preferences over outcomes (Tadelis, 2013).
Each player is assumed to be a rational “Homo economicus” or economic human, who will
always choose whichever action maximises their payoff function with respect to all possible
outcomes. This requires the player to completely understand the decision problem, meaning
they are aware of all possible actions, all possible outcomes, which outcomes will occur due
to the selection of each action, and their own preferences for these outcomes.
In a game, each of the players independently faces a decision problem. Strategies define
the behaviours, or decision making processes, a player can take in order to accomplish a
specific goal. A strategy must specify exactly which action a player will take in any situ-
ation. Players play with pure strategies when they have a deterministic response to every
situation. Stochastic responses are called mixed strategies. Markov strategies are those that
depend only on the history of the game (in terms of state variables and players’ actions),
and can be either pure or mixed. A normal-form game requires three components: a finite
set of players, a collection of sets of pure strategies, (that is, a set of possible pure strategies
for each player), and a set of payoff functions, each of which give a payoff to the player for
every possible combination of strategies (Tadelis, 2013). A strategy profile is a set containing
a single strategy for each player, and so fully specifies the actions which will be taken in a
game (Tadelis, 2013).
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A significant finite normal form game is the prisoner’s dilemma (Rapoport and Chammah,
1965). In the defining example, two players (the prisoners) have been arrested for a serious
crime, but there is only evidence of a more minor crime being committed. If neither player
is convicted of the serious crime, they will both be rewarded (Re) with a short sentence.
The players are separated, and each is tempted (Te) to confess or defect, and implicate the
other, which will reduce their sentence to an even shorter one. If one prisoner does this and
the other does not, the prisoner who does not confess will receive the sucker’s payoff (Su),
which is an increased sentence. However, if both players confess, and so implicate the other,
they will both be punished (Pu) with a longer sentence than if neither had confessed. It is
important here that the sucker’s payoff Su is a longer sentence than Pu, such that if a player
will be motivated to defect in order to obtain Pu over Su. This game is symmetric, with the
same actions and payoffs being available to each player. The possible actions are the choice
to cooperate with each other (C), or to defect (D), and the payoffs are the length of prison
sentence received. In the above example we consider the payoffs to be the negative of the
length of the prison sentence, so that preferable payoffs are larger. For a game to have the
structure of a prisoner’s dilemma, the following inequality of payoff values must be satisfied:
Su < Pu < Re < Te (1.16)
This game can be represented as the matrix shown in Table 1.1.
Player 1
Cooperate (C) Defect (D)
Player 2
Cooperate (C) (Re,Re) (Te, Su)
Defect (D) (Su, Te) (Pu, Pu)
Table 1.1: The standard payoff matrix for a two-player prisoner’s dilemma. Entries are
payoff vectors, where the first entry is the payoff to player 1, and the second entry the payoff
to player 2.
In the second chapter of this thesis, we show that the fishing behaviour of two players in a
simple bioeconomic fisheries game is equivalent to a prisoner’s dilemma, and evaluate the
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relative effectiveness of different strategies on economic outcomes for each player, and for
the abundance of the fish population.
An equilibrium of a game is one of the possible actions which will result in an outcome
that is more likely than others (Tadelis, 2013). Equilibria must be self-enforcing, meaning
that as players are in control of their own actions, they will only choose such an action if it
is in their own best interest. In this context actions are considered in a player’s best interest
if they maximise the player’s payoff, consistent with that player’s beliefs about what is oc-
curring in the game. The social optimality of outcomes can be compared by considering the
Pareto optimality of the strategies that lead to them. A strategy is said to Pareto dominate
another if it leads to an outcome which is better off for at least one player, without making
any players worse off (Tadelis, 2013). If a strategy is not Pareto dominated by any other
strategy profiles, then it is Pareto optimal. For example, in the above prisoner’s dilemma
example, the strategy profile (C,C) Pareto dominates the strategy profile (D,D) as both
players will receive a strictly greater payoff when both cooperate, according to Equation
(1.16). (C,C) is not Pareto dominated by strategy profiles where each player chooses a
different action; if either player were to deviate from this profile by defecting (leading to
the profile (C,D), it would cause the other player to receive the sucker payoff Su. By the
strict ordering of payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma, that player receiving the sucker payoff
will be worse off than if they had received the reward payoff Re. The strategy profile (C,C)
is Pareto optimal, as there is no playable strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma that Pareto
dominates it.
Pareto optimality does not necessarily lead to the best outcomes for an individual player,
or for the overall well-being of all players. A strategy s1 is strictly dominated by another
strategy s2 if choosing s2 results in a better outcome for the player regardless of which
strategy the other player chooses. In terms of the prisoner’s dilemma, D strictly dominates
C, as it will result in a better payoff for Player 1 than choosing C, whether Player 2 plays
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D or C. Rational players will never play a strategy that is strictly dominated by another
strategy (Tadelis, 2013). Furthermore, if a game has an equilibrium that is a strictly domi-
nant strategy profile, then this equilibrium is unique (Tadelis, 2013). A strategy s is a best
response to a given strategy s′ by the other player if it results in a better payoff than any
other possible strategy. Strategies that are strictly dominated by another cannot be a best
response (Tadelis, 2013).
An extremely important solution concept for non-cooperative games is that of the Nash
equilibrium (Nash, 1951), a situation in which none of the players can benefit from changing
only their own strategy. A Nash equilibrium occurs when every player is playing a best
response to their own beliefs, and the beliefs of all players about their opponents’ behaviour
are correct (Tadelis, 2013). Any combination of strategies in which all players are playing
mutual best responses to all other players’ strategies is a Nash equilibrium (Tadelis, 2013).
Consequently at a Nash equilibrium, no player can improve their payoff by unilaterally de-
viating from their own strategy. In the context of the prisoner’s dilemma, (D,D) is a Nash
equilibrium, where neither player could receive a better payoff by unilaterally changing their
behaviour. To do so, the player’s only allowable other choice of action is C; they would
then receive the Su payoff, which is strictly less than the payoff Pu they receive at the Nash
equilibrium (D,D). On the other hand, the Pareto dominant strategy profile (C,C) is not
a Nash equilibrium, as the strategy D strictly dominates C, and so at (C,C) either player
could benefit from an increase to their own payoff (as Te > Re) by individually changing
their strategy to D. The Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game can be fully described
by the set of strategies which leads to it, and their corresponding payoffs. In the prisoner’s
dilemma, the strategy profile (D,D) and the payoff vector (Pu, Pu) therefore constitute a
Nash equilibrium.
Games can be characterised by the amount of information available to each player. In
games of complete information, full knowledge about each of the other players is available.
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This means that each player is aware of their opponents’ utility functions, possible strategies,
and payoffs (Tadelis, 2013). Consequently in games of incomplete information, a player is
unaware of some information about the way other players will play the game. Games like the
prisoner’s dilemma, in which each player makes a decision at a single point in time, are called
stage (or single-shot) games. When the same stage-game is repeated a number of times, it is
called an iterated (or repeated) game (Tadelis, 2013). Iterated games can be either finitely
repeated, or infinitely repeated. In an iterated game, players are able to choose an action
at each iteration according to their strategy profile, in which specific choices can be made
according to the entire history of the game, and not just its present state (Tadelis, 2013).
Repeated games allow for further concepts of the information available to players. In par-
ticular, they allow the for the idea of perfect information. In games of perfect information,
each player, at the point at which they are making a decision, knows all events which have
previously occurred including all past actions by other players and any initial state of the
game (Tadelis, 2013). It follows that in games of imperfect information, players do not know
all past events. Games of imperfect information also represent situations in which players
may have uncertainty about the effects of acts of Nature on the game (Tadelis, 2013). It-
erated games also allow new solution concepts. A pure strategy profile is a subgame perfect
equilibrium if its restriction to every subgame is a Nash equilibrium (Tadelis, 2013). A sub-
game is a subset of a game, that is a game in its own right, and in which the history of the
game can be ignored. Iterated games provide a valuable tool for mathematically modelling
multi-stage decision making.
1.3 Stochastic optimisation models of harvesting
Stochastic optimisation models are methods for maximising or minimising an objective func-
tion where there is randomness present in the optimisation problem. Markov decision pro-
cesses are a class of stochastic optimisation models in which discrete time stochastic pro-
cesses are used to model the multi-stage decision making behaviour of a single individual in
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a stochastic environment (Puterman, 2014). In a Markov decision process, the individual
makes a decision about which actions to take in each state, at each time, for a problem which
may have either a finite or infinite time horizon. In this type of stochastic process, the system
is in a particular state sn at any time n. The action an chosen by the decision maker will
cause the state to change (in a probabilistic manner) to a new state s′n+1 at the next point
in time. Markov decision processes have the Markov property of memorylessness, meaning
that the next state in time depends only on the current state and action, and not on any
previous states or actions. A state transition matrix Q gives the probability Q(an, sn, s
′
n+1)
of transitioning from sn to s
′
n+1 when the action an is taken. The decision maker will obtain a
specific outcome or reward R(s, s′, a) depending on the state transition and their own choice
of action. The future value of rewards is discounted by a factor δ. Solutions Π prescribing
the best choice of action for each scenario are called optimal policies, and are optimal in the
sense of maximising the decision maker’s total expected (discounted) reward over the entire






Optimal policies may not be unique, but there exists at least one for each Markov decision
problem (Puterman, 2014). In order to determine the best choice of action in a certain state
and at a certain time, the decision maker must pay regard to both the immediate reward ob-
tained from choosing that action, and the potential value available in the future, depending
on the resulting state. Optimal policies are called stationary when they converge in time,
meaning that the best action in each state does not depend on time (Puterman, 2014).
Markov decision processes are commonly solved by using a backwards induction process
called value iteration (Puterman, 2014). In this method, Vn(sn), the maximum discounted
expected reward over the remaining time period at time n and in state sn, is considered.
The best decision at each period is found recursively by iterating backwards through time,
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beginning with an initial value function Vn+1, which could correspond to the last time-point
in a finite time horizon problem. In an infinite time horizon problem the initial value function
could correspond to the value of some initial guess for an optimal policy, or could correspond
to the situation in which only immediate rewards are valued for a fishing period. After ini-
tialisation, the next time period is then considered, with the action which maximises the
present and future value for each state chosen as the new value function Vn. This process is
then iterated until subsequent value functions V are sufficiently close together (Puterman,












An alternative way to solve Markov decision processes is policy iteration (Puterman, 2014).
This method relates directly to the structure of Markov decision problems, and can be used
for stationary infinite-horizon problems (Puterman, 2014). In general, policy iteration finds
solutions less efficiently than value iteration. After an initialisation step, policy iteration
solves Markov decision problems by iteratively performing a policy evaluation step, in which
the value function for a specific policy is calculated, and a policy improvement step, in which
a new policy for the next time period is chosen (Puterman, 2014). This process is repeated
until policies converge through time. We will use Markov decision processes in Chapter 3 of
this thesis to investigate the optimal way to harvest a fish population with noisy dynamics.
This models the problem faced by a monopolist (i.e. a single agent) with sole access to a
noisy renewable resource.
White (1985, 1993) provided a survey of applications of Markov decision processes, both in
“real” cases in which results were actually implemented as part of a decision making frame-
work (White, 1985), and in more hypothetical situations motivated by real world problems
(White, 1993). These included references to a series of papers by Mendelssohn on the ap-
plication of Markov decision problems to modelling the harvesting of salmon (Mendelssohn,
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1978, 1980, 1982). These papers were an attempt to decide escapement levels of the fishery:
how many members of this fish population should be left to reproduce at the end of a fishing
period, and how many should be caught. Mendelssohn (1980) utilised a lumped parameter
Ricker model of the fish population, based on the stock-recruitment relationship of sockeye
Salmon in Alaska. Policies were found which maximise the total expected discounted yield
in biomass; the economic cost of fishing was not considered, and as such payoffs were not in
terms of the actual profit obtained from fishing. The optimal policy derived in this model
takes a simple form: there is a threshold population level, below which there should be no
fishing. For any population state above this threshold, the optimal action was to fish down to
the threshold population state. Mendelssohn (1978) presented an analysis of a single-species,
multi-age model of a fishery. Age dependent mortality, reproduction, and size were included
in the population model. It was noted that it is difficult to define fishing behaviour which
will meet traditional goals such as an MSY, a constant number of fish harvested, or a stable
age distribution in an age-structured model. They presented two models, one of which was
a generalisation of the Beverton-Holt population model, and the other the Ricker model. In
the Beverton-Holt model, the cohorts are separable, and so optimal policies were found for
each age group independently of the remainder of the population.
The exploitation of populations in which growth is dependent on population size was dis-
cussed by Mann (1970). Differential equations representing the growth of males and females
in the population were developed, with a Markov decision process used to determine the
yield which should be extracted of each sex, in each fishing period. Lane (1989) considered a
Markov decision process model of fishing where the fish population dynamics are not directly
observed, meaning the fisher did not have direct knowledge of the state of the population
(Lane, 1989). The type of approach is known as a partially observable Markov decision
process. Specifically, fishers can measure their own yield, which provides an indirect mea-
surement of the actual abundance of the fish population. In this paper, Lane investigated
the decision making behaviour of independent fishers within a fishing season in terms of their
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fishing effort and their decision where to fish. Fish population dynamics were modelled as
growing according to a Markov chain in which there are a discrete number of population
states.
1.3.1 Stochastic games as models of harvesting
In stochastic environments where there are two or more decision makers affecting a system,
Markov decision processes are not an appropriate model. Instead, Markov (equivalently
stochastic) games can be used Littman (1994). Markov games are an extension of Markov
decision processes which allow multiple decision makers to choose actions which will affect
the state variable, and to each receive a payoff for their choice of action. Value iteration
methods can also be used to solve Markov games (Littman, 2001). While all Markov games
will have an optimal policy, they do not necessarily have a deterministic stationary opti-
mal policy (Littman, 2001). Solutions of Markov games can occur as two different types of
strategies, based on different types of information structure (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
With closed-loop strategies players’ strategies at time t can be dependent on the history of
play up to that point. That is, players can act on variables other than calendar time (Fu-
denberg and Tirole, 1991). On the other hand, open-loop strategies are strictly functions of
time (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). This means, for example, that players playing open-loop
strategies are not able to directly respond to deviations by other players from an equilibrium
strategy, or to realisations of environmental noise due to acts of nature. (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991). They can instead only respond to the current system state, which may be
affected by the actions of all players. It is ordinarily simpler to find open-loop equilibria
than closed-loop equilibria (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
In the Chapter 5 of this thesis, we look at how Markov games can be used to model the ex-
ploitation by two agents of a fish population with stochastic dynamics, and particularly how
the strength of the noise in the population dynamics affects the optimal fishing behaviour
and long-term outcomes for the stock.
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In Martin-Herran and Rincón-Zapatero (2005), the authors found a class of differential games
of fisheries in which there are Markov perfect Nash equilibria that are also Pareto efficient.
Markov perfect Equilibria are “profiles of Markov strategies that yield a Nash equilibrium
in every proper subgame” (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). The class of solutions found in
Martin-Herran and Rincón-Zapatero (2005) is of interest because Pareto efficiency means
that a socially desirable (in terms of aggregate payoff) outcome has taken place, which for
these particular competitive games will be a self-enforcing outcome because of the Markov
perfect Nash property they also satisfy. The strategies considered were Markov, meaning
they depend only on the current state of the game. Unlike the stochastic games we look at
in Chapter 4 they consider specifically continuous time population dynamics represented by
differential equations. They noted that Pareto efficiency of a Nash equilibrium is very rare.
The authors found necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto efficiency of a Markov per-
fect Nash equilibrium, using as the general case a two-player game where each player has a
unique action variable, and there is a single state variable. They formulated the problem as a
system of partial differential equations, for which the solutions were the Markov perfect Nash
equilibria. Chiarella et al. (1984) found examples of fishery games in which there are Pareto
efficient Nash equilibria. Here players were only able to use open-loop strategies, meaning
that these Nash equilibria are not subgame-perfect. In this fishery model each player in the
game had indirect commonality of access to the shared fishery resource. This means that
each player can harvest the shared stock when it is in their own exclusive economic zone,
but not when fish stock moves across international boundaries.
Sobel (1981) presented sufficient conditions for “myopic” solutions of both (single-player)
MDPs and mutli-player stochastic games. These solutions are those that can be obtained
from optima of a static game. The condition that transition probabilities are dependent
only on action and not present state do not apply to the games that arise from our models,
and so the existence of myopic solutions is therefore not guaranteed. There was reference
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to some forms of games in which myopic equilibria occur under some conditions, including
a stochastic fisheries model in which there are multiple interacting species. This particular
model was discussed in (Sobel, 1982). They presented a multi-species, multi age-class model
of fishery, motivated by both biological reasoning (including temporal fluctuations in age
structure, inter-specific predation and competition for prey) and operational reasons such as
the landing of bycatch. Sobel (1982) acknowledged the difficulties, which also apply to our
model, of using estimates of population biomass at the end (or start) of a fishing season as
the decision variable. Such estimates are not necessarily accurate due to a lack of sampling
data. This model also assumed that natural mortality is not large during the fishing season.
McKelvey (1997) contextualised multinational (transboundary) fisheries management as in-
volving brief and intense fish wars characterised by withdrawals from cooperative agree-
ments, economic downturns in fishing communities, and heavily depleted fish stocks. Non-
cooperative game theory offers a method to understand such conflicts in commercial fisheries.
They noted that uncertain and asymmetric information can have implications for harvesting
models of fisheries. In our fishery models we assume symmetric information for players.
McKelvey (1997) developed a simple harvest model of a seasonal “interception” fishery in
which a migratory transboundary stock was harvested by two distinct agents with their own
regulatory zones. This was a sequential model in which the first fishing fleet initially harvests
the fish population. The stock then migrates to the second zone, where the second fleet has
unrestricted access to solely exploit the stock. Finally, the fish stock migrates back to the
initial zone, where the first fleet again is solely able to harvest the stock. Like our approach,
first a deterministic, then a stochastic version was analysed. The stochasticity in this model
occurred entirely in the payoff functions of each player, with deterministic population dy-
namics remaining. They used memoryless strategies, with behaviour only taking place as a
reaction to the present level of the fish stock (in contrast with Kaitala and Pohjola (1988)
who used a cooperative differential game model in which all past deviations from agreement
were memorised). The population model used by McKelvey (1997) described the harvest
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and escapement of a stock in which there was no natural mortality, with escaping stock
spawning recruits for the next season’s population. They assumed the unit price of fish to
be constant regardless of harvest size, and that the unit cost of harvest rises as population
declines, equivalent to a fixed cost per unit effort. The problem was solved using optimal
control methods. It was found that open access to the fishery drives stock levels down to
the break-even level of payoff, which includes the opportunity cost of fishing. The optimal
escapement stock level was found to be the point where the marginal gain in revenue that
would be obtained from a decrease in escapement (that is, an increase in harvest) was equal




Emergence of balanced harvesting
from size-spectrum models of a
small-scale fishery
2.1 Introduction
Fish are an essential renewable resource throughout the world, both for the purposes of food
and employment, and so fish stocks should be protected (FAO, 2014). In commercial fish-
eries, large fish typically have a greater economic value than small fish, given that they reach
higher market prices per unit biomass (Sethi et al., 2010; Tsikliras and Polymeros, 2014).
However, in other areas of the world where there is poverty and malnutrition, the economic
value of fish is less important than its actual food content (in terms of the total biomass
caught) (Beveridge et al., 2013; FAO, 2014). In poor areas with small-scale fisheries, small
fish are as valuable as larger fish on a per-biomass basis, as they can be more easily cooked
(Kawarazuka and Béné, 2011; Longley et al., 2014).
Existing high-level fisheries’ management strategies have aims which include protecting small
fish (Botsford et al., 1997), with the goal of letting every individual fish have the opportunity
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to spawn (Froese et al., 2015). However, methods which involve features such as minimum
target sizes can have unintended negative consequences on fish stocks, including disruption
of size distributions and fisheries’ induced evolution, as well as having ecosystem level im-
pacts on non-target species. Balanced harvesting, in which total fishing mortality is broadly
distributed across species and individual sizes in proportion to natural productivity, has been
proposed as a potential alternative approach, which could mitigate the negative side-effects
of fishing on marine ecosystems (Garcia et al., 2012).
The choices made by individual fishers about how to fish can be modelled as a non-cooperative
game (Tadelis, 2013). Each fisher, or player, faces a decision problem in which they must
choose between a series of actions, each of which have a corresponding outcome. Players
in a game act to optimise their choice of action in order to obtain the best possible out-
come. Static games occur when each player simultaneously and independently chooses their
respective actions (Tadelis, 2013). This condition means that all players make their own
specific decisions without knowing which actions any other players are taking. In a static
game, outcomes are then determined for each player based on the combination of all players’
actions. Any combination of strategies in which all players are playing mutual best responses
to all other players’ strategies is a Nash equilibrium (Tadelis, 2013). Consequently at a Nash
equilibrium, no player can improve their payoff by changing their own strategy unilaterally.
Fish populations can be modelled by considering their size-spectrum, the abundance of all
members of the population of a certain size over the size range from eggs to adults, (Law
et al., 2012) which occupies several orders of magnitude. Dynamic size-spectrum models of a
population explicitly allow the abundance of the population over the whole size-spectrum to
be tracked over time. A schematic diagram representing a size spectrum model of a single fish
species supported by a plankton producer spectrum is depicted in Figure 2.1. Such models
track biomass levels to determine the growth, birth, and death of organisms of a certain size














Figure 2.1: A schematic diagram of a single species size spectrum model, highlighting the
different processes by which biomass is transferred through the ecosystem.
to use a McKendrick-von Foerster equation. This is a size-structured, continuous time PDE,
which has the biomass density of the population at size x and time t as its solution (Kot,
2001).
In this chapter, we will combine a size-spectrum model of a single fish species with an
individual-based model of the behaviour of a large number of fishers, each trying to exploit
a small-scale communal access fishery. In this type of small-scale fishery, fishers may have
to be able to choose from different fishing methods and equipment, resulting in different size
selectivity. In this model, we assume they will do this by changing their net mesh size. We
investigate how the size-selectivity behaviour of fishers changes based on relative profits avail-
able from the fishery, allowing for fishers to enter or exit the fishery depending on whether
potential gains meet their expectations, accounting for the opportunity cost of fishing. We
relate the emergent behaviour of fishers (with regard to their aggregate size-selectivity) to
the concept of a Nash equilibrium, and show that the fishing behaviour represents a move
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towards balanced harvesting of the fish population.
2.2 Size spectrum model
We consider a dynamic size spectrum model of a population of a single fish species living in
a non-seasonal environment as used by Law et al. (2012). This model allows for bookkeep-
ing of biomass as it is transferred throughout members of the population due to biological
processes of growth, reproduction, and mortality in order to obtain population levels. These
biological processes are calculated dynamically within the model, and are thus not externally
specified. Life histories of fish are described according to their size, w, with the abundance
of fish at that size given by φ(w). As it is biologically infeasible for fish to continue growing
forever, they are considered to have an asymptotic maximum weight w∞. Similarly, fish are
assumed to have a minimum size w0 corresponding to the size of a fish egg, which is assumed
to be of constant size.
The model is expanded by including a producer spectrum in the form of a plankton com-
munity, which is assumed for simplicity to be fixed. The fixed plankton spectrum provides
a continuously present source of prey for the young members of the fish population. The
relationship between plankton abundance φp(w) and body size w is considered to be that of
a power-law φp(w) = u0w
−γ with exponent −γ = −2, and with an upper bound on plankton
size set at w0,max = 0.02g, in order to match empirical observations of similar environments
(San Martin et al., 2006).
2.2.1 Fish growth
The growth characteristics of individual members of the fish population are investigated by
considering the exchange of biomass within the fish population, and between members of
that species and the producer spectrum. Fish grow by preying on smaller organisms in order
to accumulate biomass. In this single-species model, predation is predominantly conspecific,
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and so the trophic chain is comprised of that species and the producer spectrum. Large fish
prey on smaller fish, and small fish prey on plankton. The feeding preference of fish of size















In the feeding kernel s, β represents the mean preferred log ratio of predator to prey
size, and σ the standard deviation of this ratio. These parameter values are motivated
from stomach contents data (Ursin, 1973). It is assumed that fish never prey on any larger
individuals, such that when w′ > w, s(w/w′) = 0. The spatial region occupied by the
population is assumed to be well-mixed, so that the position of any fish has no bearing on
its likelihood of interacting with any other fish. Fish move through the spatial region with a
search rate dependent on their size, and parameterised by an exponent α and a feeding rate
constant A (with units m3y−1g−α). This search rate Awα, gives the volume V searched per
unit time, and represents the ability of a fish of size w to prey both conspecifically, and on
the producer population. There is an inefficient conversion of consumed prey biomass into
predator biomass: an ecological conversion efficiency κ is used to account for losses due to
feeding, digestion, and the metabolic cost of growth. That is, a proportion κ of consumed
prey biomass is assimilated into predator biomass. Consequently the mass-specific rate of
biomass assimilation by a predator of size w is given by







(φ(w′, t) + φp(w
′)) dw′. (2.2)
2.2.2 Reproduction
At the beginning of their lives, small fish allocate all of the usable biomass accumulated from
feeding to somatic growth. Fish mature and gain the capacity to reproduce as they grow to
a certain size. This maturing process is modelled by an ogive with a midpoint at size wm,
and a transition width ρm. As fish mature, they begin to allocate an amount of assimilated
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biomass away from growth and towards reproduction. We define the function representing











The reproduction function is parametrised by an exponent ρ, chosen to be equal to γ−α−1,
so that the fecundity of a mature fish will be approximately constant with respect to weight.
E(w) gives the proportion of usable biomass allocated to somatic growth, with the remaining
1−E(w) allocated to reproduction by a fish of size w. The proportion of biomass allocated
to growth decreases with fish size after maturity has been reached. Fish who have reached
w∞, the asymptotic maximum weight, allocate all of their usable biomass gained by feeding
to reproduction, and none to somatic growth, and thus represent idealised BOFFFFs in the
size-spectrum model. The size of fish eggs is distributed according to a birth kernel b(w),
chosen to be a Dirac−δ function such that all fish eggs are of the same size, w0. The total




(1− E(w))φ(w)g(w, t)wdw. (2.4)
The biomass output due to reproduction is assumed to be immediately converted into indi-
viduals of the fixed egg size w0.
2.2.3 Fish mortality
We include several sources of mortality for fish. As detailed above, fish can die by being
preyed on by larger fish of any size. We let µp(w, t) be the mortality rate of fish of size
w due to predation. The rate at which mortality due to predation occurs is calculated by
integrating the abundance of predators of size w′, the feeding kernel, and the predator search
rate:










Intrinsic mortality µi(w, t) gives the probability for a fish of size w to die of natural causes
other than predation, and for small fish is assumed to be small compared to predation
mortality, and increasing with body size. Intrinsic mortality, which is parametrised by the
exponent ξ, is calculated as




If the stock is being exploited, organisms will also die due to being harvested, and so we
include fishing mortality µf (w, t). For ease of reading, we omit the time arguments in all
mortality and growth functions, writing for example µf (w) and g(w). The total mortality
rate due to all causes is
µ(w) = µp(w) + µi(w) + µf (w). (2.7)
2.2.4 Population level dynamics
Individual level growth, reproduction, and mortality processes are scaled up to ecosystem
level dynamics through the use of the McKendrick-von Foerster equation
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Here for simplicity we have withheld arguments of time t. The parameter values used in
this size-spectrum model are given in Table 2.1, and have been chosen to represent the life
histories of African catfish (Clarias gariepinus). Steady state abundances for an unexploited
population were obtained by running the size spectrum model with not fishing mortality
(that is with µf (w) = 0). The biological processes g(w) and µ(w) are determined by numer-
ically integrating over the range of possible prey or predator body sizes. The steady state
population was used as an initial condition in simulations where the dynamic size-spectrum
was coupled with an individual-based fishing model, which is described in the next section
of this chapter.
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Parameter Comments Value Units
w0 Fish egg mass 0.001 g
wm Mid-point of maturation ogive 2200 g
w∞ Asymptotic maximum weight of fish 2290 g
A Feeding rate coefficient 750 m3y−1g−α
α Search rate scaling exponent 0.8 -
ξ Intrinsic (non-predation) mortality exponent 0.15 -
κ Conversion efficiency of biomass intake 0.2 -
β Feeding kernel mean 5 -
σ Feeding kernel standard deviation 2.5 -
kF Individual harvesting intensity 0.0025 y
−1
βi Mean target size of ith fisher’s selectivity strategy Variable -
θ Standard deviation of size-selectivity function 0.2 -
ρ Reproduction function exponent -
ρm Width of transition to maturity -
Table 2.1: Parameters chosen to represent the life histories of African catfish (Clar-
ias gariepinus) used in the size-spectrum model to calculate population dynamics. The
length at first maturity is approximately 30.8 cm (Kolding et al., 2003) (Fishbase,
www.fishbase.org/summary/1934), with asymptotic length 67.5cm. Length l is converted
to mass w using w = alb with a = 0.008g cm−b and b = 2.983 (Kolding et al., 2003). Other
parameters values are as in Law et al. (2016).
2.3 Individual based model
We extend an existing (Law et al., 2012) individual based model of the exploitation of a single
species, which considered a fixed number of fishers exploiting a population, to allow for a
dynamic number of fishers. The dynamic size spectrum model of a marine population was
coupled with an individual-based model of N fishers in a small-scale fishery. Each fisher acts
with behaviour determined according to a fixed, identical set of constraints. Individual fishers
act with the goal of maximising their own personal profit in the short term. Consequently
they do not consciously collude in order to harvest in a sustainable manner over the long
term, and completely discount future profits. Here for ease of calculation, and to show
clearly the relationship to individual size-selectivity, we refer to the yields Yi obtained by
fishers rather than their profits Pi. Note however that there is a one-to-one relationship
Pi = aY − c between yield and profit for a fisher with a fixed fishing effort.
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2.3.1 Fishing methods
Fishers are considered to have a limited harvesting ability, representing restrictions including
the actual capacity of the nets used, or the number of available boats. Each fisher is able
to harvest fish according to an individual size-selectivity function, which takes the form of
a Gaussian distribution over log body mass. As a unimodal distribution, this Gaussian
selectivity function represents a harvesting method such as gillnet or hook fishing being used
by the fisher. The amplitude of each selectivity function is given by kF , which represents
the intensity of a single fisher’s harvesting effort, corresponding to the actual capacity of the
fishing gear. Each of these individual fishing functions is also characterised by the parameters
θ, the standard deviation of the individual size selectivity, which is constant for all fishers,
and βi the mean size targeted by the ith fisher, corresponding to the choice of net mesh
sizing. Thus the ith fisher has an individual fishing function defined by









The individual size-selectivity functions for each fisher therefore have identical area on the
log body mass scale. Initially, each of the βis is obtained from a uniform random distribution
over the entire possible range of log body mass. The total harvesting pressure on the fish





This total size-selectivity function is a size-dependent population death rate, and can there-
fore be incorporated into the dynamic size spectrum model as µf (w), the fishing component
of the death rate. The biomass yield obtained by the ith fisher is calculated by multiplying













Fishers periodically have the opportunity to change their individual size-selectivity be-
haviour, representing for instance a change in the net-mesh size used to catch fish. After
every time period of length ∆t, each fisher can change their size-selectivity strategy. The
probability of such a change occurring for the ith fisher depends on the size of their own
yield Yi relative to the maximum yield obtained by any fisher. The probability that the ith
fisher will change their value of βi at the end of one such time period is given by
P = 1− Yi
max1≤j≤N Yj
. (2.13)
Individuals are considered to have a limited knowledge of their competitors. Specifically,
over a given time period, they are aware of the maximum yield obtained by any fisher in the
ecosystem, but do not have knowledge of the specific targeting strategy used to obtain that
yield. Furthermore, they do not know the current state of the population size-spectrum, and
they have no memory. Therefore while fishers have the ability to stochastically change their
harvesting behaviour, they cannot directly do so to actively maximise their current yield.
A change in harvesting behaviour occurs as a new mean target size βi being selected for
the relevant fisher. As fishers do not have knowledge of the optimal target size, βi is again
selected randomly from a uniform distribution over log body mass.
2.3.3 Economic motivations
The existing (Plank et al., 2016) individual based model of fishing was extended to allow
a dynamic number of fishers in the fishery. As there is an economic cost associated with
the act of fishing, each fisher will now require a certain level of revenue in order for them
to remain active in the fishery. One common approach to directly modelling the population
48
dynamics under exploitation is to use the Gordon-Schaefer model (Schaefer, 1954; Gordon,
1954), which considers both the costs of fishing and the revenue obtained. Under the Gordon-




= k(aY (t)− c).
where a is the market price of fish per unit mass, Y (t) is the aggregate yield at time t, c is
the cost of fishing per unit effort and k is a constant of proportionality defining how rapidly
fishing effort changes in response to profits. If net profit is positive, the total fishing effort
will increase; if profit is negative, fishing effort will decrease. At equilibrium, the yield Y (t)
is given by the ratio c/a of unit cost to unit price.
We applied this model at the level of individual fishers to determine the rate at which
fishers enter or leave the fishery. Recall that the fishing effort for each fisher is assumed to
be constant, kF , so the net profit for fisher i is aYi− ckF . We assume that if the average net
profit is positive, more fishers will enter the fishery, resulting in an increase in total fishing
effort. If average net profit is negative, fishers will leave the fishery, resulting in a decrease in
total fishing effort. Note that this defines a critical yield Y ∗ = ckf/a: if the average fisher’s
yield Ȳ is above this critical yield Y ∗ then new fishers will enter the fishery and vice versa if
Ȳ < Y ∗. We use a stochastic model for the number of fishers entering or leaving the fishery
at each time step. Specifically, the number of fishers entering or leaving during a time step
of length δt is assumed to be a Poisson random variable with mean
λ = kN
∣∣Ȳ − Y ∗∣∣∆t
Consistent with the Gordon-Schaefer model, the rate of change of total fishing effort is
proportional to the average net profit. For the numerical calculations in this chapter, we
used values k = 2.5× 10−7 and ∆t = 0.0137y (that is, each fishing period is 5 days).
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Fixed number of fishers
We start by running the model with a fixed number of fishers, as in (Plank et al., 2016). The
initial condition for the population size-spectrum was set to be the steady-state abundance
when no exploitation (F = 0) occurs. The initial condition for the total fishing effort F was
randomised by selecting each individual target log body mass βi from a uniform distribution
U(log(w0), log(w∞)) over possible log body masses. The McKendrick-von Foerster equation
((2.8)) was solved using the method of lines (Schiesser, 2012), such that it was discretized
in the spatial variable w, leaving derivatives in time t continuous. This resulted in a system
of ordinary differential equations which were solved using the “ode15s” solver in MATLAB.
After each fishing period of length δt, fishing behaviours were allowed to change, with new
target sizes βi allowed to be randomly selected for eligible fishers according to the process
described in Subsection 2.3.2. The resultant total fishing effort F was calculated, and with
(2.8) then solved for the subsequent fishing period, with this process repeated for a number
of iterations.
Figure 2.2 (a) shows that after time t = 100 years, fishers respond to their objective of
maximising their own yield by shifting their harvesting behaviours in order to target sizes in
which fish have high biomass. Consequently, without explicitly constraining fishers with re-
spect to their aggregate fishing behaviour, we observe that under the conditions of this model
they will self-organise such that it appears that partially balanced harvesting over body size
will occur. There is a peak in the aggregate fishing mortality near the 100g body size, the
same size at which the maximum value occurs in the unexploited biomass spectrum (the
blue solid line in Figure 2.2 (b)) This unexploited biomass is the population size-spectrum
in the absence of fishing; in this case the fishing mortality rate µf (w) = 0. In contrast, the
exploited. Furthermore, in Figure 2.2 (b) we observe that the exploited biomass spectrum
(red dashed line) is flattened over the range of targeted body sizes, such that the population
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Figure 2.2: (a) shows that for a fixed number of fishers, regions of high exploitation (blue
solid line) occur in regions of high productivity (red dashed line). In particular, peaks in
the total fishing rate for a fixed number of fishers (N = 2000) occur at similar sizes to peaks
in the population productivity spectrum. From (b) it can be observed that fishing causes a
flattening of the biomass spectrum in the exploited size range (blue line) when compared to
the unexploited biomass (red line).With a fixed number of fishers (N = 2000), the targeted
region of the population has a constant biomass spectrum, meaning that fishers cannot
increase their yield by changing their harvesting strategy. (c) shows that with a greater
number of fishers (N = 6000), the total fishing rate (blue solid line) becomes closer to being
proportional to productivity (red dashed line). With a fixed N = 6000, the relationship
between total harvesting pressure and the productivity of the species becomes more apparent,
showing that an emergent balanced harvesting situation has occurred. Furthermore, (d)
shows that as the (fixed) number of fishers is increased, the width of the flattened part of
the biomass spectrum under fishing pressure (red line) becomes larger. For N = 6000, a
greater range of fish sizes are targeted, representing a greater breadth of exploitation of the
ecosystem.
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biomass is effectively constant over log body mass. The exploited biomass spectrum here
is the fish size-spectrum after t = 100 years, under the pattern of fishing mortality µf (w)
determined by our harvesting model. Consequently, if individual fishers attempt to change
their fishing strategy by targeting another size range, they will not be able to increase their
yield. This is because individual yield is proportional to both population biomass, which is
here constant with log body size, and fishing intensity, and each fisher has a size selectivity
function with identical area. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium has emerged in the system, in
which no fisher can unilaterally alter their behaviour (by changing their target size) with-
out obtaining an equal or worse yield for themselves. In Figure 2.2 (b), with N = 2000, the
flattened region of the biomass spectrum is found for body sizes ranging from ∼ 8g to ∼ 200g.
In Figure 2.2 (c) and (d) we observe the effects of an increased number of fishers in the
fishery. Figure 2.2 (d) depicts a flattened part of the biomass spectrum with greater width,
meaning that as the number of fishers in the fishery is increased the range of exploited body
sizes increases. Specifically, with N = 6000 fishers, the flattening of the biomass spectrum
is observed for body sizes ranging from ∼ 1.5g to ∼ 200g. Furthermore, as the biomass
spectrum is still constant over the harvested range, we note that the Nash equilibrium still
exists for fishers when there is increased exploitation. Figure 2.2 (c) shows an increased
correspondence between the natural productivity of the population and the size-dependent
fishing pressure. The aggregate fishing function is now approximately proportional to pro-
ductivity over the rest of the range of exploited body sizes. Consequently, we observe that a
situation similar to fully balanced harvesting is occurring with this increased fishing pressure,
as was expected from previous results (Plank et al., 2016).
2.4.2 Dynamic number of fishers
The numerical methods in the dynamic model were similar to that in Subsection 2.4.1, except
that after every fishing period a random number of fishers were able to enter or exit the fish-
ery, as described in Subsection 2.3.3. Figure 2.3 shows that regardless of the initial number
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Figure 2.3: For any initial choice of fishers N0, the number of fishers will converge to a
stable equilibrium solution. The actual long-time number of fishers N depends on the size of
the critical yield value Y ∗ required to keep individual fishers active in the fishery. (a) has a
relatively high choice of Y ∗ = 6×10−6g m−3y−1, the number of fishers will converge over time
to approximately 2800. (b) shows that for a smaller critical yield (Y ∗ = 3× 10−6g m−3y−1),
the total number of fishers after a long period of time will be greater, with N converging to
around 12000 over time.
of fishers, the number of active fishers will converge over time to a level based on the critical
yield for those fishers. While initial conditions do not affect the final number of fishers, and
therefore do not affect the total level of exploitation of the fish species, the critical yield Y ∗
does. The number of active fishers which can be supported by the population in the long term
decreases as the critical yield required to sustain these fishers increases. Figure 2.4 shows that
over time fishers will self-organise into a Nash equilibrium solution, as in the fixed N model.
For both high and low critical yields, the biomass spectrum is constant over the exploited
range of body sizes. In Figure 2.4 (b), we see that the overall biomass density is similar to
the unexploited state in the case of a high critical yield (Y ∗ = 5.37 × 10−6gm−3y−1), with
a flattened region ranging over body sizes ∼ 2g to ∼ 120g. In Figure 2.4 (d), with greater
fishing pressure (and a lower critical yield: Y ∗ = 3.5 × 10−6gm−3y−1), biomass density is
lower than the unexploited state at each body size. However, the Nash equilibrium is still
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occurring with a greater number of fishers, and so no single fisher can alter their harvesting
strategy in order to increase their personal yield. With this critical yield, the biomass spec-
trum is flattened over body sizes ranging from ∼ 0.5g to ∼ 200g. Recall from Section 1.2
Nash equilibria in a game can be fully described by the combination of all strategies taken
by all players, and the payoffs obtained by each player. In the context of our dynamic fishing
model, we see that the payoff that each player will individually receive is the critical yield.
The strategies used by players are their individual fishing behaviours in terms of target size
selectivity, with the overall fishing pressure representing a proxy for the full strategy profile.
Figure 2.4 (c) shows that as in the previous individual based model, the total fishing pressure
is approximately proportional to the species’ productivity over the total range of exploited
sizes when harvesting is at a high level. When the total level of exploitation is lower, as in
Figure 2.4 (a), the maximum in the total size-selectivity occurs at the same body size at
which there is a peak in the unexploited biomass spectrum, again as in the model with a
fixed number of fishers.
For a given critical yield, there is a specific number of active fishers that the fishery is
able to support, who each obtain that yield. By considering a range of Y ∗ values and de-
termining the number of fishers which can sustainably remain in the fishery, the total rate
at which biomass is removed from the population (that is the total sustainable yield) can
be determined. Figure 2.5 shows that a peak in the total sustainable yield occurs when the
critical yield is set to a value of approximately 3.5 × 10−6g m−3y−1. This suggests that for
critical yield levels above this value, the resource is being underutilised, as a greater amount
of biomass could be removed from the population each year without irreversibly depleting
the stock. Overfishing will occur for critical yields less than this value, with a larger number
of active fishers causing the fish population to be depleted.
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Figure 2.4: For a high critical yield (Y ∗ = 5.37 × 10−6gm−3y−1), there is a small flattened
region of the biomass spectrum under exploitation (red dashed line) when compared to the
unexploited biomass spectrum (blue solid line). (a) shows that high fishing pressure (red
dashed line) occurs at sizes where the population has high productivity (blue solid line).
A local peak in the overall size-selectivity function occurs at the body size at which the
unexploited biomass spectrum has a maximum value. For a lower critical yield (Y ∗ =
3.5× 10−6gm−3y−1) and thus higher exploitation level, the flattened section of the exploited
biomass spectrum (red dashed line) in (d) is wide. Furthermore, actual biomass density
levels are lower than the unexploited state (blue solid line) for all body sizes. At high
levels of exploitation, as in (c), the total size-selectivity (red dashed line) is approximately
proportional to productivity (blue solid line) over the entire range of relevant body sizes.
Consequently at this level of harvesting, balanced harvesting is occurring.
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Figure 2.5: There is a peak in the total equilibrium yield. For a critical yield of approximately
3.5 × 10−6g m−3y−1 per fisher, a maximum equilibrium yield is obtained. Increasing or
decreasing the critical yield from this level will result in a lower sustained yield over time.
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2.5 Discussion
Size-based regulation methods of fisheries management are commonly used because of both
economic and ecological concerns (Beddington et al., 2007). However, recent research sug-
gests that alternative approaches to fisheries management may be better suited to preserving
marine resources through minimising the impact of exploitation on those ecosystems (Garcia
et al., 2012). Balanced harvesting, in which fish of a certain size are caught in proportion
to their productivity at that size, has been suggested as an approach that will minimise
disruption to fish populations and so will allow exploitation to be sustainable in the long
term. For instance, balanced harvesting will reduce the number of BOFFFs being caught,
and therefore increase the likelihood of continued reproductive success by the population.
Furthermore, the economic justification that larger fish are more valuable on a price per unit
weight basis in large-scale commercial fisheries, does not necessarily apply in the small scale
artisanal fisheries. In such regions nutritional requirements, that small fish are equally able
to meet, are a more significant concern. In these regions, fishing also provides a major source
of employment, and so limiting the amount of targetable fish could also have an economic
impact (FAO, 2014). Consequently, allowing harvesters in a small scale fishery to act with-
out minimum size regulations could be worthwhile approach.
In each of the individual based models of fishing behaviour, fishers are seen to self organise
over time into a Nash equilibrium solution. As the biomass spectrum has constant value
over the entire range of targeted fish sizes, individual fishers will be unable to increase their
own yield by changing their size-selectivity behaviour, no matter what their current target
size is. This is as expected, as if fishers were able to change their own size-selectivity in
order to increase their own yield, they would do so. Consequently any equilibrium solution
must have all fishers obtaining the same yield. This result occurs for any choice of critical
yield, with the long term solution in each case being that of equal yields for all fishers. The
width of the flattened part of the biomass spectrum depends on the width of the targeted
range of fish sizes. When there are more fishers in the fishery, the overall fishing pressure
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increases, meaning there is an increase in the range of targeted fish sizes. This corresponds
to an increase in the width of the flattened part of the exploited biomass spectrum, such
that the deviation of the population size-spectrum from the unexploited level increases.
When the cost per unit effort of fishing is high, or the price of fish is low, a high criti-
cal yield will be required to keep fishers active in the fishery. High critical yields correspond
to relatively low levels of exploitation, where the total size-selectivity behaviour is targeted
at body sizes at which the population has high biomass. The large peak in the total size-
selective fishing pressure (F (w)) occurs at the fish body size at which incoming biomass is
used predominantly for reproduction rather than somatic growth. There is an accumulation
of a large number of fish at and near this body size at any time, as they allocate their efforts
towards reproducing, causing the local maximum in the biomass spectrum. As productivity
is high here, exploitation must be significant in order for a stable equilibrium solution to
occur. For higher levels of overall exploitation, with a constant biomass spectrum, fishers
are able to obtain sufficiently large yields by targeting small fish, in particular fish smaller
than the size at which the biomass peak occurs. This means an increased number of juvenile
fish will not reach the size at which incoming biomass is allocated to reproduction, because
the increased harvesting pressure is acting as an additional source of mortality for small fish.
In this case there is not such an accumulation of fish of this size, and so the productivity of
a population in this situation is not as high at this size. Consequently, a concentration of
fishing pressure at that specific size range will not occur at equilibrium. Furthermore, the
total size-selectivity is approximately proportional to the productivity of the population over
the entire range of targeted fish sizes. Under high levels of exploitation, balanced harvesting
is occurring, as an emergent result of the self-organisation of fishers into a Nash equilibrium.
The introduction of dynamics in the number of fishers extended the results from the in-
dividual based model with a fixed number of fishers, by showing that when the economic
concerns of fishing are taken into account, a Nash equilibrium will still emerge. A new pa-
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rameter based on costs that controlled the yield required to keep a single fisher active in
the fishery was incorporated into the model. This in turn controlled the equilibrium number
of fishers able to sustainably exploit the population, and thus the total fishing mortality at
equilibrium. The fact that fishers were able to leave the system if their personal yields were
low did not prevent remaining fishers eventually self-organising into a stable Nash equilib-
rium solution. Similarly, under high exploitation the equilibrium aggregate size-selectivity
for remaining fishers was proportional to the productivity of the fish species, over the entire
range of targeted body sizes. Consequently, a balanced harvesting situation still emerged
from the model in the case where fishers’ costs and revenue were taken into account. As such,
the new dynamic individual based model produced results that were qualitatively similar to
the existing individual based model. Further possible adaptations to the model which could
be considered including allowing non-Gaussian size-selectivity functions in order to model





The prisoner’s dilemma structure of a
fishery at bioeconomic equilibrium
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we will use game theory to model the choices about fishing effort, in a
scenario where two fishers have the opportunity and ability to harvest a fish population.
We will first develop a model for monopolistic exploitation by a single fisher, in order to
determine the overall profit maximising behaviour in the fishery, which will then be used
in the two-player game. Fishing effort measures the amount of fishing that can take place,
and takes into account the time spent fishing and the availability of capital (for instance,
in terms of boats or nets). Games provide a way to understand the strategic interaction
between two or more individuals, or players. (Tadelis, 2013). In a game, each player makes
a decision about which action to take. In doing so, they take into account their preferences
for certain outcomes (usually in terms of the payoff they personally receive), as well as their
own beliefs about how their rivals will act. Games therefore provide a natural way to model
mathematically the decisions made by fishers, who independently wish to maximise their
own profit from fishing, while taking into account how any other fishers’ actions will impact
fish stocks. In this chapter we will develop a non-cooperative game representing the decision
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about fishing effort, by combining fish population models with models of the economic gains
available from fishing.
The strategy a player chooses describes which action they will take at any stage of the
game (Tadelis, 2013). The combination of all players’ strategies is a strategy profile, and
specifies all actions that will be taken during the entire play of the game. Based on the exact
combination of actions taken at a given decision point in the game, each player will receive a
payoff. In the context of our fisheries game, the payoff each player obtains will be the profit
they obtain by fishing.
There are different solution concepts through which games can be understood. One of
the most important solution concepts is the Nash equilibrium (Tadelis, 2013). In a Nash
equilibrium, all players’ strategies are best responses to each other, and no player can uni-
laterally deviate from this strategy in order to increase their own payoff (Tadelis, 2013). A
contrasting concept is Pareto efficiency. An outcome is Pareto efficient if no player can be
made better off by changing their strategy, without making another player worse off.
The well-known prisoner’s dilemma (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965), which has payoffs
satisfying Su < Pu < Re < Te can be represented by:
Player 1
Cooperate (C) Defect (D)
Player 2
Cooperate (C) (Re,Re) (Te, Su)
Defect (D) (Su, Te) (Pu, Pu)
Table 3.1: The standard payoff matrix for a two-player prisoner’s dilemma. Entries are
payoff vectors, where the first entry is the payoff to player 1, and the second entry the payoff
to player 2.
A single instance of a game can be referred to as a one-shot game or a stage-game. By
successively repeating an identical prisoner’s dilemma stage-game between the same players,
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who have a choice between the same actions each time, a multi-stage iterated prisoner’s
dilemma (IPD) can be developed (Tadelis, 2013). IPDs require another constraint on payoff
values (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965), that is, 2Re > Su+Te, in order to prevent collusion
where players alternate between the strategy profiles (C,D) and (D,C). IPDs allow players
to change their strategies at each iteration depending on both the actions of the other player
and their own actions in the past. Simple strategy profiles, in which choices are based on
only the last round of the game, are called memory-one strategies (Kraines and Kraines,
2000). Important pure memory-one strategies are
• ALLC: always cooperate
• ALLD: always defect
• TFT : tit-for-tat, cooperate on the first round and then match the other players pre-
vious action
• STFT : suspicious tit-for-tat, defect on the first round and then match the other players
previous action
The strategies used by a population of a large number of players can be referred to as a
population of strategies. An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is one in which, when
predominantly present in a population of strategies, is unable to be invaded by a differing
“mutant” strategy that would have higher reproductive fitness (Smith and Price, 1973),
in terms of better expected payoffs. Formally a strategy s is an ESS in a set of possible
strategies S if it satisfies the following conditions (Smith, 1982)
• When playing against another player using s, a player using s must outperform a player
using any other strategy s′ ∈ S, s′ 6= s.
• If a new strategy s′ evolves in the population that performs equally well against the
strategy s, then a player using s must perform better against a player using s′ than a
player using s′ does.
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No pure strategy can be evolutionarily stable in an IPD (Boyd and Lorberbaum, 1987),
meaning that any population of strategies that are successful in terms of average payoffs can
still be defeated by some other strategy or combination of strategies. Axelrod (1987) showed
that in simulated tournaments between players in an IPD the TFT strategy resulted in the
highest average score over all tournaments. If mixed strategies are allowed then a Pavlov
(Win-Stay Lose-Switch or WSLS) will outperform TFT in similar simulations (Nowak et al.,
1993). Another mixed strategy of note is generous tit-for-tat (GTFT ), which behaves the
same as TFT except that it has a small probability of forgiving an opponent who defects,
by choosing to still cooperate in the next round. This allows a situation of recurring mutual
punishment (such as will occur with TFT vs. STFT ) to be avoided.
Both pure and mixed memory-one strategies can be described in the form (p1, p2, p3, p4)
which give the probability of cooperation by a player using that particular strategy, based
on the outcome of the previous iteration of the game. Then p1 is the probability of cooper-
ating after cooperation by both players, p2 after self cooperation and opponent defection, p3
after self defection and opponent cooperation, and p4 after defection by both players. We can
then define, for example, ALLC as (1, 1, 1, 1), or TFT as (1, 0, 1, 0). However, any strategy
relying on only the immediately previous iteration can be described in this way.
In this chapter, we will show that in certain circumstances, the exploitation of a renew-
able resource by multiple fishers constitutes an iterated prisoner’s dilemma with respect to
each fisher’s choice of harvesting rate.
Various different approaches have been used to model the growth of a population, based
on differing views on whether populations are regulated by density dependent biotic effects,
or density independent abiotic effects. Density dependent effects include things like intra-
community competition and disease that will have a relatively larger impact on high-density
communities than those of low-density. On the other hand, some simple population models
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include density independent effects such as weather or climate fluctuations, which have a
similar effect on communities regardless of population size, to be the predominant factor in
regulating population growth. In reality, both aspects likely play a part in controlling popu-
lation growth to some extent. We will focus on the effects of density-dependent controls on
populations.
Game theory has been extensively applied to the study of fisheries, with contributions having
been thoroughly reviewed by Sumaila (1997) and by Bailey et al. (2010). Gordon (1954)
showed that the overexploitation of marine resources occurs because of their common prop-
erty nature, meaning they yield no economic rent, and found the optimal level of harvesting
for a single manager. Munro (1979) was the first to approach this problem using game
theory, in the context of two countries both exploiting a marine resource that straddles the
boundary of their Exclusive Economic Zones, and in particular how asymmetries in discount
rates, costs, and consumer tastes affect their outcomes. He combined the Schaefer (1954)
(also known as the Gordon-Schaefer) model of fisheries dynamics with an objective function
giving the discounted net cash flow from the fishery. It was found that allowing side pay-
ments from one player with low costs to the player with high costs reduced the game to a
sole manager situation, and thus allowed for optimal harvesting.
Levhari and Mirman (1980) contextualised their approach as a ‘great fish war’ for cod be-
tween Iceland and the United Kingdom. Their discrete time model particularly considered
population dynamics, and the fact that the density of the underlying marine resource changes
as a result of the actions of both players, meaning that each player must consider the effect
of their opponents actions of stock levels. This created what they call a ‘dynamic external-
ity’ (Levhari and Mirman, 1980) in the interaction between the two players. Dockner et al.
(1989) also considered a nonzero-sum game between two players exploiting a fishery with an
underlying Gordon-Schaefer model. Their model was duopolistic rather than one in which
there is sole ownership of the fishery, or open access to it. An important distinction is that
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the price of landed fish depended on the total quantity that is harvested by both players,
such that they are in a oligopolistic rather than competitive market. They considered both
Nash games, in which players choose their actions simultaneously, and Stackelberg games
(Von Stackelberg, 2010), in which a market leader first makes a decision, and the other player
responds.
A bioeconomic model of the exploitation occurring in a fishery can be created by coupling a
growth model of a fish population with a behavioural model of the actions taken in exploiting
that population. This model can be formulated as a non-cooperative game, where one or
more fishers chooses an action (their own fishing effort) such that an outcome occurs (their
own yield they have harvested from the fishery) for which they receive a payoff (the profit
obtained from fishing). If the resultant game has a form for which results in game theory
are well known, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, then these results can be extended to the
underlying fishing model, giving insight into which types of bioeconomic situations will allow
socially optimal outcomes to occur.
3.2 Population models
We will now give a brief description of the biological population models that will be used
in this chapter. One simple model of density dependent population growth is the logistic
equation, also known as the Pearl-Verhulst equation, in which the relevant population has a
per capita growth rate that decreases linearly with population density. Under such a model,
the population has a growth rate parameter r and a carrying capacity K which is the stable
equilibrium solution of the model. There is also another equilibrium solution where the
population is fully depleted and is therefore unable to be replenished. The growth of the
population u is given by:
du
dt
= f(u), f(0) = f(K) = 0 (3.1)
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for a continuous time model, or:
un+1 = f(un) f(0) = 0, f(K) = K (3.2)
for a discrete time model. Some common choices for the growth function include:




















• The Beverton-Holt map
f(u) = un+1 =
Kun
un + (K − un)e−rT )
(3.5)
Such models of population growth can be simply adapted to become models of harvesting
by adding a component of mortality due to resource extraction. We assume that the rate
of fishing mortality is proportional to the population density at any given time. With the
addition of a harvesting term the behaviour of the dynamical system representing the model
changes. The general form for a continuous time model is then:
du
dt
= f(u)− Fu (3.6)
Where F is the constant rate of fishing effort. For example, the logistic growth model can
be extended to become the Gordon-Schaefer model of fishing mortality by assuming that the

















representing the long-term population level under fishing effort F . The other occurs again at
u∗ = 0, representing the case where the population is fished to extinction. At the parameter
values F = r a transcritical bifurcation occurs, in which there is a qualitative change in the
behaviour of the system. This means that for F < r, the equilibrium point u∗ = K(1− F
r
)
is stable and the point u∗ = 0 is unstable, while for F > e these points switch stability. In
real terms this means that when the fishing mortality is less than the intrinsic growth rate of
the population, a “sustainable yield” (or equilibrium harvest rate) will be possible. However
when the fishing mortality is greater than the population growth rate, the population will
eventually be fished to extinction.










The Fox model also has two equilibria, at u∗ = 0 and at u∗ = K exp(−F
r
). Here a bifurcation




Let there be a fish population of density u that exhibits density dependent growth according
to the differential equation
du
dt
= f(u)− Fu, f(0) = f(K) = 0 (3.10)
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where r is the population growth rate, K is the carrying capacity, and F is the exploitation
rate. Without loss of generality, we can let K = 1. This population has no size-structure,
with u simply representing the biomass density of the population as a proportion of its car-
rying capacity.
We begin by considering a situation in which a single fisher has the sole ability (whether
through access or property rights) to exploit the fish population. We assume a fisher will
harvest at constant effort F during a fishing period of length T . The profit obtained by the





B is the price per unit biomass of fish, and c is the cost per unit effort. We will then extend
the model to allow the case of two fishers exploiting the same population. Each fisher will
have independent decision making behaviour, and so each fisher will be able to select their
own fishing effort F1 (or F2) at the beginning of each time period, in order to satisfy their
own optimality condition. For multiple fishers, the optimality condition is to maximise that
fisher’s own profit, and not the total payoff obtained by exploiting the fishery. We will then
further extend the model to an iterated game, in which the single stage game between the
two fishers is repeated, with the state of the population, and each player’s action, being able
to inform the players’ future decision making behaviour. In the iterated game, each fisher
has the ability to change their current effort F (n) at the beginning of the nth fishing period.
We will consider three implementations of this model in this chapter. These are
• Fast dynamics: This is a limiting case in which the population has a high growth
rate and so reaches biomass equilibrium quickly compared to the time-scale on which
changes in fishing effort (F ) occurs. In this case we are able to derive analytically
results including payoffs to individual fishers, and population biomass levels.
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• Slow dynamics: This is a numerical model in which the population has sufficiently
slow dynamics that growth and harvesting occur on similar time-scales.
• Separation of time-scales A numerical model of a fish population with a Beverton-
Holt map as the stock recruitment relationship. In this case reproduction occurs at
discrete intervals (at the beginning of each period), representing the regularly occurring
seasonal spawning process of the fish population. Exploitation happens continuously
throughout the period, and as such occurs in this case over a much longer time-scale
than population replenishment.
Figure 3.1 is a schematic diagram depicting the key differences between each of these mod-
els, in particular with their approach to time-scales. Each implementation considers discrete
fishing periods of equal length T . At the beginning of each fishing period, each fisher indi-
vidually chooses a level of fishing effort, which remains constant during this time. Figure
3.1 (a) shows an example of fishing efforts over 5 time periods, with these levels of effort
being applied to each of our harvesting models in (b)− (d). Harvesting occurs continuously
throughout each period in all of our models. In the equilibrium population model in Figure
3.1 (b), population growth is assumed to instantaneously reach its new equilibrium level
under the active fishing effort, at the beginning of the period. Population growth occurs
continuously during this time such that biomass levels are constant throughout each single
fishing period. In (c) we see the logistic growth model with slow dynamics. Here resource
growth also occurs continuously according to its governing differential equation. However,
as equilibrium is not quickly reached, population biomass levels will change over a fishing
period. Finally, (d) shows the response of the Beverton-Holt recruitment process to fishing.
In this case, population growth occurs discretely at the beginning of each period, with no
growth occurring during it. Therefore any population change at this time is entirely due to


















Density detemines yield 
∫ to determine yield 
∫ to determine yield 
Figure 3.1: Schematic diagram depicting the differences between how each of our models
respond to the same level of exploitation, with the same initial conditions. (a) shows the level
of fishing effort F being applied to a population over time t. (b) shows how the population
biomass u responds when it has logistic growth with fast dynamics. (c) is the biomass
response to this fishing effort for logistic growth with slow dynamics. (d) is the biomass level
for a Beverton-Holt growth model. In each case, exploitation occurs continuously throughout
each time period, with yield calculated by integrating over this time. The models differ in




We begin by assuming that 1/r ≪ T , so that the population will instantaneously reach
equilibrium, that is, the population density is in its equilibrium state (for the applied level of
fishing effort F ) for the entirety of the fishing period. Any transient behaviour from the state
of the population before exploitation reaching equilibrium is assumed to be insignificant and
ignored. This equilibrium population density is u∗(F ) where
f(u∗(F ))− Fu∗(F ) = 0. (3.12)
In this model, we consider a population that experiences logistic growth, and so is an example

















We first consider the situation in which there is a single fisher who has the exclusive and
unique ability to exploit a fishery. We do this to derive the monopolist profit level, which
is the greater economic return that can be obtained from the fishery and is the profit corre-
sponding to the MEY. This monopolist profit can then be used to determine a total payoff
from the fishery that is Pareto efficient, in a situation in which there is ore than one fisher.
Under our equilibrium assumption, u∗(F ) is clearly not changing over the fishing period, and
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so the equilibrium profit obtained by the fisher will be
P ∗(F ) = BFu∗(F )T − cFT (3.15)
We assume that the sole fisher is motivated by profit, and not other considerations such as
conservation. They will therefore act to maximise the profit they are able to obtain from
the fishery. We let FM be the monopolist effort, the effort level which maximises the profit
that can be extracted from the fishery, chosen so that
dP ∗
dF
(FM) = 0 (3.16)
where FM > 0. In the Gordon-Schaefer model, the monopolist profit is






T − cFMT (3.17)
Without loss of generality we can let the length of a fishing period be T = 1, and recalling









3.4.3 One-stage two-player game
What if there are two fishers who have identical access to the fishery? We assume they
receive the same price for fish, experience the same costs of fishing, and have the same profit
motivations driving their decision making behaviours. In this chapter, we will use i = 1, 2
to represent a player, and j = 1, 2 to represent the other player. We therefore let Fi be
the effort level chosen by the ith fisher. The total fishing effort is F = Fi + Fj, and so we
note that the equilibrium population density is dependent on the decisions made by each
player about their own effort. Because profit is dependent on biomass, this means that Pi,
the profit received by the ith player depends on both their own effort, and the other player’s
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effort.
We wish to know what the ideal behaviour is for each player under these conditions. The
socially optimal result (a Pareto equilibrium) will occur when the total payoff (that is the
economic profit) from the fishery is maximised, which will simply happen when the total
fishing effort of both fishers is equal to the monopolist effort, i.e. FM = Fi + Fj. Because of
the symmetry of the fishers’ situation, we can consider a case where they equally share these
profits, meaning Fi = Fj and so Pi = Pj. Consequently we define a “Pareto equilibrium” (or
“cooperative”) level of fishing effort FC = FM/2 which will allow this to happen when both
players choose this action. Note that while any combination of efforts which sums to the
monopolist effort will result in a Pareto optimal solution, we are restricting our consideration
to the particular case when that total effort is distributed equally between the fishers, in
order to define an action analogous to cooperating in the traditional prisoner’s dilemma. In









Analogously with the prisoner’s dilemma, we will refer to the choice by a fisher to fish
at the Pareto effort FC as cooperating, as like the prisoner’s dilemma when both players
choose this action a Pareto optimal solution will result. Each decision maker, however, is not
motivated by the goal of reaching the best social outcome, but is instead trying to maximise
their own profit, by playing a strategy against the other player. They are only concerned
with their competitor’s behaviour insofar as it affects their own outcomes. The players have
identical preferences for profit, and furthermore each knows this; this is a game of complete
information. We consider, analogously to Equation (3.15), the profit obtained by Player i:
Pi = BFiu
∗(Fi, Fj)T − cFiT (3.20)
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which is maximised when
∂
∂Fi
Pi (Fi, Fj) = 0 (3.21)
giving our optimality condition as
∂Pi
∂Fi





Fj − c = 0 (3.22)
Noting the dependence of this optimality condition on both players’ efforts, we denote Player
is best response s∗i (Fj) as a function of Player j’s effort; for each possible choice of effort
by Player j this is Player i’s “best response” strategy. Noting the symmetry of the players’
situations, we also have Player j attempting to maximise their profit with respect to the
behaviour of Player i, and so they also have a best response strategy Fj = s
∗
j(Fi) to Player
i’s actions. Because of symmetry, these best responses must be the same,
s∗j(F ) = s
∗
i (F ) (3.23)
We consider the case where both players choose to play best responses to the other player’s
actions, which by definition means there is a Nash equilibrium at (Fi, Fj). The actions each
must therefore be the same, that is Fi = Fj, and so Equation (3.22) is easily solvable. We
let FD, the “Nash effort” be this effort value where both players are playing mutual best
responses to the other’s strategy. The Nash effort in our model corresponds to the choice to
defect in a traditional prisoner’s dilemma.










which gives the value of Fi which will maximise Player i’s profit for a given value of Fj. This













meaning that when Player i is fishing at any non-zero effort level, their own profit will de-
crease as a result of any increase in Player j’s fishing effort. This is the Tragedy of the
Commons (Hardin, 1968), where the impacts of the decreased biomass caused by Player j’s
increase in fishing effort are shared between all players, while Player j takes all the reward
due to their increased yield.










We will refer to the choice of effort FD as defecting, analogously to the prisoner’s dilemma
example, as fishing at FC represents a choice by a fisher to maximise their own profit, with
respect to whichever action the other fisher may take.
While a continuous range of potential fishing efforts is allowable in a single-stage game,
in order to form meaningful conclusions about the fishers’ decision making behaviour we
can restrict these actions to create a sub-game in which the results of our model hold true.
By limiting the fishing effort which may be chosen by each player down to a possible two
discrete choices, we can therefore consider the model in the form of a two-player game with
two possible (and identical) actions for each player, similar to the structure of many common
games. These actions are to “cooperate”, or to fish with effort FC , or to “defect” and fish
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Table 3.2: A summary of the efforts (actions) of each player, their profits (payoffs), and
the equilibrium population density for each possible outcome of the game. We define the





and β = r
B
(B − C)2
with effort FD, as derived in this section. It is clear from Equations (3.27) and (3.19) that
FC < FD, such that defecting means exploiting the fish population at a higher level than
cooperating. Recall from Subsection 1.1.2 that higher fishing efforts result in higher yields,
but not necessarily higher profits. In this chapter we therefore expect the yields obtained
when players defect to be higher than when they cooperate, and consequently that the re-
sultant population levels will be lower under defection.
This game can be formulated as a single-stage game which will in the next section be repeated
to form an iterated game. As we have analytical equations for the two possible actions in
the game (for any parameter values), we can obtain the equilibrium population densities and
the players’ rewards for each possible outcome. In such a two-player game, there are four
possible rewards:
• “Reward” (Re): Both Players cooperate
• “Sucker” (Su): Player i cooperates and Player j defects
• “Temptation” (Te): Player i defects and Player i cooperates
• “Punishment” (Pu): Both Players defect
The results for each of the payoffs (for Player i) are summarised in Table 3.2. Clearly the
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Reward Sucker Temptation Punishment
Fi 0.3130 0.3130 0.4789 0.4789
Fj 0.3130 0.4789 0.3130 0.4789
u∗ 0.5347 0.4530 0.4530 0.3838
Pi 0.1048 0.0792 0.1212 0.0880
Pj 0.1048 0.1212 0.0792 0.0880
Table 3.3: A summary of the efforts (i.e. action) of each player, their profits (payoffs),
and the equilibrium population density for each possible outcome of the game when the
population grows according to the Fox model. Here r = 1, K = 1, B = 1 and C = 0.2.
payoff ordering
Su > Re > Pu > Te (3.28)
means that our restricted game is equivalent to a standard prisoner’s dilemma. Consequently,
as expected, in a one-shot game the solution is a Nash equilibrium in which both players de-
fect, and existing results apply with regards to the success of strategies in the repeated game.
We also considered the Fox model of fishing, an alternative continuous time population
model for which numerical results were used to obtain the possible effort choices for each
player. This model did not produce qualitatively different results, with a prisoner’s dilemma
situation emerging as above. Table 3.3 gives numerical values for efforts, payoffs, and biomass
for each possible outcome of the Fox model for a specific set of parameters. The relationship
between payoff values for each outcome was invariant to parameter changes, meaning the
2-player game was equivalent to prisoner’s dilemma for all parameter values.
3.4.4 Repeated two-player game
We can form an iterated game by repeating our single shot game over an infinite time horizon
(with discounting of payoffs by a factor of δ). Note that because the single shot game was a
prisoner’s dilemma when restricted to 2 actions, and because of the clear ordering of outcomes
2Re > Su+ Te seen in Table 3.2, this repeated game will be consistent with an IPD. Each
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player knows the state of the fishery (that is its biomass u) at each point in time, representing
the ability to perfectly assess stock levels. They are able to infer directly the moves their
opponent makes in each stage-game, as they know both their own action at that time and
the population dynamics. This iterated game is therefore a game of perfect information. At
the outset of the repeated game, players choose a strategy profile defining the action they
will take given the state of the game in previous iterations. The list of considered strategies
here (or in similar cases throughout the chapter) are:
• Always cooperate (ALLC) (1, 1, 1, 1)
• Always defect (ALLD) (0, 0, 0, 0)
• Tit-for-tat (TFT ) (1, 0, 1, 0), cooperate in the first stage-game
• Suspicious tit-for-tat (STFT ) (1, 0, 1, 0), same as tit-for-tat, but defect in the first
stage-game
• Generous tit-for-tat (GTFT ) (1, 0.01, 1, 0.01), has a 1% chance of forgiving defection
by the other player
• Very generous tit-for-tat (V GTFT ) (1, 0.1, 1, 0.1), has a 10% chance of forgiving de-
fection by the other player
• Pavlov or win-stay-lose-shift strategy (WSLS) (1, 0, 0, 1)
• Suspicious win-stay-lose-shift (SWSLS) (1, 0, 0, 1) same as Pavlov, but defect in the
first stage-game
• Sly (0, 0, 1, 1) defect if there was a favourable payoff in the last stage-game
In Figure 3.2 we see the profit obtained by Player 1 in this equilibrium density IPD, when
both players choose different combinations of these strategies. In this heatmap, rows repre-
sent the strategy employed by Player 1, with columns representing the strategy played by
their opponent. In each case in Figure 3.2 we see that the relative performance of strategy
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ALLC ALLD TFT STFT GTFT VGTFT WSLS
ALLC 1.125 0.938 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.125
ALLD 1.250 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.003 1.025 1.125
TFT 1.125 1.000 1.125 1.094 1.125 1.125 1.125
STFT 1.125 1.000 1.094 1.000 1.125 1.125 1.063
GTFT 1.125 0.999 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.125
VGTFT 1.125 0.994 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.125 1.125







Figure 3.2: A heatmap for the average profit obtained by Player 1 in an IPD, when different
strategy profiles are played. At each iteration of the game, population equilibrium is reached,
as the population has fast resource dynamics. Parameter values are r = 20, K = 1, B = 1,
and c = 0.2. The payoffs are normalised by the value of the Nash equilibrium (the ALLD
vs ALLD payoff) which here is 1.422. Relative performance of strategy profiles are here as
expected from the standard results for a prisoners’ dilemma.
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profiles is as expected from existing results for an infinite time horizon IPD (Axelrod, 1981;
Imhof et al., 2005). For example, when ALLC plays ALLD it is dominated, as the ALLD
player will receive the temptation payoff in each stage-game, while the ALLC player only
obtains the sucker payoff. In an evolutionary game theory scenario, a population of ALLC
players is therefore vulnerable to being invaded by ALLD players(Imhof et al., 2005). In a
series of well-known simulations comparing many strategies for an IPD, tit-for-tat was the
most successful strategy (Axelrod, 980a,b) because it is “nice”, meaning that a TFT player
will never defect first. It is provocable into retaliation if there are deviations from cooper-
ation, and quickly forgiving, as if a player that had defected begins to cooperate the TFT
player will resume cooperation (Axelrod, 1981). Looking at Figure 3.2, we see that TFT
performs relatively well against each strategy. In particular, when TFT plays ALLD, they
receive the same payoff (the Nash equilibrium). TFT is resilient to being taken advantage of
by ALLD. Furthermore, when TFT plays itself, it receives the cooperative reward payoff,
which is greater than the punishment payoff. No strategy performs better against TFT than
TFT performs against that other strategy, and no strategy performs better against TFT
than TFT performs against TFT . TFT is therefore robust to being invaded by ALLD, as
ALLD does not strictly outperform it. Many of our other considered strategies are variations
of TFT . The type of variation is responsible for differing relative performance against other
strategies. For example, a forgiving strategy such as GTFT , which has a small chance of
cooperating after a defection, can break the cycle of alternating cooperation and defection
that happens when a TFT variant plays STFT . The downside to the generosity is that




The following section approach is an attempt to deal with populations in which the pop-
ulation growth rate r is low, or changes in fishers’ fishing effort F occur more frequently,
such that the fish population does not quickly reach equilibrium during any single fishing
period. This corresponds to the situation depicted in Figure 3.1 (c), where reproduction and
exploitation happen on a similar time-scale. In this model, players cannot directly observe
the state of the fishery; this is a game of imperfect information. This represents a situa-
tion where fishers do not have accurate estimates of stock levels, and of population growth
parameters. As in the previous model, we consider both the case where there is a single
fisher with exclusive access, and the case where there are two identical fishers, each aiming
to maximise their own profit. In the two player case, as before we will obtain two possible
actions, a “Pareto” effort analogous to cooperating in a prisoner’s dilemma, and a “Nash”
effort which occurs when a player chooses to defect. The constructed two-player, two-action
symmetrical stage-game will then be repeated in the final part of this section.
3.5.1 Monopolist solution
In this model, we assume a monopolist fisher has limited knowledge about the targeted fish
population. The fisher knows the population has logistic growth, the carrying capacity, and
population growth rate. They do not however know the actual amount of population biomass
at any time, and are only able to infer it through consideration of their own yield. As be-
fore, the monopolist behaviour is investigated in order to determine the profit-maximising
(MEY) action in the fishery, such that we can derive a Pareto efficient combination of fishing
behaviours in the two-player situation.
The single player, as in the previous section, will act to maximise the payoff they receive
by choosing the effort with which they exploit the fishery. How should they do this if they
do not know the current population density? From the previous section (the fast dynamics
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case), we know that the effort FM (from equation (3.18)) will maximise the payoff obtained
at equilibrium. With slow dynamics, the population will still eventually reach an equilibrium
density (with constant exploitation). Therefore if the monopolist fisher has to set a constant
strength of fishing effort, for the slow resource case we will have the same payoff maximising
FM as in the fast resource case. We note that because of the slower dynamics, the profit
obtained by a monopolist over a period of fishing at effort FM will likely be different than
that at equilibrium.
3.5.2 One-stage two-player game
We now turn to the two-player, single-shot game case with slow resource dynamics. As
before, each player will choose their action to maximise payoff, given their knowledge of the
population behaviour, and their expectations of their opponent’s behaviour. In a single-shot
game, each player chooses an action once, with this combination of actions determining each
player’s payoff. As the players do not know the current state of the population, we can
assume that they would act as if the population was at, or was able to reach, equilibrium.
Consequently both players know the efforts FC and FD at which they should fish in order
to cooperate or defect, as calculated in the fast resource dynamics case with logistic growth
dynamics. They also have a concept of the profit and yield they should receive at equilibrium
from each of the possible outcomes of this game. That is, they know the yield they would
receive in the long term if fishing at the Pareto effort or the Nash effort, given the other
player’s behaviour. Because the population dynamics in this case can be slow, such that
the fish population does not reach equilibrium quickly in the fishing period, the actual yield
gained by a fisher will possibly be different than the expected equilibrium value.
3.5.3 Repeated two-player game
As before, the single stage-game with two players can be repeated to form an iterated game,
in which each player will choose a strategy profile that allows them to change their fish-
ing effort at the beginning of each iteration, based on the state of the game. Recall that
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each fisher’s effort will, however, remain constant throughout an single fishing period. In
order to make the action space numerically feasible, we will assume that the efforts able to
be chosen by each player are the Nash effort FD and the Pareto effort FC detailed previously.
How does having slow dynamics affect the iterated version of this game? The fishers do
not have any ability to actually know the current population biomass at any given time, and
therefore also do not know the previous actions of the other player. They must instead indi-
rectly measure population biomass by considering their biomass yield Y during the fishing





A players payoff is directly related to their own yield, as:
Pi = BYi − cFiT (3.30)
Each fisher is also unable to observe directly the other player’s action during any fishing
period, and therefore can only attempt to discern it by considering their own yield. If the
yield obtained by Player i is less than they expected during the nth fishing period, then it
is reasonable for them to assume that Player j defected during that period. We therefore
define a new parameter Y ∗, the critical threshold yield, which is the minimum yield, when
cooperating, that either player will accept in order to be convinced that the other player
has also cooperated during that fishing period. We choose this threshold yield to be the
midpoint between the yield obtained when both players cooperate at equilibrium, and the
yield obtained when both players defect at equilibrium. This parameter allows us to develop
imperfect information variants of the memory-one strategies describe in Section 3.4.4. These
strategies behave similarly, except that decisions about opponent’s prior behaviour come
from indirect beliefs based on the threshold yield, rather than direct observation of actions.
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For a sufficiently large number of fishing periods that the effects of transient behaviour
can be disregarded, we use numerically determine the population dynamics and the yields
obtained by each player. Each fishing period constitutes a single iteration of a repeated
two-player game. Each player chooses a memory-one strategy to determine their choice of
action at the beginning of each fishing period. As their opponent’s action is not definitively
known, these strategy profiles are not functions of the other player’s actions, but of the yield
obtained. Effectively, if the yield of Player i during the nth fishing period is less than that
threshold yield:
Yi(n, n+ T ) < Y
∗ (3.31)
then Player i has the belief that Player j defected during the previous fishing period, and if
Player i’s yield is greater than the threshold yield:
Yi(n, n+ T ) > Y
∗ (3.32)
then Player i has the belief that Player j cooperated during the previous fishing period,
allowing the state of the population, according to each player’s respective strategy profiles,
to be determined.
Using this method of determining each players’ perception of their opponent’s actions, we
use simulations to numerically calculate the performance of different strategies against each
other. For each possible combination of considered strategies, a large number of iterations of
an IPD are run, with the population biomass, fishing efforts, and payoffs being determined
over this time. Eulers method was used to solve (3.13) in order to determine the popula-
tion biomass over time, given the present combination of fishing efforts. In each case the
initial condition of the population was u = K, meaning the population was initially at its
unexploited carrying capacity level. IPDs for each combination of strategies were simulated
a large number of times, with average outcomes calculated. The normalised average profit
obtained by Player 1 for each combination of strategies is given in Figure 3.3. We note the
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normalisation factor for profit is much lower than in the high growth rate case (in part due
to the dependence of profit on growth rate), meaning that the actual profits obtained in
this case are lower than in the previous section. Furthermore, the relative performance of
different strategies are not identical to those in the fast dynamics model. For example, in this
iterated game, ALLD outperforms TFT , receiving a higher payoff when those strategies are
played against each other. This suggests that TFT is not robust to invasion by ALLD here.
When these two strategies play each other in an IPD, we expect continual mutual defections,
with neither strategy outperforming the other in the long term. Here, it appears that the
ALLD player can take advantage of the TFT player; in some number of stage-games, the
slow dynamics mean that the TFT receives a yield above the threshold level, and so they
assume the ALLD player cooperated in that previous stage-game. This causes the TFT
player to get the sucker payoff while the ALLD player gets the temptation payoff. Overall,
the TFT player will receive some combination of punishment and sucker payoffs, and the
ALLD player a combination of punishment and temptation in the same ratio. In contrast to
the fast dynamics model, TFT does not perform as well against any strategy as that strat-
egy does against TFT . Variations of TFT (STFT , GTFT , V GTFT ) perform identically to
it, while the Pavlov (WSLS) strategy performs worse against ALLD than TFT does. We
conclude for this iterated game with slow dynamics, our imperfect information strategies do
not result in the same payoff structure as with fast dynamics in an IPD.
3.6 Separation of time-scales
Our third and final approach is motivated by the biological nature of stock recruitment in fish
populations, where population growth due to stock recruitment often occurs generationally
in discrete spawning periods (Booth and Beretta, 1994; Allen and Barker, 1990; Campana,
1996). In addition to this, a major goal of this thesis is to understand the effect of population
stochasticity on optimal fishing behaviour. It is therefore worthwhile to develop a model in
which noise in the population growth process can be added in the future. This interim model
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ALLC ALLD TFT STFT GTFT VGTFT WSLS SWSLS SLY
ALLC 1.124 0.935 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 0.935 0.935
ALLD 1.247 1.000 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.129 1.166 1.166 1.124
TFT 1.124 0.980 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 0.980 0.980
STFT 1.124 0.980 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 0.980 0.980
GTFT 1.124 0.980 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 0.980 0.980
VGTFT 1.124 0.980 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 0.980 0.980
WSLS 1.124 0.969 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.124 0.969 0.969
SWSLS 1.247 0.969 1.124 1.124 1.124 1.129 1.166 1.107 1.073







Figure 3.3: Payoff comparison heatmap for strategy profiles when exploiting a population
with slow growth dynamics. The average profits for Player 1 (strategies in rows) given here
are obtained numerically from a large number of iterations of the game, and are normalised
to the value (0.0356) of the Nash equilibrium (ALLD vs ALLD) solution. Parameter values
are r = 0.5, K = 1, B = 1, and c = 0.2.
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will provide a link by which we can compare successful strategies from these deterministic
game theoretic models with any results obtained when there is noisy population growth. In
fisheries, the majority of noise occurs as variability in the reproductive process (Hjort, 1914;
Swearer et al., 1999; Fogarty et al., 1991), and so we want to use a population model for
which we will be easily able to add a random variable to the change in population. Further-
more, in order to be able to consider distinct generations of the population we want to use
a population model for which spawning occurs at discrete time intervals, which represent
the seasonal spawning of the population. As in the equilibrium game model, we look at the
effects of a single fisher exploiting the population, under the same assumptions. Though
reproduction occurs in discrete generations, the harvesting of the population will occur con-
tinuously throughout the fishing period, such that un(t) is the population density at time
t (0 ≤ t ≤ T ) during the nth period. When a single fisher fishes with constant effort F
over the nth fishing period of length T , the fish population will experience exponential decay
during this time, that is, un(T ) = un(0)e
−FT .
We therefore consider the Beverton-Holt map un+1(0) = f(un(T )), which gives the new
population biomass after spawning (at the beginning of a new time period) as a determinis-




une(−FT ) + (K − une(−FT )) e(−rT )
(3.33)
which can be understood as a discrete-time equivalent of the previously considered logistic
growth model. This equation describes the new population due to stock recruitment, with
a time T between generations spawning, in which resource depletion due to fishing occurs.
3.6.1 Monopolist solution
Again, we begin by examining the profit maximising fishing behaviour for a single fisher,
with exclusive access to the fishery. For this system to be in an equilibrium state we must
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have:
un+1 = un (3.34)





Within a single time period, the fish biomass decays exponentially with fishing effort accord-
ing to:




The fisher acts according to the assumptions set out in Section 2.1, and so as in that section
we can obtain a monopolist effort FM , which is the action that will result the best output
for that player by optimising their payoff P ∗(FM):





























− cT = 0 (3.38)
3.6.2 One-stage two-player game
As in the earlier sections of this chapter, we will now develop the game corresponding to this
separated time-scales model to allow the decision making behaviour of two players. We can
begin by determining an equitable “Pareto solution” level of effort FC = FM/2 for each of
the two (symmetrically behaving) players, which corresponds to the decision to cooperate in
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a standard prisoner’s dilemma. Similarly we can obtain the Nash effort FD by noting that
when two fishers are exploiting the population, we are exponentially depleting the population
by the total effort Fi + Fj, so that:
un+1 =
Kun exp(−(Fi + Fj)T )
un exp(−(Fi + Fj)T ) + (K − un exp(−(Fi + Fj)T )) exp(−rT )
(3.39)
and following an identical process to that done in the monopolist version of this model. The
profit obtained by Player i, for a given level of fishing effort Fj by the other player is:















With the population growing according to a Beverton-Holt map, we obtain the “Nash solu-
tion” effort FD by solving numerically Equation (3.40).
3.6.3 Iterated two-player game
Finally, we again allow our single-shot game with both players to be repeated over an infi-
nite time horizon, with each player choosing a strategy profile determining the actions they
will take at stages of the iterated game, based on the state of the system. Without loss of
generality, we let the carrying capacity K = 1, as well as the length of the fishing period
T = 1. Letting B = 1 and c = 0.1, we investigate how the possible effort actions change
as we alter the growth rate parameter r. Figure 3.4 (a) gives the equilibrium solutions to
Equations (3.38) and (3.40), and shows that as expected, the choice to defect means ex-
ploiting the fish population more intensively than the choice to cooperate (as seen in each of
the previous models). These special levels of effort which the fishers harvest at are used to
determine the equilibrium population density under each possible outcome, or combination
of effort choices by the players. Figure 3.4 (b) shows how the equilibrium density changes
as the growth rate r increases. We note that for each possible value of r, the solution where
90
both players cooperate has the largest equilibrium density out of all possible outcomes, as
expected when the total magnitude of exploitation of the fishery is the least. Figure 3.4 (c)
shows that that the payoffs (profits to the individual players) for each of the possible out-
comes are such that that the game constructed under the assumptions of this model satisfies
the necessary condition to be a prisoner’s Dilemma. Furthermore, Figure 3.4 (d) shows that
the relative magnitudes of these payoffs are such that for all values of r the single-shot when
repeated will be an IPD, with all corresponding properties of that game applying to it. As
these results hold true as r is varied, we expect that the population growth rate parameter
does not qualitatively affect the structure of the resulting game, and so perfect information
strategies should have payoffs as expected in line with Section 3.4.4.
As with both the fast and slow dynamics continuous time models, we can numerically cal-
culate the average profits obtained by a player for each of our combinations of imperfect
information strategies. As before, this is done using numerical simulations, to find the av-
erage profit obtained by players using each combination of strategies, over a large number
of fishing periods. In this model, Euler’s method used to solve differential equations, and
the MATLAB command “fzero” was used to find the levels of effort maximising profit in
Equations (3.38) and (3.40). In Figure 3.5, a Beverton-Holt growth model with fast dy-
namics (with r = 20 as in 3.2) is used. We see that in this case, the normalisation factor
for profits is much lower than in the logistic growth model with identical parameter values.
However, the relative structure of the performances of each strategy, matching typical IPD
results, remains. We see that memory-one strategies have a similar performance against each
other as in Section 3.4.4. In particular, we see again in this case that TFT performs well
against most other strategies; the only one that dominates it is Sly, which is designed to
take advantage of “nice” behaviour. We note that Sly performs worse against itself than
TFT performs against itself. We also observe that in this case, unlike the slow dynamics
model, TFT cannot be invaded by ALLD. In general, with this high growth rate result we
expect populations to reach equilibrium in each iteration, and so expect the performance
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of the imperfect information strategies in simulations to correspond to the results from a
standard IPD.
We can also compare the Beverton-Holt growth model with the logistic model when there
are slow dynamics. Figure 3.6 shows the numerically determined average profits for this.
With slow dynamics, the profit normalisation factor for the Beverton-Holt model is similar
(but slightly lower) than that of the logistic growth case. In this model, we again see that
ALLD can beat TFT . However, unlike in Section3.5, TFT performs better against itself
than ALLD does against TFT .
3.7 Discussion
In the construction of our decision making model, fishers are solely motivated by their own
payoffs. In particular, they wish to maximise their profit from the fishery, whether in a
single fishing period in one stage-game, or over a period of time in the iterated game. If we
instead take a more holistic view of the ecosystem, then we can consider how different types
of fishing behaviour and strategy profiles affect not only the economic output of the fishery,
but also the ecological impacts of these actions. In this model, the ecological health of the
population is measured by considering the population biomass under exploitation. Specifi-
cally, we can compare the resultant population biomass for a specific harvesting behaviour
to the unexploited biomass, to see the extent of the population depletion that occurs due
to fishing. We note that when a prisoner’s dilemma scenario emerges from our model, the
Pareto optimal solution is associated with a lower aggregate fishing effort than the Nash
equilibrium. In a Gordon-Schaefer population model, higher rates of exploitation result in
lower abundance. As such, the Pareto optimal solution has a higher equilibrium population
biomass than the Nash equilibrium. This means the Pareto equilibrium is not just socially
optimal in the game theoretic sense of maximising the total payoffs obtained by the fishers,






ALLC ALLD TFT STFT GTFT VGTFT WSLS SWSLS SLY
ALLC 1.261 0.864 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.261 0.864 0.864
ALLD 1.503 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.004 1.054 1.269 1.269 1.503
TFT 1.261 1.000 1.261 1.222 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.150 1.145
STFT 1.261 1.000 1.222 1.130 1.261 1.261 1.150 1.150 1.170
GTFT 1.261 0.998 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.165
VGTFT 1.261 0.983 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.139
WSLS 1.261 0.915 1.261 1.150 1.261 1.261 1.261 1.043 1.134
SWSLS 1.503 0.915 1.150 1.149 1.261 1.261 1.289 1.086 1.134







Figure 3.5: A strategy payoff heatmap using the Beverton-Holt population model with fast
growth dynamics. Parameter values are r = 20, K = 1, B = 1, and C = 0.2. Payoff values
are normalised by a factor of 0.1896, the value of the Nash equilibrium payoff. We note that
the payoffs for each strategy profile are significantly lower than the corresponding logistic
growth example with identical parameter values.
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ALLC ALLD TFT STFT GTFT VGTFT WSLS SWSLS SLY
ALLC 1.192 0.952 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 0.952 0.952
ALLD 1.336 1.000 1.129 1.129 1.129 1.141 1.192 1.192 1.336
TFT 1.192 0.988 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.150 1.123
STFT 1.192 0.988 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.150 1.123
GTFT 1.192 0.988 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.150 1.189
VGTFT 1.192 0.988 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.141 1.183
WSLS 1.192 0.976 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.192 1.069 1.105
SWSLS 1.336 0.976 1.135 1.135 1.138 1.147 1.069 1.069 1.105







Figure 3.6: A strategy comparison heatmap for a population with Beverton-Holt growth
with slow dynamics. Parameter values are r = 0.5, K = 1, B = 1, and C = 0.2. The
normalisation factor here is 0.0333, the Nash equilibrium payoff. Payoff values are in each
case slightly lower than in the corresponding logistic growth model.
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In our fast resource dynamics model, we explicitly see in Equation (3.26) that in a two-
player game, an increase in effort by one player will result in a reduction in the profit gained
by the other player (when that player is active in exploiting the fish population). This is
what is known as “the tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968), where the costs result-
ing from increased exploitation are shared by all who have access to the resource, but the
benefits are only received by the fisher who increased the intensity of their exploitation.
While this concept is typically applied to open-access resources, which is not strictly the
case in our two player model, it was originally formulated in terms of “common” grazing
land which was shared by a small number of users. Furthermore if our model was extended
to an open-access fishery with n fishers (which is simple to do in the fast resource dynamics
case), this tragedy of the commons would still occur. There, the increased economic costs
of over-exploitation would be shared by all fishers, with the increased benefits only obtained
by one. However, the concept of the actions (due to increased exploitation) of one fisher
imposing an increased economic cost on another fisher still applies. In our model, this higher
economic cost occurs due to a reduction in the population biomass available to be caught by
the other player. There has been some criticism of the tragedy of the commons as a concept,
with some contending that it does not accurately describe real life situations (Feeny et al.,
1996). Indeed, the fact that common land was successfully used for centuries without critical
overexploitation occurring has led to the suggestion that common property resources result
in “triumph”, not tragedy (Cox, 1985; Coop and Brunckhorst, 1999). In many real life fishing
situations the tragedy of the commons has been observed to not occur, as decision makers
collectively act in ways to avoid negative outcomes, and protect their resource (Berkes, 1985).
In our model, we are trying to understand the decision making behaviour of fishers interact-
ing without regulation or intervention from any overriding governing body. It is therefore
not appropriate to treat our results as situations that can be dealt with by adding additional
factors modelling such regulation. However, in our repeated games, we see that coopera-
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tive solutions can arise naturally between players, with cooperative strategies such as TFT
performing well in terms of payoffs. In our cooperative outcomes, we saw that individual
players acting for their own best interest in the short term (by acting to maximise profits)
resulted in outcomes that were in the collective best interest for both players (in terms of
both total profit at the Pareto solution, and minimised population depletion).
Pareto optimality occurs when it is impossible to allocate resources, through the choice
of the fishers’ efforts, in such a way that makes any player better off (in terms of increased
payoff) without making the other player worse off. However, a system being Pareto efficient
does not specify that any degree of equality or equitability has occurred. In our model, we
defined our “cooperative” or Pareto effort to be that of half the monopolist effort. This is
an example of a Pareto optimal strategy, and one in which both players will receive equal
payoffs (due to their equal effort and costs). However, any situation in which F1 + F2 = FM
holds true will in fact be a Pareto efficient solution, as in any such case an increase in effort
by either player will result in a reduction in the payoff to the other player, meaning Pareto
optimality would hold. For simplicity, and noting the symmetries of the players’ situations,
we made an assumption restricting effort choices to either the Nash equilibrium effort FD
or our single Pareto effort FC , in order to investigate the type of two-player, two-action
game that would arise (and in doing so determined this game was equivalent to a prisoner’s
dilemma). However, any of the other Pareto equilibria would still be valid solutions to the
game. We do however note that, as seen in Equations (3.22) and (3.26), the rate of change
of a player’s profit as either player changes their actions depends on the relative size of those
efforts. The potential increase in payoff to the player with the lowest payoff that could be
obtained by choosing to defect and move away from the Pareto equilibrium will be minimised
when F1 = F2 = FC , relative to any of the unevenly distributed Pareto solutions. The player
with the greater share of the profit (that is the higher effort) will instead have a smaller
incentive to fish at the Nash effort, as the marginal increase in payoff due to defection will
be lower for the fisher with the higher profit at an uneven Pareto solution.
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The separation of time-scales in which reproduction and fishing occur is a reasonable as-
sumption. Spawning periods often occur on an annual time-scale (Booth and Beretta, 1994;
Allen and Barker, 1990; Campana, 1996), whereas fishing can occur either seasonally or
continuously throughout the year. In either case, the spawning period can occur over a
much shorter period of time than the length for which fishing occurs (Conover and Present,
1990). By discretizing the reproductive dynamics, the Beverton-Holt growth model is there-
fore suitable for this purpose. As it is the discrete time equivalent of a logistic model, it also
captures similar behaviour to the Gordon-Schaefer model in terms of rates of growth relative
to carrying capacity (Berezansky and Braverman, 2004). We also assumed that the rate of
exploitation by a fisher was fixed at a constant value for the entire length of a single fishing
period, with the fishers having the ability to change it between fishing periods. As the length
of each fishing period is essentially an arbitrary one (which we generally allowed to be one
year), this assumption is also reasonable, as we could change the length of the period in the
implementation of the model in order to see how the ability to change behaviour at a higher
frequency effects the behaviour of fishers and their payoffs. This will have a predominant
impact on the slow resource dynamic case, as the underlying assumption of that model is
that fishing and reproduction occur on similar time-scales.
There is significant scope to extend this modelling process further. As a starting point,
there are an unlimited number of mixed strategies that can be used in a two-player game,
though not all are either interesting or intuitive as a decision making process (Tadelis, 2013).
We have mainly considered memory-one strategies, though strategies in which players have
memories of any length could be developed and used. However, there is likely to be some com-
putational trade-off between any potential gains in terms of payoff values, and the increased
complexity of some strategies. Furthermore, while there may be an increase in obtained
payoffs when playing against the current strategies, this does not preclude other new strate-
gies or combinations of strategies from outperforming them (Boyd and Lorberbaum, 1987).
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Particular, promising strategies could be chosen, or a method such as a genetic algorithm
could be used to generate possible strategies that could be compared in simulations to our




Applying Markov decision processes
to the monopolistic exploitation of a
fishery with stochastic stock
recruitment
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Overview of chapter
Fish populations are noisy (Hjort, 1914; Doherty and Williams, 1988). In this chapter, we
will describe optimal fishing behaviour in such noisy conditions, taking into account how
both current decision making behaviour and biological variability will impact future profits.
To do so, we use Markov models; fishing behaviour is considered “memoryless”, depending
only on the present state of the fish population. The first part of the chapter details the op-
timal harvesting behaviour for a monopolist. We use Markov decision processes (Puterman,
2014) to model this monopolist fisher’s decision maker behaviour, obtaining an “optimal
policy”, mapping from the current population state to the best choice of action, for specific
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model conditions. Next, this concept is extended to a two-player game, where each fisher
is independently attempting to maximise their own long-term profit. This Markov game
(Littman, 1994) is solved to find a policy for each player that is a “best-response” to their
beliefs of how the other will harvest the fish population.
The noise in fish stock levels can occur because of environmental reasons such as: seasons, cli-
mate (Lehodey et al., 2006) and temperature variations (O’Brien et al., 2000); inter-specific
interactions (Pritt et al., 2014); variations in available nutrients (Swearer et al., 1999); spa-
tial heterogeneity (Wiens, 1976; Levin, 1976); simple differences in individual characteristics
(Lomnicki, 1978; Tyler and Rose, 1994); and fecundity of members of the population (Houde
and Hoyt, 1987; Pepin and Myers, 1991). Noise can be expressed both continuously over
time through growth and death processes, and discretely in the reproductive process. It is
this variability in stock recruitment that has the predominant impact on the stochasticity of
population levels (Hjort, 1914; Swearer et al., 1999; Fogarty et al., 1991), and which will be
investigated in this chapter.
Generational spawning is common in fish species, with this often occurring annually (Booth
and Beretta, 1994; Allen and Barker, 1990; Campana, 1996) over short spawning seasons
(Conover and Present, 1990). Stock recruitment relationships are used to describe the growth
of a fish population from generation to generation, with concern paid to the ways in which
the current level of a fish population will be responsible for future population levels (Beverton
and Holt, 2012; Ricker, 1954).
4.1.2 Population modelling
One commonly used deterministic model of the stock recruitment relationship is the Beverton-
Holt growth model (Beverton and Holt, 2012), which can be considered to be the discrete
time equivalent of a logistic (Pearl-Verlhust) growth process (Berezansky and Braverman,
2004). The Beverton-Holt map gives the expected density un+1 of the population in genera-
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tion n+1 as a function of the expected density un in the previous generation. The population
is modelled to have a fixed carrying capacity K, a constant growth rate r, and with time T
between generations. The new expected population density is then given by
un+1 =
Kun
un + (K − un) exp (−rT )
. (4.1)
Other alternative methods of modelling fish populations also exist. For instance, the Ricker
model (Ricker, 1954), in which








is also a discrete time model of successive generations. It differs from the Beverton-Holt
model in that at high stock sizes, recruitment will begin to decrease, in order to capture
the effects of factors such as cannibalism. Both the Beverton-Holt model and the Ricker
model contain both density-dependent and density-independent terms. Continuous time
models such as the logistic growth model can also be used. For such a model, any noise
could be added as a stochastic process to create a stochastic differential equation (or could
be added in yearly increments). Continuous models could be used to represent sources of
noise that occur consistently throughout the individual growth processes occurring between
generational spawning.
4.1.3 Markov decision processes
When mathematically modelling the decision making behaviour of individuals in situations
where both the decisions themselves and randomness can affect outcomes, Markov decision
processes (MDPs) are an effective tool to use (Puterman, 2014). MDPs are discrete time
stochastic control processes consisting of
• A state space S
• A set of actions A which the decision maker can choose from
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• For each pair of states s and s′, and action a, the transition probability Q(a, s, s′)
which is the probability that the choice of action a in state s will lead to state s’.
• R(a, s, s′) is the immediate reward (or one-stage payoff) for the decision maker when
a transition from state s to state s′ occurs, due to the choice of action a.
• δ is the discount factor of future rewards compared to current rewards, equivalently
the fraction of the profit this year that an equal profit next year is valued.
MDPs exhibit the Markov property, in that the future effects of any decision at any time
only depend on the current state of the system, without any dependence at all on the history
of the system (Puterman, 2014). As such, MDPs are an extension of a Markov process to
allow the influence of actions made by a decision maker on the outcomes.
Markov decision processes are solved by finding an optimal policy Π : S → A, which is
a mapping from the set of states S to the set of actions A, and which specifies the action a
decision maker should take in each state, at each time (Puterman, 2014). In a single time
period, a decision rule specifies which action should be taken for each state. The collection
of all decision rules over time forms a policy (Puterman, 2014). That is, a policy Π is com-
prised of a series of decision rules, one for each decision epoch in the time horizon. Here
we will use subscripts to denote the specific decision rule that is followed at a given time.
Therefore Πn(s) will denote the decision rule for the policy Π in the decision epoch n. A
policy is optimal in the sense that it maximises the expected total discounted reward that
the decision maker will receive over the entire time horizon. That is, in solving the MDP we







A policy Π is called “stationary” if it does not change with time, so that the choice of action
depends only on the state, and not on the decision epoch of the MDP itself (Puterman,
2014). A necessary condition for the optimality of a policy (Dixit et al., 1990) is that it
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satisfies the Bellman equation (Bellman et al., 1954). This equation recursively defines a
value function V for the decision problem at a specific time, in terms of the current one-
stage payoff obtained due to the choice of some action, and the expected value of being in the
resulting state, based on that action (Bellman, 1966). The value Vn(sn) is then the expected
discounted reward from time n until the end of the (possibly infinite) time horizon, given
that the state is sn at time n. The Bellman equation is
Vn(sn) = max
a∈A








A Bellman equation reduces a decision problem into smaller subproblems, according to Bell-
man’s “Principle of optimality”, that “An optimal policy has the property that whatever
the initial state and initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal
policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision” (Bellman, 1966). This is
analogous to the concept of subgame perfect equilibria in dynamic game theory. Bellman
equations are particularly suited to solving stochastic optimal control problems, such as
Markov decision processes. Intuitively, the Bellman equations looks to maximise the sum
of the current and future reward available from a given state, by choosing the best possible
action.
4.1.4 Solution methods for Markov decision processes
Some common solution methods for an infinite time horizon problem are value iteration
and policy iteration, each of which act by performing updates on the Bellman equation to
compute optimal values (Puterman, 2014). Value iteration aims to find an optimal value
function, and then performs one policy extraction, to find the policy associated with the
optimum value. With this technique, the policy corresponding to the value function only
needs to be found once, because if the value function is optimal, then the policy will also be
optimal. A general value iteration algorithm given by Puterman (2014) is:
1. Initialize a value function V 0, specify a tolerance ε > 0, and set the iteration n = 0.
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2. For each s ∈ S, compute:
vn+1(s) = max
a∈A
{R(a, s, s′) + δ
∑
s′∈S
Q(a, s, s′)V n(s′)} (4.5)
3. If
||V n+1 − V n|| < ε (1− δ) /2δ (4.6)
proceed to the next step. If not, increase n by 1 and return to step 2.
4. For each s ∈ S, let:
Πε(s) ∈ arg max
a∈A
{R(a, s, s′) +
∑
s′∈S
Q(a, s, s′)V n+1(s′)} (4.7)
and stop.
In the above algorithm, steps 2 and 3 attempt to find the optimal value function for the
problem. Step 4 is the policy extraction, giving the policy corresponding to this value.
Policy iteration involves an evaluation of the current policy, and then policy improvement.
This is then iterated until convergence occurs. Puterman (2014) gives a policy iteration
algorithm as:







V = R(a, s, s′) (4.8)
for V n.
3. Choose Πn+1 that satisfies:





Q(a, s, s′)V n} (4.9)
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selecting Πn+1 = Πn if possible.
4. If Πn+1 = Πn, stop and let the stationary policy Π∗ = Πn. Otherwise, increment n by
1 and go to step 2.
Here, step 2 is the policy evaluation step, and step 3 is policy improvement. In terms of
use, policy iteration often requires fewer iterations than value iteration, particularly if the
transition probabilities for the problem are structured as a sparse matrix. However, policy
iteration is more computationally expensive, as it requires solving a linear system rather
than simply applying a linear operator.
A value iteration dynamic programming technique for a finite time horizon problem is to use
backwards induction on our stochastic dynamic programming equation. This is a recursive
method, in which each time period of the Bellman equation is solved in reverse order. The
final period is a straightforward reward maximisation problem, as there is no future value in
the system at this point (although depending on the formulation of the problem there may
be some “salvage value” of remaining stock (Puterman, 2014)). Each preceding time period
is solved iteratively, taking into account the (known) future value of being in every state,
so that the effectiveness of each possible choice of action can be determined. At each time
period, the best choice of action for each state is determined, and stored as an optimal policy.
An infinite time horizon is the limiting value of the finite time horizon scenario, as the
number of time periods goes to infinity. If the finite time horizon considered is sufficiently
long that the optimal policy converges to a stationary (time-invariant) one before the final
iteration, then that optimal policy can be considered equivalent to a stationary optimal pol-
icy under an infinite time horizon. If the discount factor δ is less than one, the total expected
reward value will converge to a finite solution if the time horizon is large enough (Sutton
and Barto, 2018). Furthermore a stationary optimal policy is guaranteed to exist if the state
space and action space are both finite, or equivalently if all single-stage rewards are bounded
(Puterman, 2014). Such a stationary optimal policy is not guaranteed to be unique, but at
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least one will be deterministic (Howard, 1960).
There are some downsides to the use of MDPs. The so-called “curse of dimensionality”
is that as the state space and action space become large, MDPs get very computationally
difficult to solve (Bellman et al., 1954). There are also large memory requirements, as for
every pair of an action and state, we require both a transition probability matrix and reward
function. Solutions also rely on the assumption that transition probabilities are constant
over time, which may not necessarily be realistic. There are approximate solution tech-
niques which may help overcome some of these problems. These techniques do not find an
exact solution, but may be faster. Examples of these include: state aggregation, in which
several qualitatively similar members or regions of the state space are grouped together, re-
ducing computation time by reducing the repetition of similar outcomes; action elimination,
where redundant or unlikely actions are excluded from the action space; and approximate
dynamic programming (Powell, 2007).
4.2 Discrete toy model
How much fish should a monopolist catch? If there is no concern for the future, they will
simply want to maximise profits in the current year. But if the individual is cognisant
of the fact that their own actions (the effort with which they attempt to exploit the fish
population) will deplete the stock, and therefore, impact possible profits in the future, they
may act differently. If they have the ability to fish into the future, then they will want to
maximise the value they can obtain from the fishery over that entire period. This may be
a long time, or indeed there may be an infinite time horizon. So how do we deal with these
potential future profits? MDPs provide a useful framework for dealing with such a problem.
Our main objective in this chapter is to develop a model in which we are able to use a MDP
in order to obtain an optimal strategy for harvesting a stochastic renewable fish population.
To get to this point, we will first use a simpler toy model to highlight necessary features of
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this application.
4.2.1 Deterministic decision problem
To illustrate the MDP framework, we will begin by considering a toy model of a fish popula-
tion, which will allow us to depict the key features of our solution method without needing
extensive numerical calculations. Our “toy” fish population has its density measured by
stratifying population levels into three categories: “High”, “Medium”, and “Low”. Fishing
depletes populations, and so if it occurs we expect biomass to decrease. If the density is high
and fishing occurs, it will decrease to a medium level; similarly fishing will cause a medium
density population to become low density. The fish population will also naturally grow, and
so in the absence of exploitation, population levels will replenish. If the population is at low
density and no fishing occurs, it will reach medium density, and if it is at medium density, a
lack of exploitation will result in it reaching high density. The fish population cannot reach
a density above the “high” level, even in the absence of harvesting. This level represents
the natural carrying capacity of the population. This information is captured in Figure 4.1,
a schematic diagram showing each possible population state, and the allowable transitions
between them due to particular actions.
An individual who has the opportunity to exploit the population must therefore make a
choice whether they fish (taking action “F”) or do not fish (taking action “DF”). The
information which will influence their decision comes solely from the state of the system,
which is its population density at that time, without any influence from the previous states
of the population. The system therefore exhibits the Markov property of memorylessness.
The allowable transitions between states under each action can also represented as a table
of transition probabilities from state i at time n to state j at time n+ 1. With deterministic
growth and fishing behaviour, allowable transitions will occur with probability 1, and state
changes that cannot occur have probability 0. Table 4.1 gives the transition probabilities
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Figure 4.1: State space diagram for all possible transitions in the deterministic toy model
of the fishery. White ovals show the possible population density states: “High”, “Medium”,
and “Low”. Yellow circles show the possible effort decisions at each state: “Fish” (F ) and




High 0 1 0
n Medium 0 0 1
Low 0 0 1
DF n+ 1
High Medium Low
High 1 0 0
n Medium 1 0 0
Low 0 1 0
Table 4.1: State transition matrices for the deterministic optimisation problem, for both of
the actions available to the decision maker at time n.
for each combination of state and action. We can also assign numerical values to the profits
obtained by the decision maker when state transitions occur. If they decide not to fish at
time n, then they obtain no yield from the fishery and thus obtain no profit in the current
time period. We also assume that they will obtain a higher profit from fishing when the
population is at high density than at medium density, and similarly a higher profit when
fishing at medium density than at low density. Table 4.2 gives an example of possible profit
levels from each state transition when fishing under these conditions.
We then have the following at each decision epoch:
• A state space S := {High, Medium, Low}
• An action space A := {Fish, Do not Fish}
• A set of transition probabilities Q(a, s, s′) from state s ∈ S at time n to state s′ ∈ S
at time n+ 1 (Table 4.1)
• The immediate rewards gained from taking an action a ∈ A and transition from state
s to state s′ (Table 4.2).
• No discounting (δ = 1)











High 0 7 0
n Medium 0 0 5
Low 0 0 1
Table 4.2: One-stage reward matrix when the decision maker chooses to fish at time n. Note
that the one-step reward is 0 for any state transition if the decision maker chooses not to
fish.
n = 4 One-step reward R(s, a) Optimum
State F DF Vn(s) Πn(s)
High 7 0 7 F
Medium 5 0 5 F
Low 1 0 1 F
Table 4.3: Outcomes for each choice of action during the final time period n = 4
Doing so will give us an optimal policy Πn : S → A.
As an illustrative example of the backwards induction process used to determine an
optimal policy, we work through the decisions that should be made in a case where the
fisher obtains the profits given in Table 4.2, and will fish for a finite period of four years.
Here we will use the notation s = (High, Medium, Low), such that in year n we can de-
scribe a full policy as Πn(s) = (aH , aM , aL), where for example aH = Πn(H) ∈ {F,DF} is
the optimal action the fisher should take if the population level is high. We will also use
V n(s) =(Vn(High),Vn(Medium),Vn(Low)) to denote a vector of the values of being in each
n = 3 One-step reward R(s, a) Optimum
State F DF Vn(s) Πn(s)
High 12 7 12 F
Medium 6 7 7 DF
Low 2 5 5 DF
Table 4.4: Outcomes of each choice of action during the time period n = 3
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n = 2 One-step reward R(s, a) Optimum
State F DF Vn(s) Πn(s)
High 14 12 14 F
Medium 10 12 12 DF
Low 3 7 7 DF
Table 4.5: Outcomes of each choice of action during the time period n = 2
n = 1 One-step reward R(s, a) Optimum
State F DF Vn(s) Πn(s)
High 17 14 17 F
Medium 12 14 14 DF
Low 4 10 12 DF
Table 4.6: Outcomes of each choice of action during the time period n = 1
possible state at time n.
We begin by looking at the final time period, where we only need to worry about cur-
rent (and not possible future) profits. In the last year (n = 4), fishing results in a profit
of 7 when density is high, 5 when medium, and 1 when low. Choosing not to fish results
in zero immediate reward for each density (as it does at any decision epoch). In each case
we see that it is preferable to fish than to not fish in the final time period, regardless of
the current state of the population, because preserving population levels by abstaining from
fishing will not be economically beneficial without any further opportunities to exploit the
fishery. Thus, as shown in Table 4.3, we have a policy Π4(s) = (F, F, F ), which gives the
fisher a value V 4(s) = (7, 5, 1). In the penultimate year (n = 3), the decision maker must
take into account what the outcome will be in the next year because of their choice whether
to fish or not. The options available to the fisher, and their possible payoffs, are summarised
in Table 4.4. If the density is high at n = 3, choosing to fish will result in a one-time profit
of 7 in that year. It will also cause the population to be depleted to medium density, from
which a profit of 5 is available in the last year (as noted above) giving a total future value
of 12 obtainable from the choice to fish. On the other hand, choosing not to fish at n = 3
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will result in an initial profit of 0 in that year, with the population density recovering to a
high density in the next year, from which a profit of 7 is available. Choosing not to fish at
n = 3 and with high density will therefore enable a combined value of 7, and so it is clearly
optimal for the decision maker to choose to fish at n = 3 when density is high.
If the population density is medium during this second to last year, then a different sit-
uation will occur. Choosing to fish will result in an immediate profit of 5, with the optimal
future profit being the 1 gained by fishing again in the next year, for a total value of 6.
Choosing not to fish will mean no profit during n = 3, with the population then being re-
plenished to a high density for the final year. As seen in Table 4.4, the best decision then
is to not fish, such that the fisher will obtain a future value of 7. Consequently at medium
density, not fishing is the optimal policy. A similar situation occurs at n = 3 with low
density. Choosing not to fish at this time allows the population level to increase in the next
time period. The gain in value (a profit of 5) from allowing this to happen (and then fishing
during the final year) is greater than the combined small profits (1 in each year for a total
of 2) received from fishing in each of years 3 and 4. Therefore with low density the best
policy is also to not fish at n = 3. Concluding, we see that the optimal policy in this year is
Π3((s)) = (F,DF,DF ), which means in each possible population state the agent has value
V 3(s) = (12, 7, 5)).
We now repeat the process for the previous year (n = 2), as summarised in Table 4.5.
In this year, the optimal policy is again Π2((s)) = (F,DF,DF ), which in this case gives the
fisher a value of V 2(s) = (14, 12, 7)). Looking at the final stage (that is, the first year of
exploitation), which is detailed in Table 4.6, we see that the optimal policy is to fish when the
population density is high, and not to fish when it is medium and low, Π1((s)) = (F,DF,DF )
with optimum value V 1(s) = (17, 14, 12)). We note that this is the same policy at n = 1
as at n = 2 and n = 3, meaning that the policy has converged. We have therefore found a
stationary optimal policy for the harvesting of this fishery, that will be followed in each year
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of exploitation except the final one. Consequently, if the finite time frame was increased
to longer than 4 years, we already know the optimal policy at all times, and can indeed
extrapolate to a solution to an infinite time horizon problem. Specifically, in the infinite
horizon regime the optimal policy is to only fish when the density is high.
4.2.2 Stochastic decision problem
Real fish populations exhibit noise in their population levels. In particular, the majority of
this noise will occur in the stock recruitment relationship, with the number of fish spawning
in a given year being partially, but not entirely, dependent on the spawning stock biomass.
With a noisy population finding an optimal policy is a stochastic dynamic programming
problem, meaning MDP techniques are able to be used to determine the optimal policy
when an individual is harvesting the fish population. We extend the toy model from Section
4.2.1 to illustrate how the process is adapted to allow for this stochasticity. In order to
incorporate noise in the dynamics, we will now allow all possible transitions between the
states to occur with each action, with different specific transitions occurring with different
probabilities. This stochasticity in the transition probabilities is used to represent the nat-
ural variability in the growth processes of the fish population, and in particular noise in
the stock recruitment relationship. The probabilities of these transitions are arbitrary for
the purpose of this illustrative model, with their values chosen such that more reasonably
realistic transitions will be more likely to occur. For example, if the current state of the
population is medium density and fishing occurs, then intuitively the most likely transition
is to low density at the next iteration, as the impact of the population reduction due to
exploitation is more significant than the natural growth of the remaining population. How-
ever, there is some chance that the size of the effects is similar, and so the population will
remain at medium density at the next iteration. There is also some small chance that the fish
population will have an unexpected bumper year, with the growth processes resulting in a
large level of stock recruitment. Then the fish population could be at a high level in the next
year, even with fishing occurring. In each of these cases, a consistent level of fishing effort
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will have occurred, and so the fisher will obtain the same yield, and receive the same profit,
as if the transition to a low density had occurred. Therefore the transition that actually
occurs is random, but the immediate profit obtained by the decision maker is deterministic
based on the action they choose and the existing state of the fishery. The new transition
probabilities for either choice of action are given in Table 4.7.
Immediate profits for the decision to fish at each population density are still as given in
Table 4.2. We note that while the immediate profit is only dependent on the current state
and the action taken, these actions themselves can now lead (with known probability) to
quite different outcomes. Consequently, we consider both the immediate profits and the ex-
pected future value from a decision instead of the deterministic future value when evaluating
that decision, in order to determine the optimal policy which will maximise the objective
function in a given iteration.
As before, we attempt to ascertain an optimal policy for harvesting this population over
a period of four years. Though transitions are now probabilistic, in the last year of ex-
ploitation the decision maker is not concerned with future profits and so will again maximise
immediate profit in the year n = 4. As such, the optimal decision for each density level in
the stochastic model is the same as in the deterministic model, with it being preferable for
the decision maker to fish at all density levels (Π4(s) = (F, F, F )), as seen in Table 4.8. The
decision making information for the penultimate year n = 3 is captured in Table 4.9, where
we see that as in the deterministic example the fisher will wish to maximise the sum of their
immediate profit and the future value that will be available in the fishery. However, in this
case the efficacy of an action is measured in its expected value, and so both the likelihood of
each outcome as well as the actual payoffs resulting from these outcomes must be taken into
account. For instance, when fishing at high density there is a 10% chance of remaining at
high density in the last year, which is valued at 7. There is an 80% chance of the population
being at medium density in the last year, which has a value of 5, and a 10% chance of the
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population being depleted to low density, which has a value of 1. As such the expected future
value of choosing to fish at high density is 0.1× 7 + 0.7× 5 + 0.1× 1 = 4.8. If the decision
maker chooses not to fish, it is certain that the population will remain at high density, and
so the expected future value is 7. We conclude that at n = 3 and at high density the decision
maker should fish.
Looking at a medium density population in the penultimate year, with the decision to fish
there will be a 5% chance of the population reaching high value even in the event of fishing,
due to an unexpectedly prolific spawning season. There is a 15% chance that the population
stays at medium density, valued at 5 in the next year, and a 80% chance the population is
at low density, valued at 1. The expected future value of choosing to fish at low density is
0.05× 7 + 0.15× 5 + 0.8× 1 = 1.9. If fishing does not occur, there will be a 90% likelihood
that the population density increases to a high level, and a 10% chance it remains at medium
density. This decision will therefore have an expected future value of 0.9× 7 + 0.1× 5 = 6.8,
and we see that the optimal policy to maximise total value is to fish at n = 3.
Lastly, we can find the optimal policy at low density in the third year. Choosing to fish
will mean that there is a 20% chance of the population density being medium in the next
year, and a 80% chance that density stays low. In this case the expected future value will be
0.2× 5 + 0.8× 1 = 1.8. If the decision maker chooses not to fish, the expected future value
will instead be 0.1×7+0.8×5+0.1×1 = 4.8. As such, the optimal decision in this scenario
is again not to fish. The optimal policy, as depicted in Table 4.9, is Π3(s) = (F, F,DF )),
which gives an optimal value V3(s) = (11.8, 6.9, 4.8)). Similar calculations for the remain-
ing years (n = 2 and n = 1) are found in Table 4.10 and Table 4.11. The policies for
these years are Π2(s) = (F,DF,DF )) and Π1(s) = (F,DF,DF )), and so we note that in
this stochastic decision model, the optimal policies have also converged to a stationary policy.




High 0.1 0.8 0.1
n Medium 0.05 0.15 0.8
Low 0 0.2 0.8
DF n+ 1
High Medium Low
High 1 0 0
n Medium 0.9 0.1 0
Low 0.1 0.8 0.1
Table 4.7: State transition matrices for the stochastic optimisation problem, for both of the
actions available to the decision maker at time n.
n = 4 Fish Do not fish Optimum Optimum
s: State R(s, F ) E(Vt+1(s)) R(s,DF ) E(Vn+1(s)) a Vn(s)
High 7 0 0 0 F 7
Medium 5 0 0 0 F 5
Low 1 0 0 0 F 1
Table 4.8: Outcomes of each choice of action during the time period n = 4
n = 3 Fish Do not fish Optimum Optimum
s: State R(s, F ) E(Vn+1(s)) R(s,DF ) E(Vn+1(s)) a Vn(s)
High 7 0.1× 7 0 1× 7 F 11.8
+0.8× 5 +0× 5
+0.1× 1 = 4.8 +0× 1 = 7
Medium 5 0.05× 7 0 0.9× 7 F 6.9
+0.15× 5 +0.1× 5
+0.8× 1 = 1.9 +0× 1 = 6.8
Low 1 0× 7 0 0.1× 7 DF 4.8
+0.2× 5 +0.8× 5
+0.8× 1 = 1.8 +0.1× 1 = 4.8
Table 4.9: Outcomes of each choice of action during the time period n = 3
n = 2 Fish Do not fish Optimum Optimum
s: State R(s, F ) E(Vn+1(s)) R(s,DF ) E(Vn+1(s)) a Vn(s)
High 7 0.1× 11.8 0 1× 11.8 F 14.18
+0.8× 6.9 +0× 6.9
+0.1× 4.8 = 7.18 +0× 4.8 = 11.8
Medium 5 0.05× 11.8 0 0.9× 11.8 DF 11.31
+0.15× 6.9 +0.1× 6.9
+0.8× 4.8 = 5.465 +0× 4.8 = 11.31
Low 1 0× 11.8 0 0.1× 11.8 DF 7.18
+0.2× 6.9 +0.8× 6.9
+0.8× 4.8 = 5.22 +0.1× 4.8 = 7.18
Table 4.10: Outcomes of each choice of action during the time period n = 2
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n = 1 Fish Do not fish Optimum Optimum
s: State R(s, F ) E(Vn+1(s)) R(s,DF ) E(Vn+1(s)) a Vn(s)
High 7 0.1× 14.18 0 1× 14.18 F 18.184
+0.8× 11.31 +0× 11.31
+0.1× 7.18 = 11.184 +0× 7.18 = 14.18
Medium 5 0.05× 14.18 0 0.9× 14.18 DF 13.893
+0.15× 11.31 +0.1× 11.31
+0.8× 7.18 = 8.1495 +0× 7.18 = 13.893
Low 1 0× 14.18 0 0.1× 14.18 DF 11.184
+0.2× 11.31 +0.8× 11.31
+0.8× 7.18 = 8.006 +0.1× 7.18 = 11.184
Table 4.11: Outcomes of each choice of action during the time period n = 1
that the best decision is to fish if the population density is high, and not to fish if the pop-
ulation density is medium or low. However, in the stochastic model it has taken longer for
the time-dependent optimal policy to converge to this stationary policy than it took in the
previous deterministic model.
4.3 Continuous state and action space
In practice, our toy model is not detailed enough, as exploiters will wish to know population
levels with more precision than simply where it fits into a few descriptive density categories.
In this section, we will use a more realistic model of fish population dynamics, taking advan-
tage of our understanding of the solution technique derived from the use of the toy model.
As in Section 4.2, we will first consider deterministic population growth ( Subsection 4.2.1),
and then extend the model to include stochasticity in the recruitment process (Subsection
4.2.2).
Let u be the directly measured population biomass. This gives us an exact numerical value,
rather than the simple categories we saw in our toy model. Biomass values are found in a
continuous, bounded range. As the population biomass is a physical quantity it must be
non-negative. We define umax to be the maximum instantaneous biomass the population can
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take. The existence of this is physically feasible as there must be some upper limit on the
possible number of fish occupying a given environment, as well as a physiological maximum
size of a single fish. The population upper limit will be significantly higher than the carrying
capacity K, which is the maximum population size which is sustainable at equilibrium in
the long term (as opposed to the maximum possible for a short time). This upper limit is
also necessary for the numerical calculation required to form a solution. Similarly, we let the
exploiter precisely set their fishing effort F , the rate at which they extract biomass from the
fishery. The new action space is also continuous and bounded, with allowable values being
the possible fishing efforts. Efforts must only have non-negative values, as the exploiter
cannot fish with negative effort. There will also be an upper limit on the allowable fishing
effort Fmax, which represents the physical (due to a limited number of boats/nets/space to
hold catch) or regulatory constraints on the rate at which fish can be harvested.
In this model, there is a continuous state space, representing the possible density values
the fish population can take. The Bellman equation for this problem differs from a discrete
state model in the manner in which the expected future value is calculated. The major func-
tional difference that a continuous state space and action space provides is that the transition
matrix Q is replaced by a probability density function p for the transitions from the current
state to possible future states when an action is taken. Furthermore, the expected future
value for each action is calculated by integrating (rather than summing) over all possible
future states. As such, the Bellman equation becomes
Vn(sn) = max
a∈A




4.3.1 Deterministic stock recruitment
In this more complicated model we can more accurately look at population dynamics. Specif-
ically, we will know exactly how fishing depletes population density, and how the stock re-
cruitment between generations occurs. The effort level F with which the fisher acts is a
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constant rate of depletion over that fishing period, and so the population density decays
exponentially over time, that is,
un(t) = un(0) exp(−Ft). (4.12)
Between each fishing period of length T , a new generation of the fish population will spawn.
The stock recruitment relationship is given by the Beverton-Holt map:
un+1(0) =
Kun(T )
un(T ) + (K − un(T )) exp(−rT )
(4.13)




un exp(−FT ) + (K − un exp(−Ft)) exp(−rT )
(4.14)
which acts as a transition function from state un at time n to state un+1 at time n+ 1. We
can also define an immediate payoff function, for the profit received by the decision maker





= Bun (1− exp(−FnT ))− cFnT
(4.15)
Note that our definition of the immediate reward Rn is based only on the current state and
action, and not on the future state. We define δ as the discount factor of future to current
profits, that is, the proportion of the profit this year that we value an equal profit next year.
B > 0 is the market price per unit fish biomass, and C ≥ 0 is the constant cost per unit
effort of fishing. Then we are able to define the problem we are faced with as finding a policy
Πn : R≥0 → R≥0 such that setting Fn = Πn(un) will maximise:
N∑
i=0
δi (Bui (1− exp(−FiT ))− cFiT ) (4.16)
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{R (un, F ) + δVn+1(un exp(−FnT ))} (4.17)
Implementation of the model
Without loss of generality, we let the length of each fishing period be T = 1 year, and non-
dimensionalise population levels so that the carrying capacity K = 1. The parameters of
interest are now the discount rate, the growth rate r, and the ratio of costs to revenue from
fishing, c/B. For numerical reasons, we discretise the state space S and the action space
A. In order to solve this problem computationally, we perform a numerical discretisation
of our continuous population density u and effort level F , using step sizes ∆u = 0.01 and
∆F = 0.01. We use a backwards induction algorithm to find recursively the value function
for each generation of the fishing problem. The process is as follows:
1. Calculate the optimal action for each state in the final year (n = N) by solving:
VN(uN) = max
F∈A
{R (un, F )} = max
F∈A
{BuN (1− exp(−FT ))− cFnT}
For each discrete value of the state variable u, perform an exhaustive search through
all potential fishing efforts F , calculating the current value if this action is taken. Store
the action F ∗ which maximises value at the present state u∗ as the action prescribed
by the optimal policy Πn(u
∗) = F ∗.
2. Decrement time by one year, represented by single time period of the MDP.
3. Solve the recursive value problem, which takes into account the value of being in each
state in the future
Vn(un) = max
F∈A
{R (un, F ) + δVn+1(un exp(−FnT ))}
As above, this is solved by exhaustively searching though all allowable fishing efforts,
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and determining which value of F maximises Vn(u) in each state u.
4. Save the best action as the policy for this iteration, Πn(u
∗) = F ∗.
5. If the policy in this current year is the same as in the previous year (so Πn(u) =
Πn+1(u)) for all states u, then stop, as we have obtained a stationary optimal policy.
Otherwise, return to Step 2.
Figure 4.2 shows that the optimal policy obtained in each fishing period will quickly converge
to the stationary value, with this convergence in fact happening with these parameter values
by the penultimate year. We see that using a backwards induction solution method can in
some cases obtain a stationary optimal policy very quickly, even when using a finite time
horizon. Recall that a policy is a mapping from a population biomass state to a specific
optimal fishing effort. A stationary optimal policy therefore tells us, under an infinite time
horizon, how heavily to exploit the fish population each year, depending on the present stock
level. There are several important features to note about this policy. No fishing occurs at
all below a certain biomass threshold (here u ≈ 0.6). At population levels below this point,
it is not optimal to harvest at all, as the possible future value of the fish stocks will be re-
duced due to population depletion in the future. By not fishing at all in the current season,
population levels will be replenished, and the future value of exploitation will be higher than
the present one-stage reward that can be obtained by fishing. We also note that the optimal
effort F increases with u. At higher population states, more fish can be harvested (giving
present rewards) without heavily depleting the population and reducing the available future
value of the fishery. Finally, the optimal fishing behaviour in the final year of a finite time
horizon problem (n = N) is to fish at a higher rate than the stationary optimal policy (which
is the fishing policy in previous years). In this final year there will be no future value in
the fishery (with non-existent salvage value in this model), meaning it is in the monopolist’s
interest to heavily deplete the population. Because the total cost of fishing increases with ef-
fort, the optimal behaviour is not to simply harvest at the maximum allowable rate, meaning
we still observe the positive relationship between biomass and fishing effort in the final year.
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Figure 4.2: The optimal policy quickly converges such that the optimal action for each state
in N − 2 is the same as in N − 1. We therefore have a stationary mapping in which the
optimal policy is independent of time. Here δ = 0.95, C = 0.5, B = 1, and r = 2.
In Figure 4.3 we investigate how changing a single parameter value will change any station-
ary optimal policy. In each case, we see that the shape of the policy does not significantly
change inside the limits of the state and action spaces, with parameter changes instead act-
ing to change the optimal fishing effort in the same way for each state. For example, in
(a) we see that increasing r causes fishing to begin occurring at lower population densities,
with the optimal fishing effort therefore being higher in the high growth rate case at each
density in which fishing does occur. In (b), we see that increasing the cost per unit effort of
fishing causes the optimal policy to be shifted to higher levels of u (so that the same levels
of exploitation happen at higher density) in the state space. (c) depicts an increase in the
discount rate δ causing a slight shift of the optimal policy to higher u, and a slight reduction
in its slope.
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(a) Changing growth rate r: C = 0.5, δ = 0.95
(b)Changing cost per unit effort C: r = 2, δ = 0.95
(c)Changing discount rate δ: r = 2, C = 0.5
Figure 4.3: We investigate the effect of changing a single parameter on the stationary optimal
policy (where convergence in time has occurred for each set of parameter values). In each
row, the parameter of interest differs, with it being r in the 1st row, C in the 2nd, and δ in
the 3rd.
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4.3.2 Stochastic stock recruitment
Finally, we are able to complete our model to allow us to fulfil our primary objective for
this chapter: finding an optimal policy (with respect to choosing from a continuous fishing
effort), in a noisy continuous population. The model is the same as in Section 4.3.1, with one
crucial difference. The new population density of each generation is now a random variable.
Specifically, it is a N(µ, σ2) normal random variable for which the mean value is the corre-
sponding future population density in the deterministic model, and σ2 is a fixed variance.
That is, we use the stock recruitment relationship given in Equation (4.14), incorporating
the exponential population decay over the fishing period and the Beverton-Holt model of
reproduction, to obtain the mean population density in the next year. The standard devia-
tion σ is the level of noise in the growth process. Formally the problem is to find a policy
Πn : R≥0 → R≥0 such that setting Fn = Πn(un) will maximise the total expected value of:
N∑
n=0
δn (Bun (1− exp(−FnT ))− cFnT ) (4.18)
where 0 < δ ≤ 1, C ≥ 0, B > 0, T > 0 are constants, and un satisfies:
un+1 =

umax if f(un) + Zn > umax
f(un) + Zn, if 0 < f(un) + Zn < umax
0, otherwise
(4.19)
where the f is the deterministic mapping used in the earlier model and the Zn are iid N (0, σ
2)




R (un, F ) + δ
∫ ∞
0
p (y|un, F )Vn+1(y)dy
}
(4.20)
which is the recursively defined probabilistic dynamic programming equation on which we
perform the backwards induction algorithm. In this equation, R (un, F ) is the immediate
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one-stage payoff function as in Section 4.3.1, when action F is taken in state un. This payoff
is assumed to be deterministic, so that noise is confined to the stock recruitment process.
The PDF for state y at time n + 1, given that the state at time n is un and the individual
decides to fish with effort F , is given by p (y|un, F ).
In order to solve this problem computationally, we perform a numerical discretisation of
our continuous state space u and action space F , using step sizes ∆u = 0.01 and ∆F = 0.01.
This also means that the probability density function for state transitions is also discre-
tised. We use a backwards induction algorithm to recursively find the value function for
each generation of the fishing problem. The process is as follows:
1. Calculate the optimal action for each state in the final year (n = N) by solving:
VN(uN) = max
F∈A
{R (un, F )} = max
F∈A
{BuN (1− exp(−FT ))− cFnT}
For each discrete value of the state variable u, perform an exhaustive search through
all potential fishing efforts F , calculating the current value if this action is taken. Store
the action F ∗ which maximises value at the present state u∗ as the action prescribed
by the optimal policy Πn(u
∗) = F ∗.
2. Decrement time by one year, represented by a single time period of the Markov decision
process.
3. Solve the now recursive value problem, which takes into account the value of being in




R (un, F ) + δ
∫ ∞
0
p (y|un, F )Vn+1(y)dy
}
As above, this is solved by exhaustively searching though all allowable fishing efforts,
and determining which value of F maximises Vn(u) in each state u.
4. Save the best action as the policy for this iteration, Πn(u
∗) = F ∗.
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Figure 4.4: With noisy population dynamics (σ = 0.2), convergence of the optimal policy to
a stationary one will still occur. Here δ = 0.95, r = 0.1, c = 0.5.
5. If the policy in this current year is the same as in the previous year (so that Πn(u) =
Πn+1(u)) for all states u, then stop, as we have obtained a stationary optimal policy.
Otherwise, return to Step 2.
Using this method of solving Equation (4.20), we see in Figure 4.4 that for a fixed level of
noise, policies will converge to a stationary optimal policy, as in the deterministic model.
The amount of noise in the population dynamics can have a significant impact on the ob-
tained optimal policy. Figure 4.5 (a) shows as σ increases, the optimal fishing effort at each
population level will decrease. Furthermore, the minimum population size for which fishing
is tenable will increase. For each value of σ in Figure 4.5 (a), the algorithm was run for n
iterations until successive optimal policies had converged; that is the sum of squared differ-




Figure 4.5: (a) shows that increasing the stock-recruitment noise σ will cause the optimal
fishing effort to decrease with population size. (b) gives the stationary distribution of the
population, conditional upon non-extinction, given by the dominant eigenvector of the matrix
Mσ, under fishing according to a stationary optimal policy. For each policy, δ = 0.95, r = 0.1,
B = 1 and c = 0.5.
When a stationary policy has been obtained, the transition matrix (where our continu-
ous state space S has been discretised) Qσ will be constant for each successive iteration.
Note that the transition matrix depends on the stochastic stock recruitment process, and
so the probability of transitioning between specific states depends on the specific value of
the population variance σ. For a stationary policy, as the specified optimal action at ev-
ery population density will be the same regardless of time, it follows that the probability of
transitioning from any one state to another will also be constant, and so Qσ is time invariant.
Qσ is a stochastic matrix, and so has a dominant eigenvalue of 1. We note that this transi-
tion matrix includes transitions to negative population densities, which are non-viable in our
fishery model. Indeed, any transition to a population state u ≤ 0 represents the extinction
of the fish population, with no ability of future population recovery, as described in (4.19).
We therefore define Mσ as a new transition matrix, which is the restriction of Qσ to the
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viable population states 0 < u < umax. This matrix Mσ is not a stochastic matrix: its
dominant eigenvalue is less than 1. The dominant eigenvalue λ is the probability of survival,
or the probability that the fish population will not go extinct in a single time period, given
that the optimal policy is followed. In each time period, there is a probability that the fish
population transitions to an extinction state. These extinction states are represented by the
entries of Qσ that are not in Mσ, while the states in which the population survives are in Mσ.
The dominant eigenvector of the restricted transition matrix Mσ gives a stationary pop-
ulation distribution of viable states, conditional on the non-extinction of the population,
that will result when the stationary policy is applied over time to a population with the
corresponding noise level. In Figure 4.5 (b), we observe the eigenvectors corresponding to
the dominant eigenvalue of the restricted transition matrix, for a range of recruitment noise.
Each eigenvector is plotted against the state variable u, and represents the stationary distri-
bution of the population that will occur under a stationary optimal policy. We observe that
the peak values of these stationary distributions move to the right in the state space as noise
increases, such that the modal population density, conditional upon non-extinction, under
optimal exploitation is larger with greater noise. We also note that increased noise causes a
larger spread in the stationary population distribution, with an increased probability of the
population going extinct (where u = 0) in a single fishing period.
The dominant eigenvalues λ1 of the restricted transition matrix Mσ give the probability
that extinction will not occur in the next fishing period. If λ1 is much less than one, then a
large proportion of the PDF for each transition will be (before restriction of the PDF to the
allowed state space) for population levels below 0, meaning that extinction is likely. Calcu-
lating the dominant eigenvalue therefore gives us a mechanism to investigate the likelihood
of the fish population going extinct under certain conditions. For Figure 4.6, with a range
of noise levels, we have calculated both the optimal policy under that level of noise, and the
transition matrix that corresponds to using that policy in that noisy environment. Figure
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Figure 4.6: The probability of extinction (1 − λ1) in a single time period, when using both
the optimal policy and the deterministic policy, for a range of noise levels. Here δ = 0.95, r =
0.1, c = 0.5.
4.6 shows the probability of extinction for each level of noise when using that optimal policy.
We see that as the variance in the stock-recruitment relationship increases, the probability
that a population will go extinct in a single generation also increases.
4.4 Discussion
We offer an explanation of the mechanisms behind the effect of parameter changes on opti-
mal policies. By decreasing the discount rate δ, we increasingly value current profits more
than future profits. As such, less effort will be made to preserve the state of the fishery by
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maintaining population levels, because doing so will be economically less viable according to
the decision maker’s priorities and motives. Because of this, we expect the optimal policy
with a lower discount rate to be one in which there is a similar or greater level of fishing effort
occurring at each population density. If the normalised cost per unit effort level is decreased,
then it will be comparatively cheaper for the decision maker to fish, with single-stage profit
maximisation occurring at higher levels of fishing effort. Consequently, low costs will be
associated with taking advantage of immediate profits, with optimal policies being for heavy
levels of exploitation to occur, even at lower population densities. With a high growth rate r,
we expect the population levels to quickly replenish to near the carrying capacity after it has
been exploited. High r will therefore be associated with a reasonable amount of resilience
to heavy rates of harvesting, allowing optimal fishing behaviour to occur at higher intensity
levels. This influence of parameter values on fishing policies can be expected to hold for both
the single player MDP model, and the two-player Markov game model.
Our chosen algorithm, backwards induction, is usually used for finite time horizon prob-
lems rather than infinite horizon ones. However, as we know that the one-stage profits are
bounded, and that this means that a stationary optimal policy must exist, we can iterate
through stages of the MDP until convergence occurs. Essentially, we set the length of the
finite time horizon to be sufficiently long enough that we obtain a solution to the infinite
time horizon problem. It is likely that alternative solution methods such as value iteration or
policy iteration could be used to find an equivalent solution, however, our dynamic program
was sufficiently tractable that this was not necessary.
Although our algorithm for the single fisher model is guaranteed to provide us with an
optimal stationary policy, it is not necessarily a unique one. If it any stage of the algorithm
there are two or more states with the same value, then the algorithm may in the next itera-
tion choose actions that would lead to either state without discrimination. We do however
note that while there may be more than one optimal policy, the actual value of being in each
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state in each of these policies would be identical, with the specified actions to take being
what differs between the policies.
An interesting feature of the stochastic continuous model is the effect of changing popu-
lation noise levels on the optimal policy. We would expect, and indeed observed in Figure
4.5, that any increase in the noisiness of the population dynamics will cause the fish popula-
tion to be more likely to go extinct under a given level of fishing effort. As such, the decision
maker would have a greater incentive to preserve population levels, as extinction will be more
likely to occur with the impact of fishing. This will effectively act to disincentivise profiting
in the short term over possible profits in the future, equivalent to reduced discounting of
future profits. That is, it is optimal for the decision maker to lower their fishing effort in a
more noisy environment, in order to protect their possible future gains from the fishery.
One interesting possible adaptation to this model would be to add a multiplicative noise
term. Currently, the noise in the population dynamics is independent of the population
level. Adding density dependent noise would allow us to capture an increased range of be-
haviour, with the variability of population growth changing with population density. For
example, it would mean increasing the stochasticity of the stock recruitment relationship, as
with higher numbers of fecund adult fish we could expect greater variability in the number




Multi-agent exploitation of a
stochastic fishery: a Markov game
model
5.1 Introduction
Markov decision processes are an effective tool for solving stochastic decision making prob-
lems when there is only a single decision maker. However, they are not suitable to use
when there are multiple decision makers able to influence outcomes. Instead, these types
of scenarios can be modelled as stochastic games, which are generalisations of MDPs to
two or more players in which the rewards and future state are affected by the actions of all
players (Hu et al., 1998). Also known as Markov games, stochastic games are equivalently a
generalisation of repeated games (as seen in Chapter 3) to allow for probabilistic transitions
between states. We will restrict our investigation to a stochastic game with two players,
though games with a greater number of players will operate conceptually similarly.
5.1.1 Stochastic games
A two-player stochastic game consists of (Littman, 1994)
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• A set I = {1, 2} of players
• A state space S
• An action set A(i) for each player i ∈ I
• For each combination of states s, s′ and actions a(i), a(j), the transition probability
Q(s, s′, a(i), a(j)); this is the probability that the choice of action a(i) by player i in
state s will lead to state s′, given that player j chooses action a(j)
• R(i)(s, s′, a(i), a(j)) is the immediate reward (or one-stage payoff) for player i when a
transition from state s to state s′ occurs when action a(i) has been taken by player i,
and player j chooses action a(j).
• δ is the discount rate of future rewards
In solving a stochastic game, we aim to find an optimal policy Π(i) for each player i ∈ I.
These policies are the same as the solution to a Markov decision process, in that they are





n (sn) to take at time n in order to maximise their own expected future profit, or
value, when the fish population is in state sn. The value function for player 1 V
(1)
n (sn) is the
expected discounted reward for player 1 from time n until the end of the time horizon, given
that the state is sn at time n, and is given by
V (1)n (sn) = R
1(sn, s
′, a(1)n , a
(2)
n ) + δ
∑
s′∈S
Q(s+ n, s′, a(i), a(j))V
(1)
n+1(sn)ds (5.1)
Analogously to the Bellman equation (Equation 4.4), we can define a recursively solvable
dynamic programming equation that allows us to obtain the optimal action in each instance
(Littman, 1994). A solution to a Markov game must be simultaneously optimal for each
player; we will look for a Nash equilibrium which here will be a pair of policies Π(1) and Π(2)
such that when player 1 is playing Π(1), player 2’s optimal policy is Π(2), and vice versa.
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5.1.2 Solution methods for stochastic games
While all finite Markov decision processes have a (not necessarily unique) stationary optimal
policy as their solution, this is not the case for Markov games. Indeed, we know that even
for deterministic matrix games, there will not necessarily be any pure Nash equilibrium,
as seen in the well-known matching pennies game (Bowling and Veloso, 2000). Stochastic
games with a finite number of players, and finite state and action spaces always have a Nash
equilibrium (Shapley, 1953; Filar and Vrieze, 2012). However, this Nash equilibrium is in
general not deterministic or unique (Hu et al., 1998), and there indeed exist games which
have no deterministic equilibrium policies (Zinkevich et al., 2006). The majority of work in
solving stochastic games has focussed on zero-sum games, which have a unique Nash equilib-
rium (Bowling and Veloso, 2000) rather than the general-sum games we consider, for which
there may be multiple Nash equilibria. Value iteration has been used to obtain solutions
in two-player zero-sum games (Shapley, 1953) and two-player general-sum games (Filar and
Vrieze, 2012). Policy iteration methods have been used (Vrieze, 1987; Littman, 1994; Hu
and Wellman, 2003), as well as reinforcement learning approaches (Hu et al., 1998) which
do not explicitly model the environment of the game, but attempt to find an equilibrium
policy for a single agent by focussing on their behaviour. (Bowling and Veloso, 2000). These
reinforcement learning techniques have been applied to both zero-sum (Littman, 1994; Hu
et al., 1998) and general-sum (Hu and Wellman, 2003) stochastic games. Individual solu-
tion methods for stochastic games do not always converge to optimal policies (Bowling and
Veloso, 2000).
There has been some consideration of other solution types for stochastic games, including
cyclic equilibria (Zinkevich et al., 2006), solutions which are sequences of stationary policies.
Value iteration algorithms are able to identify cyclic equilibria for games in which they fail
to reconstruct optimal policies (from state-action values) to find stationary equilibria (Zinke-
vich et al., 2006). Our analysis will focus on finding stationary Nash equilibria, such that
outcomes from duopolistic exploitation of the fishery can be compared to the monopolistic
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policies obtained from an MDP, and to those from the deterministic equilibrium population
game in Chapter 2. We will mathematically model a fishery such that the structure of pay-
offs and the transition probabilities are known to all players. This will allow us to apply
Bellman-like value iteration techniques to solve a non-linear dynamic programming equation
(Filar and Vrieze, 2012), in order to find Nash equilibria for our stochastic game.
5.2 Duopolistic exploitation: a stochastic game
In the real world, few fisheries are exploited by a sole agent with exclusive access. Instead,
multiple independent agents with goals which may be at odds with each other will each vie
for the rewards available from the fishery. In the previous chapter we detailed a Markov
decision process methodology to determine the optimal fishing policy when a single agent
harvests a stochastic fish population in a monopolistic scenario. This optimal policy was
a stationary deterministic mapping from the state space, representing the fish population
biomass, to the action space, representing the rate of fishing effort that the monopolist
exploits the population with. An optimal policy therefore details the ideal fishing effort
for each possible population level. We will now extend this methodology to allow for two
competing agents. The simplest possible extension to our existing strategy is to add a
second agent with fixed fishing behaviour. In this scenario, the second agent’s fishing effort
could be treated as a constant part of the environment and incorporated into our model of
population dynamics. However, we wish to allow for multiple independent agents, who can
each alter their harvesting behaviour in responses to the others’ actions, and the state of the
population. We will therefore model the non-cooperative interaction between the two fishers
as a stochastic game.
5.2.1 Population modelling
Consider a symmetric stochastic game in which two identical fishers (I = {1, 2}) exploit the
same fishery. Each fisher, or player, has identical costs of fishing, and identical preferences
138
for current and future rewards. Let the state space S and the action space A be as in
the monopolist model in Chapter 4, such that fishers can choose from a continuous range
of fishing efforts 0 ≤ F ≤ Fmax, and the fish population can have densities in the range
0 ≤ u ≤ umax. With two fishers, the total rate at which the population is depleted due to
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The fish population grows according to a stochastic Beverton-Holt process
un+1 =










n ) + Zn ≤ umax
0, otherwise
(5.3)
where the Zn are iid N(0, σ
2) normal random variables. Like the noisy monopolist model
from the previous chapter, the Beverton-Holt map gives us the expected new population
density; that is, the new population density at generation n+ 1 is a normal random variable




n ) and fixed standard deviation σ, which is the parameter repre-
senting the amount of stochasticity in the stock recruitment relationship.
Players will receive a proportion of the total yield according to the ratio between their
own effort and the total effort. Immediate rewards provide profit to a player based on the
amount of biomass they harvest in that time period, and so the one-stage reward for player
i for fishing with effort F
(i)


















−(F (i)n + F (j)n )T
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−cF (i)n for i = 1, 2 j 6= i.
(5.4)
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We note that in this fishery model the one-stage reward has no dependence on the state un+1
being transitioned to; as such arguments of un+1 will be omitted from the reward function
in the remainder of the chapter.
As in the monopolist model, each player in this stochastic game is motivated to maximise













A player maximises their expected total reward by playing a best response to their opponent’s
strategy, such that no unilateral deviation from this strategy will improve their own payoff
at any stage of the stochastic game. By our assumption of symmetry in the information
structure and preferences of the fishers, the optimal policies will be identical for each player.
We are then able to construct a dynamic programming equation analogous to Equation 3.16
for the value available to player 1 in our stochastic game. As there is a continuous state
space and continuous action space in this problem, the transition matrix Q is replaced in
the formulation of the problem by a probability density function p, and we integrate over
the possible continuous range of efforts when optimising action:




n ) + δ
∫ ∞
0
p(s′|sn, a(1)n , a(2)n )V
(1)
n+1(sn)ds (5.6)
5.2.2 Multi-agent value iteration for stochastic games
We implement an adapted process of backwards iteration as a means of obtaining simultane-
ously optimal policies Πn(u) for each player. Identically to the single agent Markov decision
process, policies are developed by iterating backwards through time, year by year, beginning
with a final time period in which agents do not value future profits at all. We then iterate





n . How does the process of iterating policies within a time period occur?
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An initial guess for player 2’s strategy is made. We then optimise player 1’s behaviour by
numerically determining the best fishing effort to use for each possible population state,
with respect to player 2’s existing policy and the effect it has on the fish population. Spline
interpolation of the value function is used (“interp1” in MATLAB) to estimate the value
between the discretised population states, with “fmindbnd” used to determine the fishing
effort which numerically maximises the player’s profit.
In response, we optimise player 2’s fishing effort given player 1’s newly determined pol-
icy. We repeat this process of alternating between each player and taking their opponent’s
new actions into account, until the behaviour of the players does not change between itera-
tions. At this point, players’ policies have converged to a fixed policy for this time period,
and we deem them to be optimal in the Nash equilibrium sense (for this single stage-game).
That is, each player is playing a best response to the other’s possible choices of action, and
neither player is able to unilaterally increase payoffs by deviating from their derived policy.
We iterate backwards through prior years in the same manner as in the MDP algorithm,
following the process of iterating between players within each year until there is convergence
to policies which are mutually best responses to each other. When the harvesting policy for
a given player does not change from year to year (meaning the optimal fishing behaviour
does not change over time) we have convergence to a stationary optimal policy. At each
period with an infinite time horizon players following this optimal policy will be using best
responses to each other’s strategy. In this chapter, we will refer to the stationary optimal
solutions of the two-player game as the Nash equilibrium. As these solutions are contingent
only on the current time, and cannot take into account the history of the game, they are
open-loop equilibria. For computational purposes, we discretise the state space, action space,
and PDF of the problem, using mesh size ∆u = 0.01 and ∆F = 0.01. When solving the
backwards induction equation, we numerically integrate over the action space.
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5.3 Open-loop Nash equilibria
5.3.1 Deterministic stock recruitment
Following on from the single player MDP model, a natural place to start is to consider a
deterministic version of this two-player Markov game (where there is no stochasticity in
the stock-recruitment relationship). With σ = 0, the transitions between population states
in each generation will be a deterministic function (Equation (3.18)) of current population
biomass and both players’ fishing efforts, with the transition probabilities therefore being
given by a Dirac delta function. The recursive dynamic programming equation for player i
in this deterministic game is










n )) for i = 1, 2 j 6= i (5.7)
To solve this equation computationally, we discretise the continuous state space u using a
step size ∆u = 0.01. For the deterministic version of this two-player game, we solve a con-
tinuous optimisation problem for the fishing effort F using spline interpolation. The initial
conditions for each players’ policy is set at half the monopolist policy, calculated as the op-
timal one-player fishing policy optimising Equation (4.18) in Chapter 4. Figure 5.1 (a) and
(c) show the optimal Nash equilibria policies (which are the same for both players due to the
symmetry of information and preferences) obtained by our algorithm for the final four time
periods of this deterministic multi-stage game. Recall that due to the symmetric nature
of the two-player game, the optimal policies for player 1 and player 2 are equal for each
iteration. In (a), convergence occurs quickly, with the policies in n = N − 1 and n = N − 2
being the same for each value of the state variable. In 5.1 (b), we note that for this number
of decision epochs, policies have not yet converged to a stationary optimal policy. If the
derived policies are calculated and plotted for a larger number of stock generations, we find
that they do not converge in the deterministic case. Instead, there is a large amount of nu-




Figure 5.1: (a) and (c) show the calculated optimal policies for both players for the final four
time periods in a two-player game with no noise. In (a), there is a high population growth
rate (r = 4), and the optimal policy is reached in the penultimate fishing period. In (c),
r = 1, and convergence over time to an optimal policy does not happen. Policies give the
best choice of fishing effort F at each value of the state variable u, in terms of maximising
the sum of current and expected future rewards. (b) and (d) depict each type of fishing
policy in the period n = N − 3, for the growth rates r = 4 and r = 1 respectively. The Nash
equilibrium is the optimal two-player policy as shown in (a) and (c). The monopolist policy
is the best single player policy, as calculated in Chapter 4. The Pareto solution is half the
monopolist fishing effort at each state. In each case C = 0.25 and δ = 0.9. Convergence to
these policies within each fishing period n has occurred.
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to numerical effects such as rounding having an increased influence on the decision problem,
with these initially small numerical differences being amplified as the future value component
is increasingly prioritised in making optimal fishing decisions. Using a finer numerical mesh
for the population state space did not allow convergence to occur, and instead amplified
the effects of numerical errors. We conclude that this method of solution is not numerically
stable for the deterministic game, as it is not robust to all feasible choices of parameter values.
There is still some useful information that can be gleaned from this result, as convergence
can occur with high growth rates. As in the monopolist policy derived in Chapter 4, there
is a minimum level of population biomass for which fishing is viable. The fishing efforts
specified by the Nash equilibrium policy are also lower at each state value than the policy
for the final year (n = N). Recall that in the final year we simply have a one-stage optimi-
sation problem, where no individual fisher values the future state of the fishery at all. We
are therefore not surprised to see that the optimal fishing effort in the final year is higher
than in previous years.
We can also compare the individual Nash policy (at n = N − 3) to the ’socially optimal’
harvesting that happens when both players fish at half the monopolist policy in Figure 5.1
(c). Here we see that at the fishing effort chosen when using the individual Nash equilibrium
policy is higher, at each population state, than the socially optimal behaviour. The mini-
mum population for which fishing is viable is approximately the same for the Nash policy
and the socially optimal Pareto solution. 5.1 (d) shows that for each population state u,
the individual fishing effort at the Nash equilibrium is higher than the fishing effort for the
Pareto solution, which is the same relationship between efforts and solutions of the game
that was seen in the prisoner’s dilemma model in Chapter 3.
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5.3.2 Stochastic stock recruitment
By adding a small amount of noise to the stock-recruitment relationship, we attempt to
gain an understanding of how the presence of two decision makers exploiting the population
will affect fishing under our model of population dynamics. In order to obtain a baseline
comparison to the single player deterministic model, we ideally want a sufficiently small
level of noise that population dynamics are as close to deterministic as possible, while the
“smoothing” effect of a small amount of randomness on state transitions reduces the impact
of numerical error. Essentially, we want to know if our method will still allow for convergence
to an optimal policy at low levels of noise.
Unlike in the deterministic two-player game, where we solved for a continuous fishing ef-
fort F , here we numerically discretise both the state space and the action space. In each
value calculation, we then perform an exhaustive search through all possible actions in order
to find the specific effort which maximised the value function in each state.
In Figure 5.2 (a) and (c), we see that convergence will occur through time to an opti-
mal policy when there is noisy stock-recruitment. In (a), the stock-recruitment noise level
is σ = 0.02 (or 2% of the population carrying capacity), and in (c) it is σ = 0.1. For the
lower noise level, it takes four fishing periods for the optimal fishing policy to converge to a
stationary policy. With higher noise it takes five periods. These stationary Nash equilibria
have some consistent features regardless of the strength of the noise. There is a minimum
population biomass for fishing to be tenable; below this population level it is optimal not to
fish at all. Above the minimum level of fishing, the optimal fishing effort increases with the
density of the fish population.
The stationary policy in each case is less than the optimal fishing behaviour in the final
period n = N . This final period represents the last chance to fish in a finite time horizon




Figure 5.2: There is convergence to a stationary Nash equilibrium policy for different values
of the recruitment noise σ. (a) and (c) show the optimal policy for each iteration until they
converge over time. Noise levels for these figures are σ = 0.02 and σ = 0.1, respectively.
(b) and (d) show each type of solution we have considered, for σ = 0.02 and σ = 0.1.
The solution types are the monopolist equilibrium, as calculated in Chapter 4, the Nash
equilibrium, which is the stationary optimal policy from (a) and (c), and the Pareto policy,
which is half the monopolist policy at each state. r = 2, C = 0.2, and δ = 0.9 for each
calculation.
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Only the costs of fishing constrain the level of exploitation. In previous periods, or with
an indefinite number of fishing periods in the future, fishers’ value having stock available to
harvest in the future, and to allow population levels to replenish so further exploitation can
occur. This means that the Nash equilibrium policies prescribe lower rates of fishing effort
for each state than the policy for the final year.
As in the monopolist model, we are interested in how optimal policies fundamentally change
with a change in parameters of the bioeconomic model. Each component of Figure 5.3 shows
how optimal policies change with a single altered parameter. The parameters considered
are c, the cost of fishing per unit effort, in Figure 5.3 (a), r, the intrinsic population growth
rate, in Figure 5.3 (b), and the discount rate δ in Figure 5.3 (c). We observe that increasing
the growth rate r results in slightly higher rates of optimal fishing effort F at each value of
the state variable u. Decreasing the cost c has a large effect on reducing the optimal fishing
effort in each state, with the minimum biomass required for fishing to occur being close to
the carrying capacity when c = 0.9. Lastly, increasing δ results in a slight decrease in the
optimal fishing rate at each state.
Our major purpose of investigation with this model is to see how noise in stock-recruitment
impacts fishing behaviour. Figure 5.4 (a) and (c) shows how stationary optimal policies
change with population noise, for populations with different growth rates. (b) and (d) show
the stationary state distributions for each noise level. As in Chapter 4, the stationary state
distributions, conditional upon non-extinction, are in each case the dominant eigenvector of
Mσ, (the transition matrix restricted to the allowed state space) when a stationary policy
is applied. In (a) and (b) there is a low population growth rate r = 0.1. (c) and (d) have
the high growth rate r = 10. In (c), we see that a high growth rate, the strength of noise in
recruitment has no effect on the Nash equilibrium policy. Noise levels ranging from σ = 0.01
(1% of the carrying capacity) to σ = 0.3 (30% of the carrying capacity) were considered. For
each noise level, the same optimal fishing policy was obtained. That is, the best choice of
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(a) Changing growth rate r: c = 0.25, δ = 0.9, B = 1
(b)Changing cost per unit effort c: r = 1, δ = 0.9, B = 1
(c)Changing discount rate δ: r = 1, c = 0.25, B = 1
Figure 5.3: We investigate the effect of changing a single parameter on the stationary optimal
policy. In each row, the parameter of interest differs, with it being r in the 1st row, c in the
2nd, and δ in the 3rd.
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fishing effort (to maximise total expected discounted value) is the same for each value of σ,
across the entire state space. These results exhibit the same features previously seen in such
policies. No fishing will be carried out when the population biomass is below u ≈ 0.5, with
the optimal fishing effort increasing with biomass above this minimum value. (d) depicts the
stationary state distributions when each policy is followed. These distributions are symmet-
ric around their mean value, and the mean population biomass is the same (u ≈ K) for each
value of σ. As population noise increases, the distributions become increasingly spread out.
Figure 5.4 (a) and (d) show results for populations with slow growth. In (a), we observe
that for noise levels between σ = 0.01 and σ = 0.1, the optimal fishing policy is the same, in
terms of the same optimal action being associated with each value of the state variable u. As
the population noise increases even further (from σ = 0.1 to σ = 0.3), the Nash equilibrium
policy changes. In this range of parameter values, an increase in σ corresponds to a lower
optimal fishing effort for each population state. This is a similar result to that seen for mo-
nopolist fishing behaviour in Chapter 4. However, in this case the difference between Nash
equilibria for the different noise levels is small. That is, the optimal fishing effort for each
state when the noise is 30% of the carrying capacity is only slightly less than the optimal
fishing effort when the noise is 10% of the carrying capacity. Figure 5.4 (b) shows the sta-
tionary state distribution corresponding to each stationary Nash equilibria being followed.
As σ increases, the modal population density of each stationary distribution decreases. The
state distributions also become increasingly spread out with higher noise. The overall effect
of these features is that as noise increases when r = 0.1, the probability of the population
going extinct in each time period also increases.
5.4 Evaluating closed-loop strategies
In this chapter we have found open-loop solutions to our Markov game model. Recall that




Figure 5.4: (a) and (c) show the stationary Nash equilibrium policies for a range of re-
cruitment noise levels. (b) and (d) show the corresponding stationary state distributions
(dominant eigenvalues of Mσ) for those noise levels. In (a) and (b), the population has slow
growth with r = 0.1. Here the optimal fishing effort at each state slightly decreases with
noise. (c) and (d) are for a population with high growth rate r = 10, and shows the stochas-
ticity σ in the stock-recruitment relationship does not appear to have a significant effect on
optimal policies. Stationary state distributions for the noise level σ = 0.01 are excluded in
both (b) and (d) for graphical reasons. These distributions approach a Dirac-δ function in
each case. Other parameter values are C = 0.2 and δ = 0.9.
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of the iterated game. In our infinite time horizon Markov game, this means that at the
beginning of the game a player specifies that they will follow the “optimal” policy to decide
which effort they will fish at every year. In contrast, closed-loop strategies allow players to
condition their actions at any time on the history of play up to that point. This allows them
to “react to exogenous moves by nature, to the realizations of mixed strategies by rivals,
and to possible deviations by their rivals from the equilibrium strategies” (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991). In our scenario, these variations in the history of the game will be expressed
as realisations of the noise in the recruitment process. Closed-loop strategies would allow
players to choose in any time period an effort level not prescribed by our derived policy,
based on their beliefs of their opponent’s own strategy. This could enable players to “take
advantage” of situations where they believe their rival is playing a certain way, in order to in-
crease their own profits, or alternatively to punish their opponent for acting in a certain way.
The space of potential closed-loop strategies is much larger than the space of open-loop
strategies (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Therefore is there is more room for complex strate-
gic behaviour in closed-loop equilibria, as strategies may be dependent on the entire history
of play. Closed-loop equilibria tend to be less tractable than open-loop equilibria (Fuden-
berg and Tirole, 1991). However, we can use the open-loop equilibria we have calculated,
along with knowledge of successful strategies in other games, to develop some basic heuristic
closed-loop strategies to be investigated. Note that these closed-loop strategies will not in
all likelihood be equilibria of our game. However, we can still look at the outcomes of players
who use such strategies, to see how the expected payoffs differ from our open-loop optimal
policies.
Our development of closed-loop strategies is motivated by results from the iterated pris-
oner’s dilemma (IPD) as discussed in Chapter 3. In an IPD, players can choose to either
cooperate or defect in each stage-game. In this game, the Nash equilibrium is to defect in
each round, but this will not necessarily maximise the total expected discounted profit over
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a number of rounds. Recall that tit-for-tat (TFT ) is a strategy for a multi-stage, two-player
symmetric game that depends only on the strategies chosen by each player in the previous
stage-game. In the first round of an IPD, a player using a TFT strategy will cooperate.
After this, they will choose whichever action their opponent used in the previous round.
TFT is an effective strategy when in direct competition with many common strategies (Ax-
elrod, 980a). Specifically, when played against itself, it obtains the IPD reward payoff in
each stage-game, and when it plays the always defect strategy, it is not defeated, matching
it with the punishment strategy (Imhof et al., 2005).
In our Markov game model, we have found two policies that are conceptually similar to
the two moves available in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Fishing with a level of effort prescribed by
the Nash equilibrium policy (ΠD) we have found in this chapter corresponds to the choice
to defect in an IPD. In each case, these choices are the best response to the player’s expec-
tations of an opponents behaviour. Fishing at a rate where both player’s efforts sum to the
Monopolist effort (as calculated using a Markov decision process) is a situation in which the
players’ actions are on a Pareto frontier. Neither player can unilaterally deviate from such
an arrangement in order to increase their own profit, without reducing the other player’s
profit. Consequently, if each of the two players fishes at half the monopolist effort, the game
is Pareto efficient. We refer to this policy as ΠC . Analogously to the method used in Chapter
3, fishing at half the monopolist effort is equivalent to the choice to cooperate in an IPD.
We can use these two policies to define closed-loop strategies, and evaluate them in terms
of payoffs and population biomass levels when compared to following each open-loop strat-
egy. To do so, we take inspiration from the strategy TFT (Axelrod, 1987). We define a
closed-loop version of TFT for our Markov game as follows:
1. In the first time period, cooperate (i.e. fish with the action F = ΠC(u1) )
2. In each successive time period, if you believe the other player cooperated in the previous
round of the game, then cooperate. Otherwise defect (by fishing with the action
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F = ΠD(un) )
It makes sense that we can similarly define closed-loop strategies which are analogous to
other simple strategies for the IPD (which we have discussed in Chapter 3). For instance,
an always cooperate (ALLC) closed-loop strategy can be defined as
• In each fishing period, fish with effort F = ΠC(u).
A closed-loop version of always defect can be defined in a similar manner. It is also clear that
we could describe variations of the TFT strategy, such as suspicious tit-for-tat or generous
tit-for-tat.
Our closed-loop version of TFT can be applied to a slightly different game than that defined
earlier in this chapter. In particular, there are differences in the assumptions about the in-
formation available to each player. In the game as defined in Subsection 5.3.2, players have
perfect and complete information. At each point in time, each player can observe the value
of the state variable u by measuring the population levels. As they know the population
biomass at the start of a fishing period (implying that they know exactly the noise in the
stock-recruitment process in each year) and they know the yield they obtain during it, they
can indirectly measure the fishing effort chosen by the other player. As they know each
move of their opponent, the fisher has perfect information. If a fisher used the closed-loop
version of TFT in this game, they would be fully aware of whether their actual profits in
realisations of the game are due to environmental stochasticity, or due to the fishing efforts
of their opponents. A major motivation of this chapter (and this thesis as a whole) is to
investigate how uncertainty affects the optimal behaviour of fishers, and what this means
for both profits and fish populations. Consequently, we want to adapt our existing game to
a situation in which they cannot observe their opponent’s behaviour; they will therefore be
unable to tell if current population levels are due to noise in recruitment, or exploitation.
We define a slightly different game to evaluate our closed-loop TFT strategy, in order to
153
satisfy our information requirements. Where players need to choose an action based on
whether they believe their opponent has cooperated or defected, they must have uncertainty
about whether deviations from their expected payoffs are due to realisations of environmen-
tal noise, or due to their opponent playing an unknown strategy. In order to maintain this
uncertainty, each player must therefore have noise in their payoff function. We implement
this by assuming that players can observe stock levels at the end of each fishing period.
With their knowledge of population dynamics, they will therefore be able to determine the
expected population density at the beginning of the next fishing period. However, they do
not know what the discrepancy from this expected value is at any time, due to noise in re-
cruitment. In this imperfect information game, players use the expected population biomass
as the input to their fishing policy. This means that the actual action chosen by the fisher
will not necessarily be the optimal action at any given time, and the payoff they receive may
differ from their expected payoff. All other facets of the game, including players’ beliefs and
preferences remain this same in this version of the fishing game.
We use simulation to investigate the relative performance of our open-loop and closed-loop
strategies:
1. Population densities are initialised to a random biomass, for which the player knows
the expected value
2. Using the chosen strategy, a fishing effort F is selected according to the player’s beliefs
about the current population state, and their beliefs about their opponent’s previous
behaviour.
3. The player determines their beliefs about what their immediate reward (RC) will be
if their rival fishes with effort FC , and what it will be (RD) if their rival fishes with
effort FD. They use this to define a threshold profit R∗ = (RC +RD)/2.
4. The actual profit Ri for each player is calculated, using the actual population density
and the actual fishing effort used by each player.
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5. If Ri > R∗, player i believes that their rival cooperated in this iteration. If Ri < R∗,
player i believes that their rival defected in this iteration.
6. Population dynamics are calculated, with the players knowing the expected population
state in this next iteration.
7. Noise is added to the population biomass, and we return to step 2.
This process is repeated for a large number of iterations for each of our closed-loop strategies:
ALLC, ALLD, and TFT. Figure 5.5 compares the way in which each of our defined closed-
loop strategies performs for a single player, when recruitment noise ranges from σ = 0.01
to σ = 0.3. (a) shows the average profit per iteration. (b) shows the average fishing effort,
(c) the average yield, and (d) the percentage of iterations in which the player chooses to
cooperate by fishing according to the Pareto policy ΠC . In the low noise case σ = 0.01,
TFT performs identically to ALLC, gaining the same profit, and cooperating in 100% of
iterations. As noise increases to σ = 0.02, the average profit decreases slightly, with fishing
efforts and yield increasing above the corresponding ALLC level. Here cooperation occurs in
approximately 75% of iterations. Where σ = 0.05, profits for a TFT player decrease further
relative to the ALLC level. In fact, profits, efforts, and yields for a TFT player occur at
approximately midway between the ALLC and ALLD levels. Furthermore, a TFT player
will cooperate in 50% of iterations. For higher noise levels, the same relationship between
strategies holds as that of σ = 0.05.
5.5 Discussion
A two-player fishing game with discrete-time population dynamics was used throughout this
chapter. Initially, we considered a deterministic version of this game, in order to get a “base-
line” estimate of optimal fishing behaviour in the absence of noisy dynamics. The solution
method we used was not guaranteed to converge, and indeed did not for some parameter




Figure 5.5: The relative performance of the closed loop versions of TFT, always cooperate,
and always defect are shown here. Results shown are average values per iteration, and are
for levels of population noise ranging from σ = 0.01 to σ = 0.3. (a) shows the profit obtained
by an individual fisher when using each type of closed loop strategy, and is normalised to
the value of the Nash equilibrium in the lowest (σ = 0.01) noise case. (b) shows the fishing
efforts used. (c) is the average yield, and (d) shows the percentage of iterations in which
cooperation (fishing with the Pareto effort) occurs for each strategy profile. For each result,
r = 10, c = 0.5, and d = 0.9.
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not occur when the population growth rate was small. We note that two-player games do not
necessarily have a deterministic stationary equilibrium (Bowling and Veloso, 2000). However,
the symmetric structure of our game, with bounded state and actions spaces, as well as our
results from the single player version in Chapter 4, suggest that a stationary deterministic
solution may be obtainable, and so we still look for them. In fact, we saw in this chapter that
adding a small amount of noise to the game as stochasticity in the stock-recruitment process
resulted in convergence regardless of the parameters used. It is therefore likely that the lack
of convergence in the deterministic case is a result of numerical noise, potentially caused by
the discretisation process. As the number of iterations of the game increased, the effect of
this apparent numerical noise on the calculated policies also increased. With any amount
of population noise, transition probabilities between states come from a continuous distri-
bution rather than a Dirac-δ function, which we believe dampens the influence of numerical
noise on our calculations. It is possible that an alternative solution method, or an adapta-
tion of the current one, could determine a stationary optimal policy in more cases. However,
as it stands our model is limited by its non-guaranteed convergence in the deterministic case.
The major purpose of this chapter was to investigate how optimal fishing behaviour in a
two-player game changes with noisy dynamics. When the population growth rate was high,
we found that the strength of noise had no impact on the Nash equilibrium policies we found.
That is, for a given population state, the same level of effort was prescribed by the derived
optimal fishing policy, regardless of how noisy the dynamics were. When the population
growth rate was small, such that the population had slow dynamics, we found results similar
to the monopolist model. That is, as noise increases, the optimal fishing effort at each state
decreases. However, this reduction in the optimal fishing effort was in this case small, such
that even with slow dynamics there was only a small difference in optimal policies between
different noise levels. We associate the reduction in optimal policies with an indirect objec-
tive of protecting stock levels into the future such that they can be harvested. As population
noise increases, fish stocks become more variable, and so the probability of stocks collapsing
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also increases. We believe the introduction of competitive behaviour means that it is no
longer worthwhile, in terms of value, for a fisher to try and protect their future earnings in
a noisy environment, as their rival can both take advantage of those earnings by increasing
their own effort, and also through their actions push the stock towards collapse, so that
future earnings are not achievable in any case.
It is clear that regardless of the noise in the stock recruitment relationship, our closed-
loop version of TFT outperforms the Nash equilibrium (ALLD) with respect to the average
expected discounted profit obtained by a player using that strategy profile. We developed
this strategy heuristically by considering strategies known to be successful in an IPD, and do
not claim that it is a closed-loop equilibria of our Markov game. However, we recall that in
the case of an IPD, TFT is a self-enforcing strategy that is unable to be invaded by ALLD.
There are many possible closed-loop strategies (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), and it may
be the case that there are other (non-equilibria) closed-loop strategies that provide better




Fishers make lots of decisions when fishing: when to fish; what gear to use; what size and
species of fish to catch, and many more. Throughout this thesis we have used mathematical
modelling to investigate how the decisions made by fishers affect the fishery as a whole, and
when these decisions lead to cooperative and competitive behaviour. In Chapter 2, we mod-
elled the decisions about which size fish to catch, and whether or not to fish. In Chapters
3− 5 we modelled the decision by fishers about what the best fishing effort is.
In Chapter 2, we modelled a small-scale artisanal fishery in which there are many indi-
vidual people fishing. Despite the name, small-scale fisheries are responsible for a significant
proportion of worldwide employment in fishing sectors, and also in the production of fish for
human consumption (FAO, 2014). Descriptions of these types of fisheries vary significantly
depend on classification, but generally each individual fisher has a low capacity to fish, has
no control over the price they can sell their catch for (or the real value of the fish they and
their family eat) (Smith and Basurto, 2019). Fishers in small-scale fisheries make decisions
about factors such as the type of gear to use (for example, gillnets or trawls), the time spent
fishing, and whether to process the fish they catch (Lopes and Begossi, 2011). While the
prevailing image of small-scale fisheries is one of low technology in poor parts of the world
(FAO, 2014), small scale fisheries like the conch and lobster fishery in Turks and Caicos have
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been able to adapt to technological improvements, resulting in gear changes and increased
selectivity over time (Béné and Tewfik, 2001).
The model used in Chapter 2 was built on an existing model (Plank et al., 2016), which
was extended to all individual fishers to enter or exit the fishery, based on whether they
receive sufficient profits for fishing to be viable. A critical biomass yield was introduced as
a proxy for the profit obtained from fishing. In this model, the critical yield is the open-
access (bioeconomic equilibrium) solution of the Gordon-Schaefer model (Gordon, 1954).
Here there is a large number of fishers, and the total cost of fishing is equal to the total
revenue obtained from it. This means that the overall profit is zero accounting for the op-
portunity costs of fishing. These opportunity costs represent the minimum profit that will
keep individuals fishing, rather than convincing them to apply their efforts to other tasks.
On average, each fisher receives the minimum profit necessary to continue fishing. In fact,
because they obtain equal yields, each fisher in this model obtains equal profit. Empirical
evidence suggests that in small-scale fisheries, individual fishers are not always motivated
solely by profit, with choices about fishing behaviour being influenced by factors such as
community peer pressure, individual fishing skills, and effort reduction (Béné and Tewfik,
2001). However, our assumption in this model that fishers require a minimum profit is rea-
sonable; while individuals may not always act to maximise profit, for them to fish it must
still be individually beneficial in terms of satisfying food or income needs.
As in Plank et al. (2016), individual fishers were frequently allowed to change their fish-
ing behaviour. In the model, this was done by allowing each fisher to change their target
fish size. In reality, fishers do not have a perfect size-selectivity with respect to the fish they
actually catch, and will not have a free and instant ability to change their gear. For instance,
individual fishers may own only nets with specific mesh sizes, and may not be able to make
quickly new nets to target fish of a different size. On the other hand, aggregate fishing be-
haviour in small-scale fisheries such as on the Kenyan south coast has shown that diversified
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gear selection and fishing behaviours can result in fish being caught from a significant range
of the possible sizes of the target species (Tuda et al., 2016). Furthermore, in small-scale
fisheries in Brazil, it has been noted that fishers change their behaviour over time based on
their observations of the size of other fishers’ catches (Lopes and Begossi, 2011). Specifically,
when fishers see others with good catches on the previous day, it is suggested they interpret
this as an increased possibility of success on the next day. There is a corresponding increase
in risk-prone behaviour, which causes an increase in the variability of the yields obtained
(Lopes and Begossi, 2011). Our assumption that fishers will change their behaviour for the
chance of an increased yield, based on their beliefs about potential yields, therefore seems
reasonable.
In our model, it was found that regardless of the starting state of the fishery, the num-
ber of active fishers converged over time, to a value dependent on the critical yield. If the
critical yield is low, the number of fishers able to be economically sustained by the fishery
will be high, while if the required critical yield is high, a small number of fishers will continue
to fish. We assumed that there are no barriers to entry in the fishery, such that it has open-
access. This assumption may not be perfectly realistic, as there will likely be some costs or
time-lags associated with becoming a fisher. However, these costs are likely small compared
to the ongoing costs of fishing effort, and indeed if they were included would simply decrease
the rate at which individuals join or leave the fishery. As Plank et al. (2016) found similar
results for a fixed number of fishers, we do not envision that adding such costs will have a
qualitative effect on our results.
The pattern of aggregate size-selectivity at the stable state matched results found in Plank
et al. (2016). Fishing pressure was found to be high at body sizes where the productivity
of the fish population was high, with the size-selectivity and productivity becoming increas-
ingly proportional over a wide range of body sizes as the total fishing pressure increased.
This corresponds to a scenario of balanced harvesting, in which exploitation occurs in pro-
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portion to the natural production of the fish population. It is important to note that this
balanced harvesting was an emergent outcome of the model; individual fishers self-organised
in a manner to maximise their own individual yields, without being explicitly constrained
to harvest in a balanced manner.
The biomass spectrum of the exploited fish population had a flattened region over the body
sizes which were targeted by fishers. This means that no fisher is able to increase their own
mean yield by changing their own size-selectivity behaviour. We conclude that the resultant
fishing pattern is an approximate Nash equilibrium. In real terms, the results of this model
suggest that in an open-access small-scale fishery, fishers will independently make decisions
about their own way to fish (in terms of gear selection, effort, and time), in such a way that
they all get a similar catch. Furthermore, without any restrictions or top-down regulatory
controls on the fishery, the overall fishing patterns will be such that the there are minimal
negative side-effects on the marine ecosystem. This may seem on the surface to be a result
that is unlikely to have empirical backing, especially considering that the majority of fish-
eries worldwide, whether they are small-scale or industrial, are restricted by external controls
(Misund et al., 2002). However, there is some evidence which supports the predictions of
our model.
In the largely unrestricted fishery based in the Bangweulu swamps in Zambia, fish are har-
vested over a significant part of their body size range (from 10g to around 10kg), and have
been in a stable manner for 50 years (Kolding et al., 2003). Furthermore, in Lake Kariba,
(also in Zambia) the overall fishing behaviour in the artisanal fishery is based approximately
on natural productivity. Here it has been observed that the fish population has size struc-
ture that is close to the size-structure of an unexploited population of the same species, in a
different part of the same lake (Kolding and van Zwieten, 2011). Our results of approximate
balanced harvesting over a wide range of body sizes therefore seems feasible in an unstruc-
tured small-scale fishery, though further investigation and empirical backing will be required.
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This model used in Chapter 2 is useful for exploring the emergent outcomes resulting from
the aggregate behaviour of a large number of autonomous agents representing a small-scale
artisanal fishery. However, the size-structured ecological model that was used is complex,
as is the potential information set available to each of the many individual fishers. These
factors limit the potential insights the model can give into the possibility for cooperation
to arise between fishers. Hence in Chapter 3 we investigated a simpler model combining
population ecology and individual fishing behaviour, such that we could focus on insights
into the features of cooperation among fishers.
In Chapter 3, we developed a two-player game by well-known unstructured population mod-
els with a model of the economic value of fishing. We modelled a situation in which either
one or two fishers decide how much fishing effort to expend, for example by making decisions
about how many fishing boats they should use, at the beginning of a fishing season. They
make these decisions about effort in order to extract as much profit as possible from the fish-
ery. The decision about effort is based only on knowledge about the amount of fishing that
the stock can support in total. Understanding the decisions fishers make about their own
effort levels is possibly the most important behaviour about fishing to understand (Opaluch
and Bockstael, 1984), and is essential for the creation of sustainable fisheries management
strategies (Béné and Tewfik, 2001).
The models we used in Chapters 3 − 5 all relate to the choices made about fishing efforts
in monopolistic (one fisher) and duopolistic (two fisher) scenarios. A monopolistic scenario
might represent a situation where there is a single fishing company who has exclusive access
to a fish stock, or the entire fishing fleet of a country with strict regulatory controls such
that the overall fishing behaviour is highly managed. In a duopoly, there will be two such
entities each attempting to harvest the same fish stocks. In either case, the “individual”
fishers will in fact be made up of a large number of individual fishing boats and people, with
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their aggregate fishing behaviour following a specific pattern. In reality, individual people
on fishing boats (whether as part of a monopoly or duopoly) will have their own preferences
about how to fish (Béné and Tewfik, 2001), and there may be rulebreaking or deviations
from optimal behavior (Watson and Pauly, 2001; Bremner et al., 2009). Whether or not
the fishing regulations are followed is a different but related problem that is worth further
investigation. This is an issue of cooperative game theory, and as such would require a sig-
nificantly different modelling process. In this thesis, we have assumed in Chapters 3−5 that
any such regulations or high-level decisions about fishing are perfectly followed at all times,
so that idealized overall patterns of exploitation, and their implications, can be investigated.
In the model in Chapter 3, we restricted a continuous choice of possible actions to two
possible discrete values. FC was half the effort at which a monopolist (fisher with sole ac-
cess) would harvest in order to maximise profit. Two fishers each fishing at this level will
result in a socially optimal result, as they equally share high profits, and have a compara-
tively low level of total exploitation of the fishery. FD was the level of effort that maximises
a player’s profit in the next fishing period, with respect to their rival’s action. This action is
better in terms of the profit immediately gained by the fisher than all other possible effort
choices, based on the fisher’s beliefs about their competitor. A Nash equilibrium occurs
when both fishers use this behaviour.
At equilibrium, it was found that the symmetric two-player game with these two actions
was structurally equivalent to a Prisoners Dilemma. This result was resilient to the choice
of population model. As such, there is a Nash equilibrium, where both fishers “defect” by
fishing with FD, and a Pareto efficient outcome, where both players “cooperate” by fishing
with FC . It was found that the Pareto outcome not only resulted in greater payoffs for each
player, but also had a lower total fishing pressure, and as such a higher equilibrium popula-
tion density. This means that from an ecological as well as an economic point of view, the
Pareto result is preferable to the Nash equilibrium. This result for the two types of solutions
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is similar to that found by Levhari and Mirman (1980) in their model.
The model up to this point focused on which decisions to make in a single fishing period.
We then investigated a repeated version of the game, in which decisions about fishing effort
are made by each player at the beginning of each fishing period. This iterated game was
found to be an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) (Tadelis, 2013). Decisions about which
effort to choose in subsequent years may be based on the amount of fish caught in previous
years. This assumption about changing fishing behaviour based on the past seems reason-
able, as similar behaviour has been observed in both small-scale (Lopes and Begossi, 2011)
and industrial fisheries, including the New Zealand hoki fishery (Vignaux, 1996). While
fishers cannot directly observe their competitors, and do not have perfect information about
them, they can measure the amount of fish they personally catch. Their own yield, combined
with their beliefs about the way in which their opponent chooses to fish, allows a player the
opportunity to (indirectly) respond to the actions of the other player.
Each fisher can choose strategies, or rules that will select their fishing efforts in the fu-
ture, based on their beliefs about the actions of the other player. The relative profits from
choosing various strategies (including ALLC, ALLD, and TFT ) in the IPD were evaluated.
When fish populations are able to respond quickly to changes in fishing efforts, the results
of these well-known strategies correspond to their known performance in an IPD (Axelrod,
980a; Imhof et al., 2005).
Simulations were used to investigate the game for populations in which growth happens
on a slower timescale than players can change their fishing behaviour. With slower dynam-
ics, the relative performance of different strategy profiles changes. For example, with fast
dynamics, ALLD v TFT will result in continual defection by the TFT player, leading to the
Nash equilibrium, and suboptimal profits for each fisher. With slow dynamics the ALLD
player can exploit cooperation by the TFT player, resulting in higher relative payoffs. This
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effect occurs because players’ have imperfect information in this slow dynamics model, and
therefore cannot distinguish between variability in payoff due to population dynamics and
due to the actions of the other player.
Players’ beliefs about their rival’s actions are governed by whether they obtain a yield above
a threshold level. The threshold Y ∗ in this chapter differs in its economic implications from
that used in Chapter 2. It does not directly correspond to an economic equilibrium level
from the Gordon-Schaefer model. Instead, it represents fishers’ expectations. They have
uncertainty about actions due to a lack of information, rather than as explicit environmental
stochasticity as in Chapter 5. We note that the profit obtained when cooperating is half
of the monopolist profit, which is the MEY (maximum economic yield). The profit at the
Nash equilibrium when both players compete is greater than the open access solution of the
Gordon-Schaefer model, and occurs at a lower effort. The limit of this competitive result
when the number of players becomes large is the open access solution, representing a similar
type of fishery to that seen in Chapter 2, where anyone is free to exploit the fishery. As Y ∗ in
this chapter is always between the Pareto and Nash yields, the threshold Y ∗ in this chapter is
higher than the corresponding threshold in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we also considered a
Beverton-Holt population model, in which growth occurs discretely and instantly at regular
intervals, with harvesting happening continuously at a fixed level between these recruitment
events. Population dynamics and growth were also separated in this way in Chapters 4 and
5. With Beverton-Holt growth, we again found that the game with restricted efforts was an
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. This result was invariant to changes in parameter values.
The models used in Chapters 2 and 3 ignore the potential for stochasticity in population
dynamics. In reality, noise has a major effect on fish populations (Hjort, 1914; Doherty
and Williams, 1988), which can be highly variable in successive years. In Chapters 4 and
5 we therefore considered fish populations with noisy growth, based on the Beverton-Holt
population model we considered in Chapter 3.
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A stochastic optimisation model was used in Chapter 4 to find how the choice of fish-
ing effort can maximise profit for a monopolist. This was done for the exploitation of a
single-species with Beverton-Holt growth dynamics, in which there was noise in the stock-
recruitment relationship. The model used was a Markov decision process, which was solved
using a dynamic programming method to find optimal fishing policies (Puterman, 2014).
These are mappings from each possible level u to the fishing effort F which will maximise
the value of the fishery in its current state. When considering the value of the fishery, both
the immediate profit obtained from fishing with that effort, and the expected profits that
will be available in the future are taken into account. This means that this model allows
fishers to consider how their own actions (specifically how they choose to fish) will impact
fish stocks in the future. Hence fishers must make decisions about effort which consider the
trade-off between catching fish now, and leaving them to reproduce so that they can catch
more in the future. To do so, they take into account factors such as the relative value of
profit over time, and the likelihood of the population being in a specific state in the future,
using their knowledge of how the fish stocks change with time.
We focused on finding stationary optimal policies, which do not change with time, and
so are solutions to an infinite time horizon problem (Puterman, 2014). The optimal fishing
policies we found for this single-player, unstructured model have some consistent features,
regardless of parameter values. Below a certain population biomass, no fishing will occur.
This represents a minimum stock level at which a monopolist is willing to fish. When stocks
are low, the revenue per unit effort from fishing is small, and so fishing is not profitable.
Furthermore, if such a population is further depleted, it is increasingly likely to collapse
or go extinct (Jackson et al., 2001). Above this minimum value, the optimal fishing effort
increases with population biomass, meaning that the monopolist will choose to fish with
greater effort when population levels are high. We also note that stationary policies result in
lower rates of exploitation than the profit maximising behaviour in the final year of a finite
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time horizon problem . This is because optimal policies take into account the profits that
can be acquired from the fish stocks in the future, and so they value some preservation of
population abundances.
We also considered how the size of population noise changed the optimal fishing policies.
It was found that as the noise in the stock-recruitment relationship increased, the optimal
rate of fishing in a a given biomass state decreased. With greater noise, there is a higher
probability of the fish population going extinct in any single iteration. With a lower opti-
mal fishing effort, the population biomass will be less depleted in each fishing period, and
so it is less likely that the recruitment stochasticity will cause the population to die out.
Consequently lower fishing rates will occur with higher noise, in order to preserve the fish
population so that some value may be extracted from it in the future.
We are able to compare our results to similar approaches which also use MDPs to model
fishing by a monopolist. Mendelssohn (1980) used an unstructured Ricker stock-recruitment
model of fish population dynamics, in contrast to our approach using Beverton-Holt dy-
namics. Importantly, Mendelssohn aimed to maximise the yield obtained from the fishery.
As such, there were no costs of fishing, and so this approach can be considered to come
from an MSY standpoint rather than with a bioeconomic objective. The policies found in
Mendelssohn (1980) always aim to fish down to the biomass point which is the minimum
required for fishing. Our results also have such a biomass level, below which fishing will
not occur. However, our policies do not deplete population this much, instead having the
objective of fishing to a stock level above the minimum required for fishing. Mendelssohn
(1978) did consider a fish population with Beverton-Holt growth, but in an age-structured
case. Here the optimal fishing policy for each age group was obtained separately. Lane
(1989) used a variation of an MDP called a partially observable Markov decision process.
Unlike our model, in which interseasonal fishing decisions are made between iterations of
the stochastic process, Lane considered the decisions made during a single fishing period.
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These decisions were made not just about which effort to fish at but also the location where
to fish. A discrete number state space and action space was also used. Allowing variable
market prices of fish, Lane found that unit prices have a much more significant impact on
the decisions made by fishers than population abundances do. Lane also investigated the
effect of improved capacity for stock assessment; it was found that as assessments of stock
levels improve, the profits fishers receive also improve (Lane, 1989).
Chapter 5 used Markov games to model the exploitation of a fishery with stochastic dy-
namics by multiple players. The model was set up in a similar manner to the monopolist
Markov model in Chapter 4, but allowed for harvesting by two players with equal access,
like in Chapter 3. As before, each player in the duopoly model acts by choosing a fishing
effort. Optimal fishing policies were, as in Chapter 4, found by iterating backwards through
time. However, within each fishing period there was also iteration between the behaviour
chosen by each player, with best responses to the other’s strategy successively calculated
until players’ policies converged within the time period.
For certain parameter combinations, convergence to a stationary policy did not occur for
the deterministic two-player version of this model. This lack of convergence was likely due
to the impact of numerical noise on the decision problem. For parameter combinations in
which convergence did occur, the calculated optimal policies were qualitatively similar to the
monopolist version found in Chapter 4, in that there was a minimum biomass for fishing to
happen, and that the rate of fishing effort increased with the population level. With stochas-
tic dynamics, there was convergence to an optimal policy for all parameter combinations,
suggesting that these probabilistic transitions had a “smoothing” effect on the numerical
noise previously preventing convergence.
When the fish population had fast dynamics, it was found that the strength of the noise
in the stock-recruitment relationship had no effect on the optimal policy; for any variance
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value (with other parameters fixed) the same stationary policy was found. When growth
dynamics were slow, we saw results that qualitatively agreed with those from the monopolist
model in Chapter 4. The noise level had a direct effect on optimal fishing behaviour, with
more noise in the recruitment relationship corresponding to lower optimal fishing efforts at
each level of population biomass. However, the strength of this relationship was weaker than
in the monopolist model, with there only being a slight decrease in the optimal fishing effort
as noise increased from a low level to a high one.
We put forward a possible hypothesis for the difference between the monopolist and two-
player results; competition between rival fishers mitigates the ecologically protective be-
haviour seen with a monopolist. The potential gains, in terms of expected higher future
stock levels than can be harvested in the future, will not with certainty go to a fisher who
decides to fish less heavily in the immediate term. Instead, their rival could simply fish more
in the present term in order to take advantage of the instantaneous profits. With our model
formulation, fishers value both guaranteed profits now, and the chance for possible profits
in the future. An outcome of the model is that it appears they value the immediate return
more in the two-player case.
Fish populations with fast dynamics are replenished quickly after exploitation. This means
that high fishing efforts are feasible, as long as the costs incurred are not too great. With
heavy exploitation, as long as the fish stock is not exploited to the point of collapse, strong
recruitment will mean that stock levels will quickly recover. However, it has been seen that
fast growing fish populations are the most at risk of ecological collapse (Pinsky and Byler,
2015). Further investigation will be required, potentially by considering variable or size-
specific growth rates. It also be worth investigating how growth rates affect the relative
size of MEY, MSY, and unsustainable yields which will lead to population collapse, in more
detailed population models.
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The optimal policies we found in Chapter 5 were open-loop solutions of the Markov game.
Open-loop solutions of the game in which only the state of the fishery at the current point
in time are taken into account (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). For example, this might mean
that at the beginning of the entire fishing process, a player decides that they will follow a
specific pattern of fishing effort based on the stock level at a given time. This pattern will
not change over time, regardless of how the other player chooses to fish. These differ from
closed-loop strategies, with which players are able to take into account the entire history
of fishing (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), and so can change their behaviour at any time in
response to the fishing effort used by the other player. For example, in any fishing period
they might fish in a certain way if they believe their opponent had a high effort during the
previous period, and fish in a completely different way if they believe their opponent fished
with low effort previously.
Influenced by the strategies used in the IPD in Chapter 3, we also developed some closed-loop
strategies for this Markov game. Note that these closed-loop strategies are not equilibria
of the game; instead we wish to evaluate how more complicated strategies, motivated by
existing game theory knowledge, compare to the open-loop solutions in terms of profits and
population levels. The main strategy of interest was a closed-loop version of TFT. As in
Chapter 3, we used a threshold yield to determine players’ beliefs about whether their rival
cooperated or defected in the previous stage-game. In economic terms, this is the same as in
Chapter 3, being midway between the yield obtained at MEY and the yield from the Nash
equilibrium. The difference in this chapter is that the players’ expectations of yields are not
just based on population equilibria; instead they vary over iterations with the current state
of the population.
The reason for players’ uncertainty about their rivals actions also differs between these chap-
ters. In Chapter 3, this was because of a lack of information about population dynamics. In
Chapter 5, it is because of being unaware of the actual realizations of environmental noise.
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We compared the average payoff in each iteration when using TFT to the profits when using
both the Pareto (half the monopolist) policy, and the Nash equilibrium (open-loop equi-
librium) policy. It was found that for low levels of noise, tit-for-tat performed identically
to the Pareto policy, while for higher levels of noise tit-for-tat had a lower average payoff
than the Pareto policy, but a higher average payoff than the Nash policy. Consequently our
closed loop tit-for-tat strategy resulted in higher average profits (at all noise levels) than the
open-loop equilibrium.
The assumptions we have made about our Markov game can be compared to assumptions
made in similar models, with the types of solutions obtained also able to be compared.
Martin-Herran and Rincón-Zapatero (2005) looked for solutions of a continuous-time fishery
game that are both Nash equilibria and Pareto efficient. In contrast, we developed Pareto
efficient solutions to our game using a monopolist model in Chapter 4, and find Nash equi-
libria separately in our two-player model. We were however able to compare our Pareto
efficient policies to our Nash equilibria, and find that they are typically not the same. Con-
sequently, our results differed in form from those of Martin-Herran and Rincón-Zapatero
(2005). A sequential game, in which players take turns to make decisions about fishing at
different times was used by Martin-Herran and Rincón-Zapatero (2005). Here, an economic
model similar to ours was used, while the information sets of the fishers are asymmetric.
Consequently Martin-Herran and Rincón-Zapatero (2005) found different optimal policies
for different fishers, unlike our symmetric results. Optimal control methods are used to solve
this problem.
The models we have used in Chapters 2 − 5 were for a single fish species. Real marine
communities have many interacting species, with both conspecific and interspecific preda-
tion occurring. Multi-species size spectrum models have been developed (Law et al., 2016),
and could be coupled with an individual-based fishing model in which both different target
sizes and target species are allowed. Our current fishing model has a fixed fishing effort for
172
each individual fisher, which may not be a realistic assumption. However, by allowing the
number of fishers to change, the total fishing pressure is still variable, and so we would expect
that this assumption does not have a significant effect on the aggregate fishing behaviour.
We also assumed that there are no barriers to entry or exit of the fishery (whether costs, or
lead times.) This is unlikely, but additional costs of this type would simply reduce the rate
at which the number of fishers changes. As we have seen in earlier results that with a fixed
number of fishers the emergent balanced harvesting outcome still happens this assumption
seems reasonable.
In Chapter 3, the fast dynamics case was based on the assumption that the fish popula-
tion would quickly reach equilibrium under a fixed level of fishing effort, relative to the rate
at which fishers are able to change their fishing effort. In reality, many fish species, including
some which are of high economic value such as orange roughy (Hoplostethus atlanticus),
have slow growth rates (Clark, 2001). It is therefore unlikely that fish stocks of these low
productivity species will indeed reach equilibrium quickly, especially when compared to the
time scales on which fishers would be able to alter their gear or fishing behaviours. The slow
dynamics case possibly exemplifies a more realistic scenario for low productivity fish species.
In our simulations of this model, decisions about fishing efforts were made based on the yield
obtained by each fisher (as a proxy for profit). The yield obtained in each time period was
used as an indicator of whether the rival player had cooperated or defected. This allowed
the use of well known game-theoretic strategies such as TFT (Axelrod, 1987).
The beliefs about which yields should be obtained in specific situations were based on the
corresponding fast dynamics equilibria. With slower dynamics, populations will replenish
less quickly, and so yields (and profits) should be lower than with fast dynamics. In this
chapter, we were aiming to gain understanding of how a fisher’s uncertainty about their
environment, in terms of population dynamics and other fishers’ behaviour, could alter their
decisions about fishing. Consequently, while the specific beliefs the individuals have about
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expected profits are not necessarily correct in the slow dynamics case, this is representative
of fishers not having perfect information about their environment.
In our two-player prisoner’s dilemma models, we restricted the actions of each player to
a choice between two effort levels. These levels represented complete cooperation, where the
maximum economic yield (i.e. the Monopolist profit) is shared equally between the players,
and complete competition (the Nash equilibrium), in which each individual fisher chooses the
effort that will maximise their profit with respect to the other fisher’s effort. The Nash equi-
librium effort strictly dominates all other choices of effort in a single-shot prisoner’ dilemma,
in that whatever action Player i chooses, Player j can increase their own payoff by moving
effort towards the Nash level. In reality, a fisher is able to aim for any number of levels of
fishing effort, as the combination of a number of inputs include the time spent fishing, the
amount of boat-trips taken, and the number of nets used.
Because of the uncertainty in fish stock estimates, parameter values representing popula-
tions are unlikely to be perfectly known, and indeed population models do not perfectly
represent real fish populations. As such, fishers may not exactly know the fishing effort that
leads to the Pareto efficient and Nash equilibria. Moreover, these idealised results are based
on equilibrium assumptions that may not hold up to scrutiny in real life fisheries (Larkin,
1977). However, it is reasonable to assume that fishers are aware there is a level of effort
where if all fishers cooperate and fish at, population abundances and profits will be high, but
that there is a higher level of effort which in the short term will result in increased profits
to the fisher who takes advantage of the increased yield, if no other fishers deviate from the
cooperative level. This is the essential information that is captured in our restriction to two
actions; the outcomes themselves do not need to be optimal in terms of maximising available
profit, as long as this trade-off between cooperating, and defecting for short-term profit is
captured by the model.
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We have also assumed that the two fishers are perfectly symmetric, with identical costs
of fishing, and identical preferences and information. If that was not the case, the levels of
effort for each solution to the prisoner’s dilemma games would not be symmetric, and so
different fishers could exhibit different behaviour in certain situations. For example, fish-
ers may not have the same expectations of profit, and so there may be different levels at
which slow population dynamics cause one fisher to believe that defection from the Pareto
frontier has occurred. Furthermore, we have assumed that all fish are perfectly and equally
catchable, with there being no spatial variation in fish population density, and no effect of
population depletion on the ability to catch fish. Setting a “fixed” level of fishing effort will
not in actuality translate to a guaranteed yield for an individual fisher.
In the stochastic population model used in Chapter 4, all noise was incorporated discretely
into the stock-recruitment relationship. We could have included an additional continuous
source of noise, affecting the population dynamics during harvesting. This would be able
to represent sources of stochasticity with temporal effects, such as seasonal variations in
population catchability or fishing patterns. Furthermore, the existing noise in recruitment
is density-independent. It is possible that the actual population level has an effect not only
on the expected population size in the next time period, but also in the variability in re-
cruitment. A multiplicative noise term in the population model would be able to represent
this type of variation. The MDP used to obtain optimal fishing policies for the stochastic
population was solved under the assumption of an infinite time horizon, with constant pa-
rameter values. This implies that the population does not characteristically change between
time periods of the stochastic process; there are no long-term impacts of exploitation or any
time dependence on population dynamics.
It is also possible that fishing regimes could change over time. This could include new
entrants to the fishery, in which there is no longer sole access to the fish stock. In this
case, our Markov game model would be appropriate to use. In fact, the results from the
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monopolist model are still used to determine the Pareto frontier in the Markov game model,
and so are still of use when applied to fisheries in which there are shared stocks. It is also
possible that there are changes in the costs of fishing or the price of fish over time. This could
be included in the stochastic model by allowing time-dependent parameter values. For the
current formulation of our MDP model, with bounded state and action spaces, a solution (a
stationary optimal policy) is guaranteed to exist, but is not guaranteed to be unique. There
could therefore be other policies which are of the same value to the sole fisher. On the other
hand, Markov games will not necessarily have a stationary solution.
The Markov games in Chapter 5 were solved by finding open-loop equilibria rather than
closed-loop. The space of closed-loop strategies is much larger, but finding closed-loop equi-
libria is comparatively difficult (Puterman, 2014). We were however able to define a simple
closed-loop strategy based on TFT that performed better than the open-loop equilibrium
that we did calculate. While not derived as a profit-maximising equilibrium strategy, this
closed-loop TFT resulted in a higher average profit per fishing period than the open-loop
Nash solution, for every level of noise in the population dynamics. This result suggests
that further investigation of closed-loop strategies could be worthwhile for this problem,
and that the use of strategies motivated by results from Chapter 3 is a reasonable starting
point. Adaptations of TFT, such as STFT and GTFT may be considered. A potentially
worthwhile extension to this model would be to allow mixed strategies (which includes the
aforementioned GTFT ), where the optimal action in each state is taken from a probability
distribution, rather than from a deterministic mapping. A possible alternative approach
would be to look for cyclic equilibria; these solutions are not stationary, but satisfy the con-
dition for an equilibrium in that there is no benefit for a player to unilaterally deviate from
it (Zinkevich et al., 2006). Cyclic equilibria are a set of stationary policies which are strictly
cycled through (Zinkevich et al., 2006). Another valuable extension would be to include
some size-structure in the population model. While this would not necessarily need to be a
full size-spectrum model like in Chapter 2, allowing fishers to target individual fish of dif-
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ferent sizes at different rates would add some biological complexity to the model, and would
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